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1 Understanding labour migration trajectories
I tread European ground, my feet sculpted and marked by African
earth. One step after another, it’s the same movement all humans
make, all over the planet. Yet I know my western walk has noth-
ing in common with the one that took me through the alleys, over
the beaches, paths and fields of my native land. People walk
everywhere, but never towards the same horizon. In Africa, I
followed in destiny’s wake, between chance and infinite hopeful-
ness. In Europe, I walk down the long tunnel of efficiency that
leads to well-defined goals. (Diome 2006: 3)
Labour migration is as old as humanity, an ageless human strategy to
improve life. It is a manifestation of imbalances between parts of the
world as well as an expression of links between them; major popula-
tion movements at different episodes have shaped the world as we
know it today. Many of the world’s estimated 175 million migrants
(IOM 2005) are people searching for improved economic opportunities
abroad: they travel in search of work, a higher wage, or simply the
chance for a better life – and there is no reason to expect this tendency
to diminish in the near future. This panorama is one of diversity, com-
plexity and new tendencies of international migration, and therefore
impossible to stereotype or interpret simplistically. In the fortunate
cases, the migrant belongs to the top layers of the international labour
market, moving around between the major global cities, with well-paid
employment contracts. However, a large group of migrants do not fit
these profiles: they were not invited; their skills are limited or not
recognised; they face difficulties finding a job, or have to accept inferior
working conditions in order to make a living.
This topic caught my attention when a Senegalese family had tried
to involve me in the migration plans for their oldest son, and when I
was visiting him later, after he came over as a migrant worker in
Europe. He and his friends drew their motivation from the example of
‘the lucky ones’ who manage to support their family with money from
paradise; this conflicted with my knowledge as a sociologist, aware of
the difficulties in European labour markets. I was left wondering how
they do it: how do they manage to organise a life on unwelcoming
territory? My initial interest lay in the labour dimension, but as the
research evolved, I realised other areas of life had to be taken into
account. Fatou Diome’s illustrative novel about a Senegalese migrant
woman in France provided me with the quote above, which para-
phrases the journey of African migrants in Europe. This curiosity
about West African labour migrant trajectories lays at the basis of this
study, and forms its main topic.
The arrival of considerable numbers of migrant workers in European
societies during the last couple of decades has raised a number of chal-
lenges for the individuals involved, as well as for the host societies.
Taken together the group of migrants constitutes only 3 per cent of the
world population, and those coming to western countries form a min-
ority, but they attract attention that is disproportionate to their num-
bers. Labour migration has, in the 21st century, moved to the top of the
policy agendas of many countries: debates about the ‘migration crisis’
have affected politics, public opinion, media, academia and society as a
whole for the last decade (Schierup 2006). Stalker (2003) explains this
by pointing at how labour migration confronts us with fundamental
and hard questions about our society: about solidarity in and between
countries, about identity and culture, about political status and moral
duties (Sayad 1993). The number of conferences, publications and
meetings is rife; labour unions, employers’ organisations, government
officials and journalists launch communications and initiatives; inter-
national organisations like the UN, the OECD, the ILO, the EU and
the IOM coordinate activities in countries of origin, transit and destina-
tion. This reflects the shift in emphasis of the international debate on
labour migration from its narrow focus on asylum seekers and refu-
gees to a more broad-based view of linkages among migration, globali-
sation and development and sharing of benefits by both receiving and
sending countries.
As both the receiving societies and the migration flows themselves
evolve, it seems clear that the social and economic processes by which
immigrants are received and incorporated will change as well. Under-
standing these processes will be important: the rapid changes have far-
reaching implications for how new immigrants can gain a place in the
economic and social life of their host countries. They are also signifi-
cant for certain geographical areas where concentration of immigrants
becomes a key factor in social transformation. In what follows, the ‘de-
pendent variable’ of this study will be outlined: employment patterns
and coping strategies of newly arrived migrants in host societies. The
research question will be narrowed down and formulated, and some
fundamental choices in the research design will be explained.
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1.1 The research question: Understanding trajectories
Our knowledge of how recent immigrants manage to organise their
lives and find their way in the complex labour markets is rather lim-
ited; there is a serious lack of insight in the nature and structure of the
complexities of survival strategies and settlement. In this research I
want to gain a better understanding of the trajectories of newly arrived
low-skilled labour migrants in Europe: how they perceive and maxi-
mise their chances and what determines their decisions and strategies.
Given that economic immigrants come in search of a better life, and
that the context in which they arrive does not automatically provide
them with the means to achieve that, how do they develop strategies to
realise their goal? What kind of life-course patterns can be identified?
How do they change over time?
In terms of trajectories, the only scenario that underlies most cur-
rent appraisals of migration processes dates back to Piore (1979). He
suggests that the transition from temporary migrant to permanent set-
tler consists of several stages: initially, migrants behave like purely eco-
nomic beings divorced from their social settings. They work for long
hours in poor conditions, avoiding leisure and social contacts that may
hinder the accumulation of funds and therefore their return aspira-
tions. This initial commitment, however, cannot be sustained for long
periods: as the need for companionship and community grows, the mi-
grants work fewer hours, socialise more, send less money home and
have to stay longer to reach their economic goals. Gradually, the mi-
grants establish households in receiving places; a resident community
grows with new social structures and new generations that may share
the aspirations of native residents. According to Piore, those who settle
permanently in these enclaves are concerned with upward mobility, job
stability and their future in the receiving places.
However, this seems to be a rather individualistic appraisal of the
process of settlement. De Lourdes Villar (1990) criticises this overly
adaptationist framework in which migrants take advantage of the
opportunities and cope with the constraints imposed by life in places
of settlement, resulting in necessarily progressive accommodation. She
stresses the role of adverse economic factors and new circumstances in
pressing migrants to modify traditional behaviours and attitudes, while
at the same time curtailing the migrants’ potential to accumulate
resources. In order to understand the possibilities and constraints they
encounter over their trajectory as labour migrant, their micro-level
individual decisions should be put in a broader perspective about the
functioning of labour markets and states. The structural context will be
fundamental to my research project.
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Several studies have investigated how recently arrived migrants man-
age to survive in large cities. The first were published in the US
(Briggs 1984; Chavez 1992; Chiswick 1984; Cornelius 1982); later, the
topic saw a greater impetus in Europe as well (Engbersen 1995; Leman
1997; Leman et al. 1994; Tarrius 1992). These studies revealed a huge
diversity and heterogeneity in groups of undocumented migrants in
terms of their origins, the way in which they enter the country, their
work and the structure of their family life. In general, the early years
were characterised by case studies of particular migrant groups rather
than generalisations for abstract theorising. Immigration was studied
from an anthropological micro perspective, or as statistics in a macro-
economic framework, but little attention was paid to the strategies
themselves. Later studies have tried to put migration in its wider per-
spective, ‘from geopolitics to micro politics’, as in the study of Knights
about Bangladeshi immigrants in Italy (1996). She includes the
change of government in Bangladesh, the Italian legislation, the open-
ing of Eastern Europe as a migration route, as well as the mechanisms
of immigration, migration sponsorship, connections to Italian political
groups and clientelistic relationships within the community. The
Dutch in depth field study ‘The Unknown City’ is also proof of a com-
prehensive vision (Burgers & Engbersen 1999).
From these studies of migrants’ experiences in the labour market
and the ‘gaps’ they leave, the main points of attention for my research
project will be discussed below. The trajectories of newly arriving mi-
grants are the central topic, and form the ‘dependent’ variable. In order
to study them, a number of fundamental choices were made from the
start. The first is situated at the macro-level where I will look at politi-
cal and economic opportunity structures and compare them between
countries. Second, at the micro-level, is the choice of a model based on
individual agency. Last is a focus on mobility in its widest sense,
including legal categories, geography, as well as employment.
The macro-context: Labour market and state
The trajectory of an immigrant depends of course on individual charac-
teristics, such as educational background or professional experience,
but here I opt for a more structural approach. In her discussion of 200
years of migration in Europe, Sassen argues that international migra-
tions are produced, they are patterned, and they are embedded in speci-
fic historical phases; this is why one should look at larger social, eco-
nomic and political structures (Sassen 1999: 155). The socio-economic
position of immigrants and the dynamics in their labour market posi-
tion, their prospects with respect to their original goal, can only prop-
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erly be understood by taking into account the socio-economic and poli-
tico-institutional environment of the country of settlement.
A first element is economic in nature: when trying to understand
the place and position migrants are most likely to occupy in the host
countries, an insight into the very dynamics of the labour market in
which migrants arrive is crucial. In the post-war guestworker age of
migration a specific balance between economic mode of production
and migration existed. Drastic changes in the relationship between eco-
nomic structures and their demographic bases have made the relation-
ship between newly arriving migrant populations and the urban labour
markets central to research and policy. Therefore, the realities of a
changing post-industrial labour market should be analysed, with spe-
cial attention to the built-in demand for immigrant labour. However,
the migration flows also require responses from the state, stressing a
second structural factor. The ways in which political bodies have tried
to regulate and influence these market tendencies constitutes another
theme, although it is difficult to separate between state and labour mar-
ket dynamics. The state influences the labour market through regulat-
ing the principle cornerstones of entrance, retirement and paid ab-
sence; it also sets the conditions for migration, by allowing certain cate-
gories to enter the country, by attributing them with certain rights, and
by controlling the territory.
These macro-scale structural factors result in a set of opportunities
influencing the newly arrived migrants’ mobility in the labour market:
they offer a set of legitimate and illegitimate opportunities. A frame-
work of ‘independent variables’ building on the interaction between
the state, the labour market and migration will be developed in the
next chapter. In order to highlight the importance of the labour market
as well as the state, several authors have called for more explicitly com-
parative research on immigration in different countries and systems,
testing explanations comparatively across nations and migratory sys-
tems to determine which ones prevail under what circumstances and
why (Massey & Taylor 2004; Portes 1997; Reitz 2002).
The micro-level: Agency
Both the methodological individualism of neo-classical approaches and
the legal positivism of state actors have ignored the agency of migrants
and their families in different fields of reality; another tendency is to
victimise migrants, seeing them merely as passive recipients of the
macro-influences. Here, they are considered to be partly producers of
their own process, with the capacity to mobilise resources, activate
options and create or broaden their own spaces of control, be it in an
arena that they do not have power over, where choices are limited by a
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range of factors including migration regimes, social networks and
personal characteristics. These factors are not taken into account in a
traditional neo-classic approach; the actor perspective used in this book
will go beyond that of homo economicus, rationally looking for profit
maximisation; those involved in the migration experience have other
wishes and fears as well.
Although Giddens (1993) has not been able to overcome completely
the dualisms of subject and object, agency and structure and structure
and process (Cohen 1989; 1991), his structuration theory offers insights
and tools to link individual lives with structural forces. Structure is not
external to individual lives; structural properties are both the medium
and the outcome of the practices they organise. Actions should be stu-
died and analysed in their situated contexts, showing how they sustain
and reproduce structural relations without falling into the functionalis-
tic trap. There are no mechanical forces that guarantee the reproduc-
tion of a social system from day to day or from generation to genera-
tion, but all social life is generated in and through social praxis. In this
sense, structure is internal, embodied; but it also stretches away in time
and space, beyond the control of any individual actors. Through this ap-
proach, both structure and agency can be included in the analysis. The
concept of strategy, for example, is used here to steer a course between
giving individuals a sense of agency whilst at the same time retaining a
sense of the contextual constraints that shape their lives. It refers to
more or less rational principles which authors can articulate and de-
scribe, and which form general prescriptions for goal-oriented actions.1
The dynamic dimension: Time and space
Unlike the mobility that lies at the origin of their status as migrants,
attention to processes of immigrants’ dynamics in destination coun-
tries has been very limited in the geographical and sociological litera-
ture, which is characterised by a static perspective on the position of
newly arrived migrants. Time and places, and changes in both dimen-
sions, are not often taken into account (Leman 1997; Pe´rez 1995).
Though both geographical and socio-economic mobility have been
shown to be key concepts for immigrants to optimise their opportu-
nities, this topic has not been extensively covered. Migrants move
across space (looking for job opportunities in different seasons in
different areas), but also across sectors and even across countries, im-
proving their opportunities and blurring academic categories (Knights
1996). In a labour market where their competitive advantages lie lar-
gely in their flexibility, in an administrative context that makes it diffi-
cult to obtain or maintain work permits, the existing dichotomies of
legal versus illegal residence status, and formal versus informal sector
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employment, are blurred. Within the category of undocumented immi-
grants, for instance, different degrees of exclusion exist: some are semi-
integrated and others live a marginal and isolated existence (Chavez
1992); the movement between these categories by newly arrived mi-
grants has been shown clearly but has not been analysed so far (Massey
et al. 1998; Mendoza 1998). Traditional clear-cut definitions of status
and work need considerable rethinking to capture the complexity, pre-
cariousness and volatility of migrant lives; their movements between ex-
isting categories may show relevant dynamics and need therefore closer
examination (Kloosterman et al. 1999).
Recently, a wider pledge for a ‘new mobility’ paradigm has been
launched: the movement of people, information and materials that was
largely ignored or trivialised in social sciences should be more closely
studied (Sheller & Urry 2006). Some empirical work has started to be
developed (Gogia 2006). Recently, Schuster has made a first attempt,
in distinguishing between ‘status’ mobility – how and why migrants
move across categories such as documented vs. undocumented mi-
grant, labour migrant, family member, asylum-seeker or refugee; and
geographic mobility – which factors cause some migrants to move and
move again, from one country to another and within countries. She
shows convincingly how these are key questions in the daily lives of
immigrants (Schuster 2005).
The resulting key questions
Based on these initial considerations, the research question can be nar-
rowed down into a set of subquestions. From an original focus on
labour market experiences, the research has evolved to a wider perspec-
tive on other dimensions of life. From both the theoretical framework
and the interviews, it became clear that housing, social networks and
legal status should be taken into account in order to explain possibilities
and strategies on the labour market. The study has hence evolved
towards a more integrated narrative on migratory experiences, although
the central concern remains with employment.
The main question is therefore:
– How do newly arrived uninvited labour migrants find a place in
European urban labour markets? How do they get by?
A set of subquestions can be derived from the points of attention out-
lined above:
– How does the employment situation of migrants develop over time?
How can we modify the often static perspective? Can we distinguish
certain phases in immigrant trajectories? How do these relate to
Piore’s three-phase model?
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– How do other dimensions of life as an immigrant change over
time? What is the role of social support systems, the legal context,
the relationship with home and integration schemes? Is there a cer-
tain mobility in terms of geography, legal status, improvement of
economic conditions?
– How is this trajectory influenced by structural forces such as the
needs of the labour market and the state that regulates migration?
How does this balance of possibilities and constraints change and
evolve in different contexts? As a result, is the migratory experience
different in different countries?
– Is the life-course methodology an appropriate instrument to exam-
ine the relationship between the agency of individual actors and
structural factors? Is it a good tool to map various forms of mobi-
lity?
1.2 Research design
In order to answer these questions a research design was elaborated,
which will be outlined and explained below. However, rather than test-
ing very specific hypotheses, or measuring outcomes, this study sets
out to understand and explain migration dynamics and the variety of
mechanisms that are involved. The aim is to see how immigrants cope
with conditions at their destination and develop strategies to reach
their goal; this implies that individual respondents occupy a central
place in the research.
The aim is to reconstruct trajectories over time, to gain an insight
into the transitions and choices made by immigrants, and to explore
their decisions and motivations within a specific economic and political
opportunity structure. The focus on socio-economic and politico-
institutional elements inspired the choice for a comparative approach;
because of the attention to dynamics over time, a qualitative life-course
model was chosen. The migrant group studied are West African immi-
grants; the particular contexts are Barcelona (Spain) and Antwerp
(Belgium) with the explicit aim of comparing them. All these elements
will be expanded upon below.
Qualitative life-course interviews
As past events and present thoughts and intentions cannot be ob-
served, the answers to the research question cannot be found in exist-
ing statistics. In addition, parts of the group are not included in regular
statistics due to their undocumented residence status; others because
of the informal character of their employment activities. Motivations
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and reasons behind decisions cannot be questioned in a survey, push-
ing us in the direction of qualitative research. Nor is a random survey
a possibility, for the targeted group is not represented in administrative
databases. Even more important, we could argue that giving out a ques-
tionnaire to people living in jurisdictional, social and economic insecur-
ity would not permit the collection of the pertinent information (Adam
et al. 2001). Therefore, knowledge has to be based on small-scale
studies of selected groups (Engbersen et al. 1999; Mendoza 1998).
Particularly for the undocumented migrants that I want to include in
the sample, or for the periods in which now regularised workers were
illegal, we need to rely on retrospective interviews.
The life-course methodology suits the research questions very well,
given that it takes into account changes over time, and employment
mobility as well as geographical or administrative shifts of situation. It
also corresponds with Giddens’ structuration theory (1993), inspiring
me to make a strong case for recognising the participants in this study
as knowledgeable agents, who can describe what they do and their
reasons for doing it with a complexity that often remains completely
unexplored in standardised survey approaches. Therefore, evidence
from qualitative life-course interviews will be used to get a greater
depth of understanding of the strategies of new migrants, and will
generate new questions.
The comparative case study
Next to stressing agency, Giddens (1993: 297) puts strong emphasis on
the study of the context of behaviour; respondents are mostly geared to
the flow of day-to-day conduct, while day-to-day life is also part of the
reproduction of institutionalised practices:
in moving from the analysis of strategic conduct to a recognition
of the duality of structure, we have to begin to ‘thread outwards’
in time and space. That is to say, we have to try to see how the
practices followed in a given range of contexts are embedded in
wider reaches of time and space – in brief, we have to attempt
to discover their relation to institutionalised practices.
As I want to show the political and economic context for understanding
immigrant adaptation and integration in the labour market, I choose a
comparative research design. It is based on the case study of a single
relatively homogeneous group of immigrants in two different cities and
countries (Burgess et al. 1994). The case studies provide an opportunity
to explore differences between individual life paths as well as collective
patterns, put in the context of cross-sectional material. I cannot put it
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better than Reitz (2002: 1011) when he outlines the need for compara-
tive research, but also mentions ‘the complexity involved’, saying:
Most research focused on a single setting. Rather than compar-
ing the impact of different structures, the tendency has been to
compare immigrants located differently within the same struc-
ture, as well as comparing labor market segments within a given
setting (...) However, the research served primarily descriptive
purposes because of the uncertain explanatory power of labor
market structure, beyond the simpler concepts of discrimination
and human capital. In a comparative context, the analytic oppor-
tunities increase, but so does the complexity. It is very meaning-
ful to ask whether different labour market structures might lead
to different outcomes and, if so, what those differences might be.
The answer, however, must take account of two major issues.
First, labor markets vary along several dimensions, including not
only the size of immigrant segments and niches, but also overall
employment regimes and industrial relations processes, earnings
dispersions, gender inequalities, career structures and unemploy-
ment rates. Because these dimensions are frequently interrelated,
the comparative perspective requires that they be considered
together and in terms of their joint impact. Second, labor mar-
kets also are interrelated with other institutions of society, includ-
ing education, the welfare state, and even immigration policy.
In Europe, there is varied experience with migration and illegal forms
of employment, and covering them all would be impossible. First, com-
paring more communities in one setting would highlight the differ-
ences based on the migration motive, culture or national background,
while looking at people from the same group of origin in two settings
allows highlighting structural mechanisms of the context. In addition,
as Soenen (2003) mentions, detailed information about a group’s mi-
gration and labour market opportunities is never complete nor at free
cost. This means that it would be difficult to develop a satisfactory
degree of familiarity with a sample consisting of people from very dif-
ferent origins, each to some extent different in recruitment strategies
for migration, ways of entering the country and specialised labour cir-
cuits. Second, because the type of analyses proposed implies a good
knowledge of the local language and good working relationships with
public authorities and other local actors, and due to limited time and
resources, just two countries will be compared. This has the advantages
of ethnographic richness, as there still can be an adequate familiarity
to allow a satisfactory in-depth knowledge of the cases. At the same
time, two cases allow us to get a first idea of diversity, and can generate
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to some extent results that might clarify a bigger picture of life as a
newly arrived migrant.
However, international comparative policy research is a very compli-
cated thing to do, and the ways to go about it have their own merits
and problems. The extent to which we can control variation in case stu-
dies is limited: ‘The only way to sustain the view that our cases differ
in only a few dimensions is either to know very little about the cases or
to willingly disregard most of what we do know’ (Bryman & Burgess
1994:34). Rather than trying to argue that our cases represent unique
cases or represent dominant groups (Beauregard 2003), it is the fact
that they are just one of many ethnic communities having established
themselves in just two of many ordinary cities in the last decades that
makes them important. Studying them can therefore shed a light on
processes that are shared by other immigrant groups in different
countries.
Research population
The population will consist of immigrants from West Africa, more spe-
cifically from Senegal and Gambia. This choice is motivated by the
continuing growth of migration from Africa to Europe in the last
twenty years (Castles & Miller 1993): West Africans constitute an im-
portant part of the new migration flows into Europe of which little is
known (Kaplan 1998; Leman 1997; Mendoza 1997). They also corre-
spond to the category of ‘new’ migration, as they are arguably part of
the increasingly diversified flows, and are relatively new in both Spain
and Belgium, with no colonial links between the countries of origin
and of destination. Their motivation to migrate is in general not based
on the status of political refugee, but rather on the hard economic cir-
cumstances in their country of origin; their determination to find work
on European labour markets is important for my research. In addition,
they tend to be a perfect choice for highlighting the low-skilled niches
in the labour market. In addition, they are a highly visible group being
black immigrants and largely Muslim, which could potentially attract
xenophobic reactions in the host society. A further elaboration of this
population’s migration characteristics will be provided in chapter four.
Focussing on the Senegambian population automatically means
working with a single, relatively homogeneous group with specific char-
acteristics, and giving up claims about this research being representa-
tive of wider African migration to Europe. The general dynamics prob-
ably are the same, both in the countries they leave as in the countries
where they try to build a new life. The fact that Senegambians tend to
be economic migrants (Kaplan 2001), for example, has important con-
sequences upon arrival in Europe: they cannot rely on the government
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support that comes with asylum applications, and therefore depend pri-
marily on each other for financial support and finding work (contrary
to refugees). It also implies that their migration project is initially a
temporary one, not with the aim of permanent settlement. The speciali-
sation in the labour market, the nature of their solidarity networks, the
French language background for Senegalese and English for Gambians,
lack of colonial links and timing of migration all make up a specific
profile that is (to an unknown extent) different from migrants coming
from other parts of Africa. It may however shed light on migration
from Mali, Guinea Bissau and Conakry, Burkina Faso and Mauritania.
Research areas
Focussing on cities makes sense because cities have commonly been
the first destination of migrants, as they are important transfer points
in terms of both mobility and information.2 Cities continue to be trans-
formed by the presence of new ethnic, racial and religious groupings
who sometimes settle in the older cores of cities, or on the periphery
in concentrated housing arrays; the city sets the scene for processes of
social, economic and cultural integration and exclusion (Body-Gendrot
& Martiniello 2000; Bousetta 2000). Large cities are the main gate-
ways and often terminals for newly arriving migrants (Davis 2004).
Their urban labour markets in particular have become the primary
interfaces between two of the most salient contemporary socio-econom-
ic trends discussed above: the post-industrial transition as well as new
large-scale immigration flows (Sassen 1991; Pugliese 1993; Klooster-
man 1996). The two are interrelated, but the exact way is currently
hotly debated throughout a variety of theoretical approaches and in
numerous descriptive studies.
This research project will focus on economic change and new migra-
tion in European cities; the cases selected are the cities of Antwerp (in
Belgium) and Barcelona (in Spain). Both are regionally important port
cities with an industrial past, now featuring a changing labour market
with a bigger service sector. Barcelona, in the northeastern corner of
Spain, is its second largest city, the capital of the autonomous commu-
nity of Catalonia and the main centre of Catalan economic develop-
ment. Antwerp, in the north of Flanders, on the river Scheldt, is the
second largest city of Belgium, the biggest of the Flemish region, and
unmistakably the motor of economic growth in the area. While offer-
ing similarities in terms of economic profile (port cities, industrial ba-
sis, growing service sector), they differ in terms of institutional and
welfare arrangements for immigrants and in the rigidity of the labour
market.
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Figure 1.1 Maps of Belgium and Spain
Source: www.state.gov
Belgium is one of the smaller EU countries and belongs to the core of
‘old’ Europe; Spain is far bigger and located at the southern border of
Europe, forming a direct border with the developing world. In terms of
migration history Spain, as other Southern European countries, was
itself a supplier of labour migrants until the 1960s, while Belgium has
a more long-standing tradition of receiving guest workers (Freeman
1995). The organisation of integration facilities and the legal frame-
work surrounding migration are therefore more developed in Belgium;
however, Belgium has moved towards a stricter migration regime,
while Spain has been welcoming newly arriving workers. On the politi-
cal level, Flanders has also seen the rise of an explicitly anti-immigrant
political party (Vlaams Belang) that now receives almost 25 per cent of
the votes; the socialist party in Spain deals since March 2004 with the
migration issues it inherited from eight years conservative rule. The
Belgian labour market is one of the most rigid in Europe, with high so-
cial protection of employees and heavy taxation on labour, while Spain
has a more flexible labour market. The level of welfare provided is very
different, with Belgium being quite generous and Spain representing a
situation in which the provision of welfare services was aborted before
having reached maturity. Therefore, the familial nature of reciprocity
networks tends to be stronger in Spain than in Belgium. Comparing
two cities that differ significantly can bring to light the differences that
are expected to influence the trajectories and decisions of immigrants;
they will be developed more systematically in the next chapter.
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1.3 Structure of the book
The structure of this book, consisting of eight chapters, follows a rela-
tively simple and classic scheme. This introduction outlines the re-
search as a whole and pays attention to trajectories as the ‘dependent’
element. It is followed by the second chapter presenting the general
analytical framework of the research: it explores central theories and
concepts that can help to identify the ‘independent variables’ relevant
to Senegambian immigrants’ trajectories. Located in the wider land-
scape of sociological and geographical literature about new migration
and urban labour markets, this framework includes a description of the
changing post-industrial labour market, with special attention to the
built-in demand for immigrant labour, as well as the state’s response to
migration flows in the form of immigration regulation processes.
These structural factors will guide the analysis: they are illustrated for
the two case studies, Antwerp and Barcelona, and allow a better under-
standing of the ways the ways immigrants enter, find work and live.
In the methods chapter, I focus on the strategies for obtaining and
presenting the material collected for this study, from gaining access
over sampling to the analysis. I will also deal in more depth with some
issues arising specifically from life-course interviews and the chal-
lenges in interviewing undocumented migrants. A fourth chapter
reflects the importance of migration as a livelihood strategy in Senegal
and the Gambia. It argues that migration has become an institution, in
at least three ways: the socio-political and economic setting that stimu-
lates people to migrate, the specific migrant ‘business’ network that
allows for networks, information and a fast entry into the informal
European labour market, and the crucial role their remittances play on
family and national level.
Chapters five to seven constitute the empirical core of this research,
presenting the analysis of individual trajectories and the factors influ-
encing them. Respecting the chronology of the life-course approach, I
start with a report of the immigrant’s life as an undocumented mi-
grant, moving on in the next chapter to the phase of trying to regular-
ise their stay, and in chapter seven I discuss their position as documen-
ted migrants. These successive phases run parallel to changing priority
to survival strategies in the beginning, documentation strategies later
and finally upward mobility strategies. Each of these chapters follows a
similar outline, starting with an analysis of the labour market, trying to
find patterns in the variety of experiences, and developing a typology of
careers in both cities. But I also look for deviant options and the indivi-
dual characteristics that influence these choices or possibilities. Next, I
investigate the wider context in which the labour market trajectories
take place, the way migrants try to overcome difficulties in employ-
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ment situations and the importance of housing, family and community
throughout the different steps many migrants take. The aim of these
empirical chapters is a comparison of the patterns found in the two ci-
ties, and exploring the links to differences in state intervention, or in
the functioning of labour markets. I argue that the macro contexts in-
fluence the lives of migrants not in a random way or as a side effect,
but that the opportunities and constraints for migrants are rather a
core element linked to society’s structure.
To conclude, I evaluate existing theories in the light of my empirical
findings, contradicting, modifying or complementing them with the
insights derived from the research.
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2 Embarking on an explanatory framework
In Europe, my brothers, you’re black first, citizens incidentally,
outsiders permanently, and that’s certainly not written in the
constitution, but some can read it on your skin. So, you see, it’s
not enough just to set foot on French soil in order to live the life
of those minimum-wage tourists […]. There‘s unemployment
over there now, too. What assets do you have that’ll guarantee
you success over there? When you’re ambitious, you need a
broad back. As illegal immigrants, you’ll find it a hard slog if
you’re lucky enough not to get picked up by the police, who’ll
bundle you onto the next plane home. (Diome 2006: 124)
In Diome’s novel, The Belly of the Atlantic, Salie works more than full-
time as a cleaning lady to finance her advanced literature studies at a
French university. On a return visit to Senegal, she tries to convince
her younger brother and his friend – both determined to make it to
Europe – that physical strength and determination are not sufficient to
succeed, and that structural factors make individual lives difficult. She
mentions two elements: the French labour market is not exactly wait-
ing with open arms to receive unskilled migrant workers; and the state
has not much consideration for undocumented foreigners. This argu-
ment does not impress the teenagers, but her points will be taken up
in this chapter.
To explore how the trajectories of newly arriving Senegambian mi-
grants are influenced by structural economic and political factors, this
project compares two different cities, Antwerp and Barcelona. A wide
range of social theories provides us with a list of elements that might
be relevant for how migrant workers try to organise their lives: this
ranges from theories about labour markets, over welfare states to mi-
gration policies themselves. Once identified, these can be applied to
the specific case studies, in order to provide a concrete background
against which the empirical analysis of the next chapters can take
place. Detailed information on the different opportunity structures will
result in concrete questions about the consequences for respondents
facing the task of finding their way into two host societies.
2.1 What is new about recent labour migration?
‘New’ international migration emerged as a global phenomenon at the
end of the 20th century; its symbolic starting point is often traced to
1989 and the geo-political and geo-economic changes of that year (Koser
& Lutz 1998). The conclusion of the cold war and collapse of communist
regimes resulted in the end of Europe’s political division and the re-
organisation of borders (Castles & Miller 1993). From a historical, con-
ceptual, or philosophical point of view, the label of ‘new’ migration is
arbitrary and debatable (Koser & Lutz 1998)1. As a relative and empiri-
cal term, it gains in value if one makes clear what is considered the
‘old’, and in what dimensions the phenomenon is different from ear-
lier. Recent migration can be compared implicitly to the organised
guest worker schemes of the 1950s and 1960s, and this juxtaposition
may highlight some characteristics that are ‘new’, such as the changing
migrant profile and flows, and the post-industrial labour markets.
The changing migration context
According to IOM (2005: 459), labour migration is the ‘movement of
persons from their home state to another state for the purpose of em-
ployment’2. This may sound very clear, but the terminology of immi-
gration is not used with great rigour in daily discourses; to avoid confu-
sion with, for example, asylum, it is necessary to highlight the variation
inside the migrant population and to clarify the terms (Carlier & Rea
2001). In fact, when someone is working in another country, a number
of legal descriptions might portray their situation.3 They are likely to
be a ‘foreigner’, a person who is not a national of a given country; they
may be ‘undocumented’, ‘clandestine’ or ‘irregular’, all meaning ‘mi-
grant workers or members of their families not authorised to enter, to
stay or to engage in employment in a state’.4 However, they are prob-
ably not adequately labelled as ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘refugee’, terms that
are frequently misused. These two concepts are based on the 1951
Refugee Convention (or the Geneva Convention) offering protection to
people under a well-founded and proven fear of persecution due to
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a social
group.5 Neither refugees nor asylum seekers can be illegal, given that
refugees are granted the permission to stay, and asylum seekers have
the right to stay until a decision on their application has been made.
However, we should be aware that the distinctions are not ‘natural’
but a product of the needs of the political and economic system, or of
particular groups within them. The state sets out the administrative
and legal conditions, processes and structures for recognition of differ-
ent ‘kinds’ of migrants (labour migrants, refugees and permanent resi-
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dents), and often shapes the political and ideological reactions to them
(Bovenkerk et al. 1990). De Genova (2002) draws attention to the fact
that social scientists have often uncritically taken over the distinctions,
concepts and definitions that follow from migration legislation. It is,
for example, quite common to make a distinction between political
refugees and economic migrants, a division that coincides with notions
of the ‘good or deserving’ foreigner (meeting the Geneva description)
and the ‘bad or undeserving’ migrant (only looking for a better life).6
Given that the economic difficulties that developing countries face are
a direct result of the political situation of the country, it is difficult to
decide if migration is due to political or economic reasons. In addition,
the changing definitions in host countries over time show the relativity
of these categories (Couper & Santamaria 1984).
The total number of labour migrants in the world is estimated to be
86 million, with 34 million of these in developing regions; in 2000,
there were about 52 million migrants among the 465 million workers
in high-income countries, making migrants an average twelve percent
of their work forces (IOM 2005). They can be skilled workers, seasonal
employees, trainees, working holidaymakers, transfers of staff within
multinational companies, and cross-border workers. They are brick-
layers or nurses, strawberry pickers or IT specialists, prostitutes or clea-
ners; some of them have contracts as highly paid managers, others live
their lives in the margins of society as undocumented migrants. Inter-
national migration expands its diversity in terms of origins and desti-
nations, as well as social, demographic, and economic characteristics,
which differentiates this period from the previous era of guest worker
migration (Castles & Miller 1993; Collinson 1994; Massey et al. 1998;
Pugliese 1993; Sassen 1994).
In terms of profile, a growing number of different nationalities and
ethnic groups participate in the new migratory experience; migrants
tend to be younger and more often female, making them different
from the ones of other periods of migration in history. Within Europe,
the opening of the eastern borders and the war in Yugoslavia initiated
flows of migrants from these areas. Migrants also aim for new and dif-
ferent destinations, reflecting the changing poles of economic attrac-
tion: the new geography of migration includes the Gulf States, Eastern
and Central Europe as well as India and China. In Europe, the Mediter-
ranean countries have become a target for large-scale, spontaneous im-
migration, despite its rising unemployment and rather low rates of eco-
nomic growth. New types of migration include intensified short-term
and transit migration, as well as clandestine migration. Senegambian
migrants in Antwerp and Barcelona are a good illustration of this in-
creasingly mobile and diversified migrant population.
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More than a decade has passed since social anthropologists Glick
Schiller, Basch and Blank-Szanton (1992) introduced the notion of
transnationality to academic discourse, which was soon to become one
of the most popular concepts in current migration research. Although
migrants have always kept in touch with home, Schiller suggested that
an increasing number of immigrants orient their lives to two or more
societies. Before, migration between places that were fundamentally
distinct is said to have been either circular (with limited attachment to
new destination, and migrant returned sooner or later to place of ori-
gin) or linear (permanent settlement, reorientation to the place of desti-
nation) (Castles 2002). However, the lives of these new migrants cut
across national boundaries and bring two societies into a single social
field; for some, migration may not be definite or irreversible and even
the ones who have settled permanently entertain strong transnational
links. The revolution in information and communication technologies
has meant that many Africans in Europe are now able to live ‘transna-
tionally’, maintaining significant social, economic and cultural ties with
their countries of origin, and with fellow-migrants living elsewhere.
Networks have been a central thematic for understanding the quotidian
processes that make up transnationalism ‘from below’ (Boyd 1989;
Portes 1997). Real empirical multi-site research is scarce; one example
is Ghana Transnet looking at immigrants in the Netherlands, and tra-
cing back their family members in different sites in Ghana (Mazzucato
2005).
These transnational contacts can result in active involvement in the
economic, cultural, social and political life of sending countries; in
flows of people, goods, money, and ideas; in the creation of new insti-
tutions that cross national boundaries; in short, place has changed to
become multifaceted and translocal space. The impact of transnational-
ity on nation-state sovereignty and autonomy, on economic activities as
well as the process of migrant belonging, multiple identities, family life
and multi-layered citizenship remains an open question (Brettell &
Hollifield 2000; Bryceson & Vuorela 2002; Castles 2002; Cohen 1996;
Faist 2000; Koser 2003). Although this study will not provide a
detailed answer to the issue, the transnational ties will be taken into
consideration when trying to understand migrant trajectories: attention
will be paid to mobility patterns and community dimensions. At the
same time, warnings go up not to exaggerate or presume the weight
attributed to transnational ties, nor to assume that every migrant is in-
volved to the same extent (Dahinden 2005).
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The changing economic and political context
Economic migration movements towards Europe have existed for a
long time, and were sometimes even initiated by industrial countries.
The different phases of development that characterise the economic
history of capitalism are associated with particular forms of interaction
between the production system, the labour market and the state – and
therefore with specific forms of migration. At each of the major down-
turns of the capitalist world-economy there has been a perceived need
to restructure the specific mode of production, the state and the organi-
sation of the labour market inflows (Johnston 1993). The combination
of post-war economic growth and the inflow of migrant guest workers
is well-known.
Recovery from the major downturn in the 1970s has involved a
marked shift away from the structures of mass production and the
rigid labour markets that typified Fordism, the emergence of ‘flexible
accumulation’, distinguished by a remarkable fluidity of production ar-
rangements, labour markets, financial organisation and consumption
(Johnston 1993). The last two decades have seen a simultaneous
growth in the complexity of production processes, in the significance
of corporate structures of control and international financial systems.
This in turn has led to a growing importance of new intermediate or
producer services (like advertising, professional services, consultancy,
computer services, cleaning, catering and other support services),
changes in the pattern of locational advantage and changes in private
consumption patterns. This process is generally called post-industrial
economic restructuring (Cross & Moore 2002; Pugliese 1993; Sassen
1996) and its consequences for migrants on the labour market will be
discussed below.
Another element of the new setting in which migrants arrive, is the
ongoing complex debate about whether or not Europe needs migrants
to fill the holes left by a shrinking and ageing local work force, and to
make the welfare system tenable (UN 2000). The solutions proposed
range from increasing the fertility rate, over diversifying the tax bases,
to postponing retirement ages and shift to a capitalisation system (in
which the present generation saves and capitalises for its own day of
retirement), but increasing immigration has also been suggested. The
debates between supporters and critics of this idea continue (see, for
example, the debate between Harris and Coleman (2003)), but in gen-
eral, both sides would agree that immigration alone cannot alleviate
the ageing of the native population; it can only be a complementary
measure and should be subject to practical and political constraints. In
any case, these concerns have prompted many countries to consider
stepping up immigration; some have already started to facilitate labour
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market access for skilled immigrant workers: Austria, France, Germany
and Switzerland admitted about 15 per cent more immigrants in the
last decade (OECD 2006).
Against this background, I will present some theoretical factors that
can influence migrants’ trajectories in their new home countries. The
discussion of these ‘independent variables’ includes urban labour mar-
kets, state regulation of labour markets and migration policies.
2.2 The explanatory structural factors
This chapter explores the structural elements that frame the labour mi-
grant experiences: how do Senegambian immigrants fare after arrival,
and how do they make the money they need to realise their goal? In or-
der to structure the answers to this question, I will refer to Polanyi’s fra-
mework or three ‘modes of economic integration’. Households and
communities may or may not gain access to resources through either
market exchange (market), re-distribution (state) or reciprocity mechan-
isms (networks), or a combination of those (Polanyi 1944; Harvey 1973;
Mingione 1991; Kesteloot et al. 1997).7 In western advanced economies,
access to resources is dominated by ‘market exchange’, and the most
obvious approach for most households is to put their labour on the
market. Their wage is the price they get when they succeed in selling
this. Others are self-employed and sell goods and services. The law of
supply and demand broadly determines what they are paid; as a result,
the labour market generates inherent stratification, and unequal access
to resources based on strong or weak positions in the labour market.
This can be socially destructive. To compensate partly for the structural
inequalities generated through market exchange, the state can redistri-
bute when everybody contributes to a common stock of resources that
are redistributed according to agreed rules – one of which is the deci-
sion about who can access the system. Within the EU the organisation
and extent of welfare state provision varies considerably between the
different ‘welfare regime types’. In this way, the state is also generative
of inequalities, and is an important factor in patterns of social exclu-
sion and spatial concentration of poverty. Finally, reciprocity helps
people to obtain resources through mutual exchange. Goods and ser-
vices brought into the system by one participant are given back by the
other members, generally in the form of different goods and services,
and frequently not at the same time. These features of the exchange
process involve mutual trust between the members of an exchange net-
work and binding ties between each participant and their network.
In order to identify the structural elements that will shape the trajec-
tories of immigrants in Antwerp and Barcelona, a first section will deal
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with economic theories on immigrant incorporation in urban labour
markets. Second, the redistribution role of the state in influencing im-
migrant possibilities and constraints will be discussed, including both
its role in regulating the labour market and in defining the conditions
for migration itself. Third, the redistribution role of social networds is
very important. Immigrants effectively and strategically use social orga-
nisation as a resource which assists them in their struggle to live and
work (Chavez 1990; Espinosa & Massey 1999; Massey 1999); some
groups can fall back on strongly established migrant communities
while others cannot do so or only to a limited extent (Engbersen & Van
der Leun 2001). Networks can act as a barometer, measuring and com-
paring changes in the local conditions (Knights 1996), provide solidar-
ity and create an internal market (Engbersen 2001). Hence, the most
evident networks are the household, the extended family and some-
times neighbourhood networks or networks within ethnic minority
communities. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the ethnic
community is considered a constant element in this research and reci-
procity strategies are therefore left out at this comparative stage of the
overview; they will however be dealth with in the empirical analysis.
Urban labour markets
The past 25 years have seen a transformation of urban economies that
is central to an understanding of the way in which migrants are accom-
modated. Cities used to have a thriving manufacturing economy, ser-
ving as staging grounds for unskilled newcomer groups; making a
living but also ‘integration’ happened through the factory floor. In to-
day’s post-industrial societies, economic restructuring has changed the
nature of labour demand, with both workers and companies respond-
ing to the opportunities this transformation presents; the socio-
economic positions of different social groups condition their strategies.
However, the links between post-industrial economic restructuring and
the labour demand for migrants are hotly debated and have inspired
different theoretical attempts to grasp them (Cross & Moore 2002;
Cross & Waldinger 2002; Pugliese 1993; Sassen 1996).
According to both neo-classical (Chiswick & Hatton 2002) and dual
labour market theories (Cross & Moore 2002; Piore & Sabel 1984;
Sassen 1991b; 1996), recent migrants such as the Senegambian popula-
tion are expected to occupy jobs in remaining industrial sectors mini-
mising labour costs (Kloosterman, Van der Leun & Rath 1999), or in a
service sector characterised by polarisation (Rath & Kloosterman 1998),
mainly because they are more willing to put up with relatively low
wages, long hours and bad conditions (Linton 2002). They may try to es-
cape these conditions by launching their own enterprise (Light 2002;
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Kloosterman et al. 1998). Sassen (1991a; 1996) showed how the origin
of demand for informally produced or distributed goods and services lies
in the structural transformation of the economy. The emergence of
downgraded and informal sectors staffed by migrant workers forms part
and parcel of advanced capitalist strategies of deregulation and flexibil-
ity; it is just one dimension of the wider phenomenon of the ‘casualisa-
tion’ of employment (Pugliese 1993; Schierup 2006). Studies estimate
the size of the informal economy as being, on average, between 7 per
cent and 16 per cent of the EU’s GDP (European Foundation for the Im-
provement of Living and Working Conditions 2005).
Different theories imply a different view on the time dimension: ac-
cording to neo-classical approaches, migrants can move up the social
ladder rather easily, while many other theories suggest a form of
‘blockage’ in specific sectors, where individual skills, previous educa-
tion and work experience do not make any difference for labour market
integration. In these fast-changing times, another element is cohort
effects, or the time uniqueness of entering in the 1980s or late 1990s.
Do labour market entrants of the same period face similar advantages
or disadvantages (Clark 1998)? Recent economic developments in
Barcelona and Antwerp play a major role in offering chances to newco-
mers: the degree of post-industrialisation, of economic growth, the pre-
sence of informal work, and the sectoral composition of the economy
play a role. These elements will be taken into account in the case de-
scriptions below.
State regulation of labour markets
The migrant labour market does not only follow economic laws and
evolutions; since the beginning of the welfare state, these processes are
mediated by state intervention (May et al. 2007; Schierup 2006). The
degree of protection in the labour market, and the rules for redistribut-
ing welfare benefits by public or semi-public institutions, are crucial to
immigrants’ lives, influencing everything from their chances to earn
an income, through their geographical mobility decisions to their fa-
mily lives. A debate about the state is therefore crucial, as it can have
influence as a single actor (e.g. in the organisation of welfare systems)
or through setting the framework in which other actors perform (e.g.
setting minimum incomes per sector); in its prerogative roles as gate-
keeper, as provider of welfare and collective consumption, and as pre-
server of law and order.8 The structure and institutional framework of
the state is therefore critical to an understanding of labour markets.
Almost by definition, the rules of the system make this redistributive
dynamic explicitly restricted to legal citizens; however, by excluding the
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undocumented migrants, the state is equally important for them, and
the degree of implementation heavily influences this general principle.
A first element is welfare regimes. Although most countries occupy
intermediate positions in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) ideal-type distinc-
tion between liberal, corporate, and social welfare states, it is possible
to make a rough comparison between Spain and Belgium. Both coun-
tries score relatively high on corporatism, but Belgium has a second
tendency more towards the social democratic type, while Spain has
many characteristics of the family-oriented group. This would mean
that the degree of regulation and protection is higher for Belgian citi-
zens than for Spanish ones; the relative lack of control and the more
flexible labour market in Spain might provide more chances for low-
skilled and/or undocumented workers.
A second dimension consists of labour market policies. In highly
controlled labour market regimes, legal labour is protected by a dense
web of state regulations concerning the minimum wages, hours of
work, fringe benefits, work environment, health issues, hiring and
firing conditions. However, recent trends on post-industrial labour mar-
kets have implied a dismantling of labour market regulations, a dra-
matic increase in the practice of subcontracting, smaller companies,
informalisation, flexibilisation and ‘casualisation’ (Cross & Waldinger
2002; Gordon & Sassen 1992; Held et al. 1999; Jordan & Du¨vell
2002; Van der Leun & Kloosterman 2006). It has been argued that
strict approaches to labour market regulation (like Belgium) have tem-
pered this deregularisation of the labour market. In general, countries
with less comprehensive regulation of labour markets and less elabo-
rated systems of social insurance (like Spain), went furthest in increas-
ing flexibility and mobility in the labour market (Jordan & Du¨vell
2002). On the importance of the informal labour market there seem to
be different hypotheses. A high degree of casualisation (Spain) might
raise the level of informality, but so might a high level of labour market
regulation (Belgium) by unintendedly pricing out many jobs of the for-
mal market through high minimum wages and other regulations that
drive up the labour costs above the level of labour productivity (Cross &
Moore 2002; Van der Leun & Kloosterman 2006).
A third difference can be found in social policies. When the labour
market does not supply an income, the welfare state may provide via
the availability of a number of safety nets, in terms of unemployment
benefits, health insurance etc., at least for national citizens (Vink
2005). In order to understand which social policies play a role in mi-
grant lives, Baldwin-Edwards (2004: from p. 326 onwards) identifies a
number of different phases in the life cycle of a migrant and his rela-
tionship with welfare regimes. First, in the case of undocumented mi-
grants, his hypothesis is that they are likely to exist completely outside
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of the system under conservative regimes, owing to the high degree of
regulation. Limited evidence in southern Europe suggests that they are
more part of the system. In the phase of long-term residency and bring-
ing over family, southern Europe would represent the most socially
unprotected geographical area for migrants, because of the temporality
of residence permits and the highly skewed welfare systems. By con-
trast, the conservative state is perceived to present more rights after
substantial periods of employment and residence. In the last phase, the
establishment of ethnic communities exhibit high unemployment rates
along with low participation rates, and raises questions about integra-
tion and include anti-discrimination policies to guarantee competitive
and fair labour markets rules. In spite of the growing similarity of basic
principles among European states, discrepancies remain in the rights
each country grants to foreigners, including social protection, access to
work and to citizenship (Geddes 2003; Withol de Wenden 2004).
Migration policies
De Genova’s plea (2002) for a scientific ‘problematisation’ of the
history of immigration law shows the production over time of a set of
legislative interventions on labour migration, linked with economic
needs, and previous experiences with migration. As an answer to the
crisis of the 1970s, European countries imposed the principle of closed
borders. The creation of the common monetary and economic
European market reinforced this trend towards protecting internal la-
bour markets, with more restrictive immigration policies for non-EU
workers, except for high-skilled professionals (Awad 2004; Geddes
2003). Border control against uninvited workers became a priority
everywhere, as well as the strengthening of public authorities’ powers
over matters relating to entry and stay. Governments of destination
countries have tried to fight against abuse of the remaining channels,
by making the procedures for family reunification, students, asylum
seekers and tourists with visas increasingly difficult and controlled. In
this context, and for the first time maybe in migration history,
although they were present before, ‘illegality’ has become increasingly
a pressing policy issue at the core of the migration debate.9 Undocu-
mented migrants are usually bracketed by public opinion and by politi-
cal initiatives and racist and extreme nationalist movements into a
single category with very negative connotations (Arango & Baldwin-
Edwards 1998). By definition and because of hardship, they challenge
the system, they break laws and rules, compete with legal migrants
and citizens for job opportunities. At the same time, they also live in
the core of our society, on the expensive square meters of rack-renters,
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clean our houses, plaster our walls, pick our tomatoes and wash our
dishes, representing unprecedented challenges to policymakers.
In the face of similar problems of undocumented migration, the
basis for a common immigration policy has been negotiated in the EU,
from the 1986 Single European Act over the Schengen Convention
(1990) to Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1998). Despite
these attempts to harmonisation of immigration policies, the bulk of
legislation is still national and discrepancies remain in their
approaches to migration policy (Boswell 2003; Favell & Geddes 1999;
Stalker 2002). Owing to the distinctive histories and geographies of
European states, as well as to pressure from national public opinion,
policies differ in the right to enter as refugee and asylum seeker, the
length of residence card validity or access to citizenship and the priori-
ties for managing illegal migration (Withol de Wenden 2004). The
national immigration and asylum legislation generally acts on the mat-
ter according to current political interests and needs, and lack a pro-
spective vision. The mix between these policy elements can be different
between countries; in addition, the configuration of and between wel-
fare state and labour market may differ. Freeman (1995) distinguishes
three different types of immigration policies and traditions in liberal
democracies. The most expansionist and inclusive are the traditional
English-speaking settler communities, which are of less interest here.
Belgium belongs to the group of Western European states that as fully
developed national states faced labour shortages after WWII, mounted
temporary labour programmes for workers from Southern Europe,
Morocco and Turkey. After the oil crisis of the early 1970s, all of them
declared migration stops; they were faced with the fact that many guest
workers did not return but stayed in the country, and that the state was
unable to cope with this group. The general public was mildly sceptical,
later more outspokenly negative, and nowadays overt conflict and extre-
mist parties can be found in many countries. Politicians try to reassure
voters with restrictionist policies while they often lack the capacity and
probably also the political will to stop the migration flows. Policies in
these countries are still haunted by ‘the mistakes, failures, and unfore-
seen consequences of the guest worker era and by the social conflicts
associated with the new ethnic minorities’ (Freeman 1995: 890).
Spain, on the contrary, but like other Southern European states, has
only recently gone from being a labour exporter and has only in the
last two decades become a net immigration country, with specific char-
acteristics (King 2000; King et al. 1997). Spanish immigration policy
was marked by the near complete absence of any institutional mechan-
isms or administrative experience as to planning, regulating or control-
ling migration; and by the external pressure by the EU to impose them
(Awad 2004). This has resulted in a series of new laws imposing visas,
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work and residence permits, social and political rights, in a partial and
ineffective attempt to organise legal entry, curtail illegal entry and regu-
larise those already inside (Freeman 1995).
This discussion has raised a number of variables that can influence
the trajectories of migrants in Barcelona and Antwerp. We can see the
image of a ‘differential opportunity structure’ in both cities emerging,
based on different limits and opportunities. This image will now be
more concrete with a description of the case studies.
2.3 The two case studies
In order to highlight the structural factors influencing migrant trajec-
tories, this study proposes a comparative analysis of two case studies,
Antwerp and Barcelona. The functioning of labour markets, welfare
policies and immigration politics will be elaborated for the two local-
ities in a detailed and consistent context setting, embedding them in a
historical perspective and with attention to the national and the local
levels, in a modest attempt to follow Schierup’s description of the im-
mense variety of Europe’s social and political landscape (2006). The
aim is not to test the above theories empirically, but to show the rele-
vance of the elements listed for the variety of immigrants’ conditions
of social insertion or exclusion in the daily urban life, representing lim-
its, rights, and possibilities in different urban settings.
More than the theory, the actual implementation of the institutional
framework is very important for it can differ considerably from the dis-
course, the principles and even the letter of the law. This requires look-
ing at more decentralised levels of decision-making, where the policies
are interpreted and tested against reality. Migrant settlement creates
specifically local problems that local authorities must cope with, affect-
ing a broad range of local policy areas, often in the absence of clear or
effective national policy (Alexander 2004).
Antwerp
With 461,000 inhabitants,10 Antwerp is the second largest city of
Belgium, a country that counts about ten million inhabitants; it is also
an important harbour city and centre for industrial labour, making it a
key area for the economic dynamic in Flanders. By the same dynamics,
it has long been a stronghold of Catholicism and socialism, since it
contained a wealthy trading class next to a massive industrial proletar-
iat: for seven decades, the power was in the hands of socialists and
Christian Democrats. The important economic dynamic in Antwerp
has attracted immigration since the end of WWII; later foreign workers
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also engaged in tertiary niches of the urban labour market; this early
presence of guest workers differentiates Antwerp from Barcelona
(Adriaenssens and Geldof 1997; Eggerickx et al. 1999). More than 150
nationalities live in the territory, making up 13 per cent of the popula-
tion, with the Moroccans and the Turks as largest non-EU groups
(Vermorgen 2002).11 Many live in the 19th century belt around the
medieval centre of the city, an area that was abandoned by its original
population in the 1950s and 1960s who moved towards suburban
areas. There, 40 per cent of the population is from foreign origin, and
unemployment stands at 16 per cent.12
In terms of local politics, the politicisation of the migrant question
in the decaying 19th-century neighbourhoods of the city, police in-
efficiency in the face of increased petty crime, the lack of adequate and
sufficient social housing projects and the dirtiness of the streets have
made Antwerp since 1988 the breeding ground of the Flemish
extreme-right, incarnated by the Vlaams Blok party (Blommaert &
Martiniello 1996). Next to favouring Flemish independence, the family
as social cornerstone and tougher combating of crime, the Vlaams Blok
holds radical views on issues such as migrant workers, political refu-
gees and the status of Islam (Govaert 1995).13 The party is today not
only successful in deprived areas, but also in middle-class and well-
to-do neighbourhoods; steadily winning elections, they became the lar-
gest party in the city with over 30 per cent of the votes and could there-
fore be viewed as the single most influential element in local politics,
as well as at the Flemish and federal level. The fear of the continuing
growth of the extreme-right in Flanders14 motivated government efforts
to control and limit these flows and excesses, and to present an image
of toughness and strictness, without actually developing a coherent
migration policy (Desle´ 1997). On the political level, all ‘democratic’
parties (as opposed to the undemocratic Vlaams Blok) had to join the
coalition in 1994 (and again in 2000) in order to construct a political
‘cordon sanitaire’. A difficult coalition between Christian-democrats, so-
cialists, liberals, green party and Flemish nationalists had to be as-
sembled through protracted and difficult negotiations; difference of
viewpoints and the parties’ urge to profile themselves did not favour ef-
ficient policymaking. The new mayor, Patrick Janssens, managed to
change the dynamics and perceptions; in the October 2006 local elec-
tions, Vlaams Belang kept its 33 per cent of votes, but the Socialist
party of the mayor took the first position with 35 per cent.
Concerning the discussion of migration, economy and social policies,
not only the appropriate municipal authorities are involved and respon-
sible, but also the regional and the national level. Before 1970, Belgium
was a highly centralised unitary state including three levels of power:
the state, the provinces, and the communities. However, a series of
EMBARKING ON AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK 39
constitutional reforms have fundamentally reshuffled the institutional
landscape and resulted in the federalisation of Belgium, bringing about
a gradual and complex devolution of powers from the federal level to
the Communities and Regions15 (Blommaert & Martiniello 1996).
Economy and labour market
As suggested above, the evolution of the economy in general and the
labour market in particular, are crucial to an understanding of migrant
trajectories. Since the end of the coal mining in the late 1970s,
Belgium has few natural resources and needs to capitalise on its cen-
tral geographic location in Europe, highly developed transport network,
and diversified industrial and commercial base. The main exports are
machinery and equipment, chemicals, diamonds, metals and metal
products, as well as foodstuffs. The gross domestic product per head is
$29,360; agriculture contributes one per cent, industry 18 per cent,
construction 5 per cent, and services 76 per cent to the total GDP
(OECD 2005). The disparities in economic performance take a geogra-
phical form (Esteva˜o 2002): while heavy industries made the south his-
torically richer and more dynamic than the north, economic growth
and employment in Flanders have now surpassed those in Wallonia
thanks to a post-industrial modern, late-capitalist private-enterprise
economy. Despite a high level of unemployment, some enterprises or
sectors in Flemish community have serious problems in finding appro-
priate personnel. This is the result of a gap between the low level of
education of the job seekers and the quality requirements that the em-
ployers demand, as well as the sometimes unattractive labour condi-
tions. Despite this demand, populations of migrant origin face high
unemployment rates, particularly people with non-OECD nationalities;
within the wide variation, the Africans and Turkish are least successful
(OECD 2005). In the city of Antwerp specifically, the economy turns
around trade, with the seaport at the heart of economic life; another
important economic activity is the diamond trade, with a worldwide
leading position. Industrial activities have declined since 1970s, result-
ing in increased unemployment (WAV 2000).
The most recent OECD employment report sketches the situation of
the Belgian labour market, as presented in Table 2.1. Compared to the
other countries, economic growth is slower; this weak economic
growth is translated into a low rate of employment growth. Unemploy-
ment is higher than the OECD average, and concerns exist that long
term and high unemployment benefits have an adverse effect on la-
bour market performance (OECD 2006). The demand for temporary
workers has been growing steadily over the last three years, reaching
90,000 on an average working day (De Standaard 10 January 2007);
they are often an introduction into fixed work. The costs to employ a
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person permanently are high. For the informal labour market, the Bel-
gian government estimated undeclared work at 20 per cent in 2004,
concentrated in the sectors of construction, hotels and restaurants,
cleaning, agriculture, and domestic services (Schneider 2006). The
economic crisis has led to an increase in undeclared work, due to the
potential cost savings that it allows to employers, as well as to workers,
such as savings on tax and social security contributions both employers
and workers (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions 2005). For the growing group of undocumented
migrants, such as part of the respondents in this research, gaining
access to this informal work is their only option.
Table 2.1 Key labour market indicators for Belgium and OECD countries
1993-2003 2004 2005 Average
OECD
2005
Growth of real GDP, percentage
change from previous period
2.2 2.4 1.5 2.8
Employment and labour force
growth, percentage change from
previous period
0.7 0.6 0.9 1.1
Unemployment rate 8.5 8.4 8.4 6.4
Ratio of employer’s labour costs for
minimum wage workers relative to
median wage workers in the 21 OECD
countries with statutory minima, 2004
- 0.45 - -
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2006
Migration policies
Belgium has a relatively long tradition of migration, attracting a variety
of spontaneous migrants because of its central position (Caestecker
2000; Desle´ 1997; Lennert & Decroly 2002; Martiniello 1997). The of-
ficial migration stop in 1974 put an end to active recruitment policies
of Italian, Moroccan and Turkish guest workers for the industries of
heavy steel, construction, textile and harbours that were hit by a major
economic crisis, stagnation and decline (Ouali 1997).16 Since then and
until very recently, the doctrine of zero-immigration has dominated;
the admission, entry, visit, and settling of foreigners have been based
on more and more restrictive legislative and statutory provisions, partly
reinforced by the process of European integration. The 15 December
1980 law constitutes the basic text on questions of foreigners’ adminis-
trative status; it limited family reunion, study permits and work per-
mits for non-EU foreigners, and proposed voluntary return schemes to
foreigners (Caestecker 2000). The law has been modified more than
twenty times, centring around three major points but always pointing
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to more limitations (Bribosia & Rea 2002; Vuylsteke 2006). First, ma-
king the conditions for entry to the country more difficult; second,
restricting the procedures for recognition of refugee status, making it
rapid and clear; third, hardening the rules for residence, settling, de-
portation, social protection and foreigners’ access to the labour market.
In fact, this migration stop was never fully implemented and
Belgium has always remained a country of immigration, with never
less than 35,000 entries per year (Lennert & Decroly 2002; Vlaamse
Gemeenschap 2003), though never in a pro-active planned way. Free
circulation of EU citizens remained possible, and the guest worker
population have, instead of returning home, brought their families
over in family reunion schemes (in 2004, this figure mounted to
31,342, more than double the number of asylum seekers (De Standaard
21 October 2006). There were legal admissions for foreign students for
the length of their studies, and work permits for specific categories of
highly qualified workers (Wets 2001). Belgium also became a country
of passage for people on the way to the UK (Demets 2003), shown by
the relatively large numbers of people caught around the harbour and
train stations.17 The right of asylum has continued, and other people
choose to reach the country as undocumented migrants, illustrating
the theoretical trend explained above. As an asylum application seemed
to be the only way left to hope for a residence permit, the system with
its various competent authorities had to cope with a flood of improper
asylum demands.18 In the early 1990s, the number of asylum applica-
tions was around 5,200 per year, but in the later 1990s, it reached on
average 18,000.19 The government claims that their decision to give
asylum seekers only material support instead of money has resulted in
a decline to 11,600 applications in 2006 (De Standaard 3 January
2007).20 The accompanying regularisation in 2000 gave residence to
about 40,000 people, out of 50,000 applications (OECD 2005; Wets
2001). Migration is an important phenomenon for Belgium and num-
bers are above the average for the EU. Over 8 per cent of the popula-
tion, or some 850,000 people out of 10.4 million, do not have Belgian
nationality; around 70 per cent of these are EU nationals (OECD
2005). Recently, a system has been opened in which Eastern European
workers can migrate to Belgium in the framework of specific job con-
tracts that fill gaps in the labour market.
However, politics seem unable to control totally such a complex so-
cial process as migration (Caestecker 2000). In addition to legal migra-
tion, Engbersen estimates that between 100,000 to 150,000 people live
as undocumented migrants in Belgium (De Standaard 20 January
2007). Their only hope for regularising their stay is marriage or article
9.3 of the law, providing the exceptional opportunity to demand a visa
when already in Belgium, for humanitarian reasons. This case by case
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procedure has now become a standard step, but a very small number
of people are regularised (Wets 2001). Although the repatriation capa-
city of the state is limited and the presence of undocumented migrants
is sometimes tolerated, an active detention and repatriation policy ex-
ists (Wets 2001). Many of them seek shelter in the immigration con-
centration neighbourhoods of large cities: in Antwerp-North, some
schools have 40 per cent undocumented children, 75 per cent of the
patients of Medecins Sans Frontie`res and 70 per cent of the non-Belgian
victims of rack-renters are people without papers. All aid organisations
have seen their stock of clients grow so strongly that they have had to
close the door to a queue of waiting people – although only an esti-
mated 20 per cent asks for help (Frederix 2005).
More recently, the demographic and economic need for migration
were the subject of strong discussion; despite the external and internal
pressures to open the borders, there is no political consensus within
Belgium (Martiniello 2003; Ouali 1997). In the framework of migra-
tion from the new EU member states, Belgium chose to close its
borders; however, it facilitated the procedure for work permits from
Belgian companies needing extra labour force in specific niches con-
fronted with a shortage (‘bottleneck professions’). In 2006, some
6,800 migrant workers entered, of which 85 per cent work in agricul-
ture and horticulture; the construction, catering and transport sectors
also took several hundreds of workers each.
The Belgian nationality code, which was adopted in June 1984, has
also been modified on several occasions, resulting in progressively
easier access to citizenship. The so-called ‘quickly Belgian law’ of 1 May
2000, put Belgium on the avant-garde in the field of acquiring national-
ity. On simple declaration in the municipal administration, every resi-
dent staying legally for three years in Belgium can become Belgian in
one month, after being interviewed by the Public Prosecutor about their
conduct, but not about their willingness to integrate as before (or auto-
matically for third generation). In 2000 this resulted in about 54,950
applications, mostly from Moroccan, Turkish and Congolese residents.21
Social policies
In Belgium, the gradual construction of the welfare state since the end
of the 19th century has resulted in a system of significant and relatively
adequate income redistribution, financed through taxes and social
security contributions (Vranken et al., 2001). Gross public expenditure
in Belgium consistutes 28 per cent of GDP at factor cost in 2001; after
direct and indirect taxation of public transfer incomes, the total net so-
cial spending stands at 26.3 per cent (OECD 2005:32). According to
Esping-Andersen (1990), the Belgian welfare state belongs to the conti-
nental conservative type; conservative because it is still based on the tra-
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ditional family model, preserves the social hierarchy determined by the
market, and participation in the system of redistribution is defined by
one’s position in the labour market. The risks covered include pen-
sions, unemployment benefit, sickness and disability benefits, indus-
trial accidents, occupational diseases, family allowance and sickness in-
surance. In addition, thanks to an additional redistribution scheme in
1974, a subsistence income is available to everyone, including those
who do not participate in the labour market, which means the level of
social protection can more or less be compared to the Scandinavian so-
cial-democratic countries (Dewilde 2004). However, for undocumented
migrants there is only a basic right to some emergency health services,
some social services, and education (Desmarez et al. 2004; Wets 2001).
At the same time, the system is labelled ‘corporate’. This means that
the social partners are closely involved in policy determination and in
the management of the social security system. Collective negotiations,
in which employers, the state, and the unions take part, determine the
labour market agreements, resulting in a more regulated labour mar-
ket, where labour protection and conditions are subordinate to the aim
of flexibility. The high labour costs and strict regulation of the labour
market are said to stand in the way of active job creation policies in the
private sector, and the welfare state is strongly biased against the ex-
pansion of government social services as an alternative strategy for em-
ployment promotion. To meet these changed circumstances, consensus
has grown about the ‘active welfare state approach’ in the second half
of the 1990s. The relationship between social security and assistance
has changed and is still changing by the introduction of other distribu-
tion principles than need, such as merit or moral arguments.
Specific integration policies for immigrants developed quite late
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, because of the hidden consensus on
the provisional character of guest worker migration (Martiniello 2003).
The existing and expanding foreign and ethnic minority population left
Belgian society facing never-anticipated integration problems, particu-
larly regarding education and labour market incorporation. Many smal-
ler private initiatives had started to support former migrants and their
children, and in 1981 a first law against racism was introduced. It was
only after the first breakthrough of the rightwing Vlaams Blok party in
the 1988 local elections that a Royal Commissariat for Migrant Policies
was erected, to be replaced in 1993 with a permanent institute ‘Centre
for Equal Opportunities and the Fight Against Racism’. Phases of pro-
gress have often been inspired by three elements: the electoral success
of extreme-right, Islamic fundamentalism and urban violence (such as
the May 1991 urban revolts in Vorst) (Desle´ 1997). The separate actions
and projects, financed privately and by different public authorities,
were gradually brought together and are now coordinated by the city.
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The DIA (Integration Service Antwerp) coordinates the city council’s
policy on minorities in three fields (Vermorgen 2002): the support of
the services in their contacts with the population of a different cultural
background and the introduction of diversity management in the whole
of the city; the reception and the settling down of new residents; and
the fostering of contacts with and participation of the established ethnic
minority communities in the city (Blommaert & Martiniello 1996).
As the design of integration policies belongs to the authority of the
communities, integration policies have traditionally taken different
shapes in the different regions. Flanders, inspired by the Dutch multi-
cultural model, focused on cultural and linguistic integration. This has
been criticised because the concept of integration is transformed into a
purely voluntaristic concept, controlled by Belgians, centred on vague
notions of a culturally homogeneous nation-state, and finally the re-
sponsibility of migrants alone (Blommaert & Verschueren 1991). The
policies developed in the Walloon part followed the French republican
model with a general focus on relieving socio-economic inequalities
(Blommaert & Martiniello 1996). Now, policies seem to converge as
there is more attention to general social and economic considerations
in Flanders, and for cultural diversity in Wallonia (Martiniello 2003).
Overall, the tendency has been to move away from a target group pol-
icy towards a diversity policy and one of equal opportunities, horizon-
tally represented over all departments of the city. Since 2004, some
groups of newcomers (non-European, unemployed) are obligated to
take an ‘integration course’, including language courses and an offer of
intensive labour market guidance (Desmarez et al. 2004).
Barcelona
Barcelona is considerably bigger than Antwerp, with 1.5 million citizens;
Spain outsizes Belgium fivefold with 42 million inhabitants. The percen-
tage of immigrants used to be considerably lower, with two to three per
cent, constituted mainly of Moroccans, Peruvians and EU citizens.22
However, Spain is now the country with one of the highest rhythms of
immigration in Europe, even only looking at legal entries, with an
increase of 24 per cent in 2003 (Pajares 2004). A socio-historical ap-
proach to the Spanish state, political culture and civil society reminds
us that Spain has a fairly young local democracy dating from 1979,
when the first local democratic elections took place. The first local
democratic elections in 1979 were won by the main Social democratic
party with large majorities. In Barcelona the local branch PSC (Partit
dels Socialistas de Catalunya) has remained in power until today
through different coalitions with other leftwing parties like the ex-
communists, and the left oriented nationalists. At the national level,
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the socialists won the elections in 1982 and stayed in power until
1996, when the Popular Party ruled for eight years, until the socialists
took over again days after the Madrid bombings that left 191 people
dead in March 2004.
Somewhat parallel to Belgium, the Spanish ‘State of the Autono-
mous Governments’ since the early 80’s has gradually been giving in-
creasing jurisdiction to the regional governments, making Spain today
one of the most decentralised countries in the EU.23 Local govern-
ments as well have gained in jurisdiction and have become the closest
institutional level to the citizen. Because of limits in terms of financial
resources, and restricted political power, most policies necessarily need
the collaboration of both levels. In issues of migration, the region of
Catalonia does not have the authority to manage autonomously immi-
gration from abroad, and has to comply with the general lines of Span-
ish state policies in relation to work and residence permits; the differ-
ent powers will be discussed where relevant.
Economy and labour market
In the 1980s, the opening of the Spanish economy to foreign capital and
firms implied economic restructuring and a changing post-industrial
labour demand (as described in theory above). The administration advo-
cated liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation of the economy of the
predominantly family-based small firms and introduced some tax re-
forms to that end. The low productivity sectors (intensive agriculture,
tourism, the construction trades and small industries) faced reduced
percentage gains due to the end of the internal rural exodus, while the
need to keep being competitive in a European market made it unafford-
able to raise salaries. The types of jobs involved implied hard manual la-
bour, low-status and flexible work in the service sector or casual and of-
ten seasonal labour, increasingly rejected by the Spanish population.
While these often entered unemployment, Spain turned to immigrant
workers from poor countries. However, critics argue the attention to flex-
ibilisation of the labour markets has lead to a neglect of the necessary
structural reforms of sectors (Magone 2004): Spain has still inefficient
agricultural and industrial sectors, often small scale, with some forms of
production struggling to keep up technologically with the more ad-
vanced economies. The rapid economic growth has led to the develop-
ment of segmented labour markets with large informal sectors generat-
ing a demand for workers. Catalonia in particular has experienced in the
1980s and early 1990s powerful economic developments linked to a
combination of more-or-less standard post-Fordist economic restructur-
ing and more regional tendencies, inspired amongst others by the new
strategic geographical position in the EU, and the 1992 Olympic Games
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in Barcelona (King & Rodrı´guez-Melguizo 1999), attracting flows of in-
ternational immigrant workers.
Gross Domestic Product per head stands at $19,869, considerably
lower than Belgium, with agriculture contributing 4 per cent, industry
18 per cent, construction 11 per cent and services 67 per cent (OECD
2003). The main industries include textiles, transport equipment, me-
tal manufactures and agricultural products. The Spanish economy re-
cords relatively strong growth compared to the other EU countries, as
seen in Table 2.2, with five percent annual growth on average. It also
belongs to the highest group for employment and labour force growth.
Very sharp cuts in unemployment rates were recorded in Spain,
though they are still above the OECD average; more importantly, the
report notices that this ‘went hand in hand with a marked slow-down
in the growth of output’ (p. 34). This ‘productivity-poor’ growth has
been most visible in Italy and Spain, with productivity growth falling
to very low levels, and it is linked to the increase in employment of
less-educated workers.
Table 2.2 Key labour market indicators for Spain and OECD countries
1993-2003 2004 2005 Average
OECD
2005
Growth of real GDP, percentage
change from previous period
3.5 3.1 3.4 2.8
Employment and labour force growth,
percentage change from previous period
3.5 3.9 4.8 1.1
Unemployment rate 14.4 10.4 9.2 6.4
Ratio of employer’s labour costs for
minimum wage workers relative to
median wage workers in the 21 OECD
countries with statutory minima, 2004
0.3
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2006
A particular characteristic of the Mediterranean economies is their dual
nature: a technologically advanced primary sector, with high degrees of
unionisation and state-regulation alongside an extensive underground
economy of localised networks of smaller handicraft and industrial
workshops, often family-based, which have now expanded to sectors
that are integral parts of Spanish industrial economy (Calavita 1998;
for Italy, see Schierup et al. 2006). The relatively large informal sector
is historically linked with the presence of self-employed workers,
micro-enterprises and subsistence economies, while subsequently the
policies of work flexibility have contributed to its existence (Quassoli
1999). An EU study in 2000 calculated that the underground economy
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in Spain represented 22 per cent of the total (European Foundation for
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2005).
Another form of segmentation is shown in the proliferation of tem-
porary and part-time jobs, which are in excess of 30 per cent according
to the most recent Employment Outlook. Many workers are trapped in
temporary/non-employment cycles that represent as much as 11 per
cent of total employment in Spain (OECD 2006). The labour force is
increasingly split between older, long-term workers who enjoy indefi-
nite contracts and high levels of protection, and contingent employees
with fixed-term contracts (Calavita 1998).
The role of immigrants in the economic picture is aptly summarised
by Schierup and his colleagues in some of the subtitles of their most
recent book: The Shifting Role of Migrant Labour: Between ‘Primitive
Accumulation’ and ‘Flexibilization’ and From ‘Irregularity’ to ‘Atypical
Jobs’ (Schierup, Hansen & Castles 2006). This points at the fact that
immigrants, many of them undocumented, used to be a residual factor
boosting flexibility in sectors under heavy global competition; while
nowadays, many of them are regular workers and a central structural
component of the economy. The jobs they occupy still tend to be margin-
al, as seen in the temporary and part-time contracts, linked to employers’
drive for flexibility and diminished working conditions and labour costs.
The economic growth is directly linked to the arrival of migrants, and
this relationship had become widely acknowledged by Spanish public
opinion (El Paı´s 22 March 2007), labour unions, employers, and autho-
rities. It is estimated that its contribution to the GDP in the decade
1995-2005 has been 3.2 per cent annually (Caixa Catalunya 2006). On
a regular basis, reports are commissioned stating that Spain will need
more migrants to meet the labour demands of its growing economy.
Migration policies
Spain was traditionally a country of emigration, and continued to be so
for the biggest part of the 20th century. Its economy after 1950 was,
and to some extent continues to be, characterised by the coexistence of
economic sectors of high and low productivity. This lead to the rapid
movement of many workers to other regions within Spain as well as to
other European countries, leaving some rural areas depopulated in the
1970s (King, Fielding & Black 1997). However, the 1973 oil crisis repre-
sented the closure of Western European countries to further labour mi-
gration and with it, the end of the cycle of mass emigration of Spanish
workers. During the later 1970s and early 1980s, Spain started to re-
ceive considerable flows of return migration, consisting of workers and
their dependants, although large numbers of Spanish continue to live
abroad (Cacho´n 1999; King 2000). However, the development has
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been accelerating and the increase in migration has sharpened after
1995 and even more after 2000, as seen in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 Foreign residents in Spain, evolution 1955-2008
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In response to these growing numbers of immigrants, the first
Spanish law set up to regulate immigration, the ‘Foreigners Act’, was
passed in 1985. From the early start until today, Spanish public authori-
ties clearly try to reconcile two opposite logics when designing migra-
tion legislation (Escriva´ 1997). One is compliance with strict policies of
border control as demanded by the EU (to which Spain was incorpo-
rated in 1986), and the other the fulfilment of certain needs for
unskilled workers in agriculture, industry and services. Early laws
clearly fell short of what a comprehensive immigration regulation
should have been: they were perceived as very controversial, restrictive
and discriminatory24 (Gorta´zar 2002). What is more, the policy agenda
of the Foreigners’ Act did not correspond to regional situations and
‘over time this conflict resulted in the gradual development of a more
sophisticated set of policies that increased the autonomy of Spanish
authorities in this area’ (Moreno Fuentes 2000:2). Regularisation of
undocumented immigrants, extension of social rights, or the develop-
ment of special bilateral agreements for the import of temporary and
seasonal workers would represent the other side of the coin of Spanish
immigration policies. A new ‘Foreigners Act’ was passed by the govern-
ment of the PP in 2000, after winning the general election with an
absolute majority. It modified an earlier pro-immigrant law, hardening
considerably many conditions, and increasing the period of required
residence for individual regularisation from two to five years. The aim
was to encourage measures for integration when legal, but restrict
EMBARKING ON AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK 49
access to these rights for the majority of the aliens (Gorta´zar 2002).
The socialist government modified the law again in November 2003,
softening some of the sharp edges without changing the bottom lines.
Politicians took and continue to take a low-profile stance on migra-
tion policy, which reflects both a lack of confidence in dealing with
such a new issue, and the ambivalence about the immigration question
(King & Rodrı´guez-Melguizo 1999). Public attention to migration
issues was very low, but Zapata-Barrero (2004) points out that in 2000
an important qualitative change took place, with immigration passing
from being a technical and administrative matter to being a topic of so-
cial and political importance, often mentioned as first or second worry
in public opinion surveys.
The contradiction to the widely communicated border controls and
policy of toughness is a practice where immigrants continue to arrive
on a daily basis despite investing considerable amounts of money and
resources to build an effective system of closed borders.25 This means
that the implementation of a strict control of migratory flows is often
softer in reality than on paper. Once inside, the laissez-faire approach of
the Spanish authorities in terms of the enforcement of the law
provided an optimum environment for the community. Therefore, the
regularisation campaigns have been a powerful tool in immigration
policy (Mendoza 1998) and represent one of its more pragmatic as-
pects. Although they raise criticisms for providing strong incentives for
further undocumented immigration, the Spanish government has used
them on six occasions (1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2005) to try
solve problems of exploitation and marginalisation. By legalising all
immigrants they give the migrants living in Spain without a working
permit or residence permit access to a legal and administrative status
and facilitate their access to markets (labour, housing, banking, etc.),
and public services (social security, education, health, personal social
services, etc.). In addition, as early as 1993 Spain adopted a quota sys-
tem officially presented as a tool to promote active immigration. It was
designed to distribute work permits for specific regions and economic
sectors in Spain to potential immigrants abroad (through Spanish em-
bassies and consulates). In practice though, instead of attracting new
workers, the quota system is functioning as a concealed regularisation
mechanism for irregular immigrants already present in Spain; issuing
an annual average of 30,000 work permits mostly to migrants form La-
tin America (Favell & Hansen 2002). Making the addition, Carvajal
(2004) sees that between 1986 and 2001 at least between 600,000 and
700,000 people have been regularised, plus 140,000 of the contingent
between 1993 and 2000 (and other channels left out here). This leads
Gorta´zar (2002) to ask how many legal immigrants are in Spain thanks
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to special regularisation and how few immigrants entered and re-
mained in Spain in a regularised situation.
Social policies
The Franco regime expanded an existing series of basic schemes for so-
cial protection in the areas of pensions and health care, although selec-
tive and particularistic, following in general terms the conservative-
continental model described by Esping-Andersen (1990). However, the
violent suppression of protest against exploitation and deprivation of the
popular classes partly explains the weakness and characteristics of the
Spanish welfare system, which is to date not as all-embracing as welfare
systems elsewhere in Western Europe. The democratically elected
governments have made considerable efforts to increase public expendi-
ture through the universalisation and modernisation of the health sys-
tem, and increasing the level of pensions and other benefits; at the same
time, the macro-economic logic has come to stress flexibility of labour
markets and limited government intervention (Magone 2004: 183;
Moreno 2006). Gross public spending lies considerably lower than in
Belgium at 21.7 per cent, but the difference becomes even larger in the
net social spending, where it goes down to 18.9 (OECD 2005: 32).
Because of the lower level of welfare benefits, largely compensated by the
still important role of family networks, Spain has also been qualified as a
fourth type of welfare state, the family-oriented Southern European type.
Since the 2000 law, legal immigrants have the same civil and social
rights as Spanish nationals, and undocumented immigrants have the
right to basic social rights such as free access to public healthcare ser-
vices, free compulsory education (three to sixteen years) and the very
scarce public housing. This is based on the criterion of residence, ex-
plaining why even undocumented immigrants inscribe in the census.
With regard to specific policies focused on the integration of ethnic
minorities, there seems to be a lack of a clear policy paradigm framing
the development of an incorporation policy. When a specific policy tar-
geting the immigrant population is launched it generally has a short-
term focus and it is aimed to tackle problems as they appear, not really
planning in advance to meet future needs (Agrela 2003). Many mi-
grants rely on third-sector organisations and social services that help
undocumented immigrants, often with support from state administra-
tions (Domingo, Kaplan et al. 2000). King (1999) qualifies this Span-
ish model of integration as close to ‘differential exclusion’ (going back
to Castles): migrants are incorporated into certain areas of society, but
denied access to others, based on the belief that their admission is only
a temporary phenomenon.
Zapata (2004) summarises the Catalonian plan of immigration poli-
cies as very advanced, with reference to principles as integrated poli-
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cies, intergovernmental relations, social participation, equality of rights
and duties, access to services and sectors, and codevelopment. Associa-
tions and NGOs have a strong say in the debate, together with public
administration and interest organisations, although political participa-
tion is strongest at the city level. The extent of inclusion depends in
large part on the town where the immigrant lives and on the civil ser-
vant asked for support and services. In Barcelona, there are municipali-
ties like Vic and Mataro´, where various measures towards social inclu-
sion of immigrants have been taken regardless of their documentation
(Domingo et al. 2000). King (1999) argues that the Catalan govern-
ment has a stronger commitment to the integration of migrants than
does the national government, which can be linked to several factors.
Not only has the region a longer history of incorporating migrants
from other parts of Spain (More´n Alegret 2002; Pascual de Sans et al.
2000). They also face the risk of the gradual dilution of their own spe-
cific identity by the arrival of culturally and ethnically different groups
which may feel tempted to embrace a general Spanish (Castilian speak-
ing) umbrella identity, instead of a combination of a regional Catalan
plus the general Spanish one (Moreno Fuentes 2004). Some of the dis-
tinctive Catalan features can thus be found in the reliance on the con-
cept of ‘jus solis’, while Spanish law is based on ‘jus sanguinis’; and in
the fact that language represents an emblematic instrument of social
integration. The general attitude towards integration policies is trying
to avoid different treatment between social groups of different cultural
or geographical origin; migration-related questions are channelled
through general services if at all possible (More´n Alegret 2002; Pascual
de Sans, Cardelu´s & Solana Solana 2000; Rigau i Oliver 2003). How-
ever, diverse services of attention specifically dedicated to foreign immi-
grants have been developed, and some important specific programs in
education, health and protection of minors have been taken. The gov-
ernment of Catalonia has contracted-out their social services provision
to migrants to NGOs and supports their task by means of public subsi-
dies (Roque 2003).
2.4 Conclusion: Summarising hypotheses
The available openings or limits for immigrants are to some extent a
consequence of elements of the theoretical framework: the economy
and resulting labour markets, different degrees of control and regula-
tion and different welfare states and immigration policies. In terms of
labour markets, some low-skilled jobs have disappeared due to technol-
ogy, increasing productivity and progress, but others have been created,
mostly in the service sector or in activities that cannot be substituted by
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relocation and subsequent imports where production needs to be orga-
nised close to the consumption market. Some of these jobs in the lower
steps of the labour market have become vacant because of higher ex-
pectations of the original workforce; others are linked to the changing
economy stimulating the demand for low-skilled workers. This seems
to be the employment context in which Senegambian migrants will
have to find their way. The juxtaposition of economic and welfare state
dynamics regarding labour migration makes it clear that the global la-
bour market and the system of welfare states described above have
competing logics. Several authors mention the contradiction between
contemporary forces of globalisation, the dismantling of economic bor-
ders and the demand for cheap labour on one hand, and the restriction-
ist stance of western capitalist democracies regarding immigration in
the other (Massey 1999: 312; Van der Leun & Kloosterman 2006).
Comparing both cities in terms of migration in Table 2.3, the percen-
tage of residents of immigrant background is still larger in Belgium as
an old immigration country, but numbers have been growing con-
stantly in Spain, and immigrant workers nowadays represent a substan-
tial proportion of the total workforce. The earlier experience of Belgium
translates in a better-equipped institutional framework, although Spain
has rapidly caught up over the last decade. Economic trends show the
growing structural dependency of the Spanish economy on migrant
labour, and the reliance on sectors that attract low-skilled workers (tour-
ism, agriculture, small-scale industries). Migrants in Belgium arrive in
a more regulated post-industrial labour market, with less space for low-
skilled jobs, and a context of a solid set of welfare provisions, while re-
distribution through the state is more residual in Spain.
Table 2.3 Theoretical elements of comparison, as background for different migrant
trajectories in Antwerp and Barcelona
Antwerp Barcelona
Urban labour
markets
More post-industrial
Stagnating labour market
with high regulation
Service-based economy
Large informal labour market
Industrial moving towards services
Growing economy needing flexible
and cheap workers
Tourism, agriculture
Large informal labour market
State regulation of
labour markets
Corporatist welfare state
Very regulated labour market
High social protection
Mediterranean welfare state
Relatively flexible labour market
Limited social security
Migration policies Previous guestworker schemes
Larger foreign population
Restrictive migration policy
Rightwing party Vlaams Belang
Relatively new and fast migration
Relatively small but fast-growing
foreign population
Changing + regularisations
Not political until recently
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In what follows, we will see whether and how the trajectories and
strategies of Senegambian migrants are shaped by these features of the
cities, by the resources offered and the constraints imposed by the local
contexts. Given the life-course method of the research, the analysis of
the empirical material will follow and respect the time dimension as
suggested by an apparent sequence built into the migration project.
Three stages will be distinguished26, each presented in a separate
chapter: ‘survival strategies’ apply mostly to migrants who arrive in
Europe without the necessary documents; afterwards, many of them
may try to regularise their stay, developing ‘documentation strategies’;
and finally, they may start to consider strategies for upward or geogra-
phical mobility.27
The combination of these three phases with the structural elements
discussed above, results in a series of hypotheses that will guide the
empirical research. To start with, in the phase of survival as an undocu-
mented migrant, I expect:
– More informal work in the booming Spanish economy than in Bel-
gium
Subsequently, in the area of documentation strategies:
– More rigid implementation of migration legislation in Antwerp
than in Barcelona
– More chances for obtaining papers in Spain than in Belgium
Finally, in terms of mobility strategies:
– Easier to find work in the growing Spanish labour market than in
Belgium
– more social protection in Belgium than in Spain
– Less special services for migrants in Spain than in Belgium.
Before answering these questions, the methods with which the data
were collected will be explicitated in the next chapter.
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3 Data collection: Interviews and participant
observation in a hidden population
To tell or not to tell? How to tell? Do I spell it out or not? So
what do I do? A few lines appear on the ceiling. Narrator, your
memory is a needle that weaves time into lace. And supposing
the holes were more mysterious than the patterns you make?
(Diome 2006: 97)
The aim of this research is to gain a better understanding of employ-
ment patterns and survival strategies, family situations and mobility
decisions of newly arrived migrants. I want to obtain not only informa-
tion about personal characteristics (such as education, work experience,
legal status, social networks, time spent in the country) as well as an
image of these processes, but also an idea of the way they are experi-
enced, how choices are motivated. What is more, it is important that
the variety of trajectories be represented in the data. This implies that
there is a need for in depth, qualitative information, which was gath-
ered through interviews and participant observation, both of which will
be discussed below. This argument for qualitative research is even
more relevant as the topics included phases in which people resided il-
legally in the country, or who at some stage performed informal work.
While the interviews and participant observations will be valuable in
giving a detailed account of the Senegambian migrants entering Barce-
lona and Antwerp and the sectors of employment they seem to occupy,
this research aims to go beyond a specific ethnography. In order to set
these data in a more general context of the operation of local labour
markets, and the role of immigrants in them, multiple sources of extra
information were relied on. These included statistics as well as the col-
lection of a wide range of policy documents on the cases, and a selec-
tion of newspaper articles from two main newspapers (De Standaard in
Belgium, El Paı´s in Spain) to cover more recent trends and debates.
This information will serve to frame the results from the interviews; it
allows situating the research sample within the broader pool of mi-
grant experiences in both cities; in short, this may allow avoiding the
trap of localism. Next, I interviewed 28 key informants from labour un-
ions, NGOs working with immigrants and municipal immigrant ser-
vices in both cities (see list in appendix B); this provides the essential
background information to legislation, history, the specificities of the
research group, the comparison with other migrant communities. They
were very useful in giving vivid and summarised accounts of informa-
tion that can sometimes be found in books, but also in providing an
insight in the day-to-day challenges, power struggles or choices made
in the different spheres of migration policy. Although the empirical
analysis presented later is based on migrant experiences mainly, all
other information informed my understanding of the background and
underlying mechanisms.
3.1 A new world opening up
The difficulty of building contacts, trust and sample frames within hid-
den communities are well known; in the case of immigrants, problems
are likely to be magnified in cases where migrants have moved illegally
and fear to reveal their identity to researchers. I will explain below how
a new world, that of Senegambian immigrants in Barcelona and
Antwerp, opened up for me in a complex interaction between the com-
munity, me, and chance. In their respective articles about researching
undocumented migrants and homeless youth, both Cornelius (1982)
and Ensign (2003) have discussed methodological challenges that have
to be considered when planning, doing or disseminating research with
hidden populations. I refer to them heavily in the following discussion
of the points of special attention that cover my fieldwork experiences
and strategies.
Gaining access
As I was looking for Senegambian migrants only, who are numerous
but not a majority in both cities, and not visibly different from other
black groups, gaining access was not easy. I therefore decided to rely
on individuals in the community who then introduced me further.1 I
also invested considerable amounts of time in ‘being around’ in the
community, participating in parties, meals, and discussions, joining
people for shopping or going out. From a methodological perspective,
being around was necessary in order to do the very interviews: because
of different cultural interpretations of time and the precariousness that
characterises their lives, fixing appointments ahead turned out to be frus-
trating, and often interviews were done instantaneously when running
into someone, or finding him or her at home. In addition, being available
for the unexpected meeting or opportunity facilitated numerous new
contacts. However, participant observation and the resulting friendships
can also have a negative influence on the recruiting procedure. Without
knowing or realising, one can get associated with cliques and social
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groups that do not get along, influencing the search for more respon-
dents; or people can feel left behind or even cheated if you start contact-
ing other groups of which they have negative images. On the level of the
information obtained, participant observation enables the researcher to
understand better what is said in interviews, which is particularly rele-
vant in the case of research with relatively ‘different’ populations in terms
of culture, living conditions and experiences (Soenen 2003). It increases
the familiarity with the culture of respondents, as well as the degree of
trust; it allows asking for additional explanations, double-checking, and
triangulation of information, thereby bringing advantages in interpreta-
tion or abstractions. Moreover, sometimes the observations give you in-
formation that completes the interviews – or sometimes contradicts it.
Sampling
The population I am targeting (part of which is undocumented) cannot
be sampled through any strict randomisation procedure; samples that
include undocumented migrants are usually not representative, and it
is impossible to arrive at credible generalisations for the whole popula-
tion (Cornelius 1982).2 Usually, a rather small set of initial contacts is
asked for assistance in making contacts with other members of the
social network, and the researcher should always start from several in-
dependent sources that tap into the population one is trying to get at.
This ‘snowball method’ tends to keep refusal rates relatively low and it
is therefore widely recognised as almost a prerequisite for meaningful
surveys in this field.3
Within the limits of snowball-methods, my sample was inspired by
the concepts of theoretical sampling, constant comparison, and satura-
tion from the Grounded Theory Approach (Glaser & Strauss 1967).
The individuals in the research should represent the main variety of
phenomena that are conceptually important when assessing the rela-
tionships between core variables; some of these variations can be de-
rived from theory, others will emerge from the research itself (Rubin &
Rubin 1995). This involves a process of progressive focusing through-
out the fieldwork, driven by feedback of the analysis into the data col-
lection: these are not strictly separated phases in qualitative research.
Based on the analysis of a small number of interviews, and with the
necessary theoretical background information and knowledge, the re-
searcher is able to take decisions about the selection of more data
sources according to their ability to add to or challenge emerging theo-
ry. Indeed, ‘theoretical sampling’ is very important to help generate the
theoretical equivalent of a statistically representative sample. However,
I would prefer to call my sampling procedure ‘purposeful’ rather than
theoretical (Holkup et al. 2004; Patton 1990), given that my final aim
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was not the construction, from the ground up, of a new theory. An-
other matching term could be Maximum Variation Sampling (Ensign
2003; Tilly 1996). I wanted to cover the diversity of working experi-
ences and strategies (sectors, contracts, levels of specialisation), which
might be a result of many other differences: age, sex, and ethnicity, so-
cio-economic backgrounds, varying education, length of time in the
host country and so forth.
The process of data collection is ended when the ‘theoretical satura-
tion point’ is reached; for serious practitioners of the grounded theory
approach, this term refers specifically to the development of theory.
Frequent use within multiple bodies of literature has resulted in its
meaning becoming diffuse and vague, and following Guest et al.
(2006), I rely on a more general notion of data saturation when little
new data or information is revealed by additional interviews. Using
data from a study involving sixty in-depth interviews with women in
two West African countries, these authors found that saturation of the
codebook occurred within the first twelve interviews, although basic
elements for metathemes were present as early as after six interviews;
variability within the data followed similar patterns. Anyhow, in this
kind of research, it is not so much the sample size that needs to be jus-
tified but rather the sampling strategy:
The validity, meaningfulness, and insights generated from quali-
tative inquiry have more to do with the information-richness of
the cases selected and the observational or analytical capabilities
of the researcher than with sample size. (Patton 1990: 185)
Given the time and energy invested in establishing a first set of con-
tacts, it was tempting to stick to these groups. However, with uncritical
snowball sampling there is a clear bias towards well-connected indivi-
duals, long-stayers or permanent settlers, because they have larger net-
works, are easier to locate and more recruitment paths lead to them.
Most people refer to those whom they resemble, meaning a particular
sub-group might be over-sampled when relying solely on peer
recruitment.
The most challenging issue was therefore to keep the diversity men-
tioned above in mind, and make the effort to go out in search of new
entry points in order to find individuals that are more difficult to reach.
The background information from statistics and key informants guided
the sampling process, by pointing to the diverse characteristics to cover.
From the participant observation, I obtained even more knowledge ne-
cessary to do purposeful sampling. I knew people with families were
around before I interviewed a married person with children, I heard
that rasta-men are perceived as distinct from the main population, that
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artists have their own experiences; that there are different specialisa-
tions in hawking, that I would need to find self-employed workers. I
then contacted people with a good knowledge of the community (el-
derly men, religious leaders, owner of a phone shop) to find people
with these specific profiles; I urged respondents to think of those
groups; I moved areas in Spain during fieldwork; everything to diversi-
fy networks and entry points.
3.2 The interviews
I was able to conduct 35 interviews in Belgium, and 46 in Spain, be-
tween October 2005 and September 2006. The interviewees represent
the different situations, generations, backgrounds that I thought might
be important. The smaller number in Antwerp is due to the fact that
the experiences in Belgium seem to be less varied than in Spain (see
chapters 5 to 7). A more detailed discussion of the sample in relation
to the population as a whole will form part of chapter 4. Here, more at-
tention will be paid to the particularities of the interviewing process,
from the informed consent, to the qualitative life-course approach.
Informed consent and anonymity
Informed consent of the participants is of crucial importance for all re-
search, but in this case, both parts of the term proved problematic,
sometimes because of respondents’ undocumented status, sometimes
because of a profile of low education. First, it is hard to ‘inform’ people
who have difficulties reading and writing about the possible impact of
my work; living in a world far away from academia or any written
sources, it was never clear to me if explaining the concept of a study,
research project or book made any sense to part of the group I was in-
terviewing. Second, the standard written consent sheet was problematic
for people who come from an almost exclusively oral culture, who try
to live invisibly and may not even want to give their real names. At-
tempting to obtain written consent in these cases would be cumber-
some at best and could jeopardise the safety and well-being of the un-
documented people. Therefore, in my research oral consent is used in-
stead of written consent (Byron 1994: 12; Ensign 2003).
As Sin (2005) mentions, a narrow interpretation of approval as a ‘ri-
tualistic enactment of consent-seeking’ (passing the research ethics
committees or the signing of a consent form by respondents) does not
absolve researchers of further need to engage in ethical concerns and
reflexive practice; consent seeking should not be thought of merely as
an event. When doing research, I often noticed that the negotiations
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about ensuring informed consent continued before, during and after
the act of research; people asked again about my work, my links with
the government or writing a book throughout the interview, or during
time spent together. This illustrates that there is a certain amount of
power for the respondent to participate or not, and to decide what to
tell or not; many possible respondents refused to participate in the in-
terview in their own indirect ways. Others disclose only partially by
withholding information or refusing to answer specific questions. Still
others turn the interview situation around, and decide how much they
want to tell me as the rapport with the researcher developed. However,
it is important to remember that the research relationship is inherently
an unequal one, even in cases where attempts are made to share power
(Holkup et al. 2004).
When guaranteeing anonymity in the introduction of an interview,
we usually refer to an academic technique of covering identities in
scientific publications by using pseudonyms – the same was applied in
this study. However, especially with narrative, in-depth, or life histories,
the specifics of such things as the job strategies, the migration history,
and the family situation, can make it impossible to hide completely the
identity of an informant (Ensign 2003); it is usually impossible to as-
sure complete confidentiality of data with just the convention of using
fake names. This is probably even more pertinent for small groups or
close communities like the ones who participated in this research:
someone familiar with the group could put all information linked to a
pseudonym together and complete the puzzle of a concrete individual.
This invasion of privacy would represent a breach of confidentiality
and might result in a risk of psychological or social harm. Great care
was taken in writing up and reporting the information to ensure that
names, locations and other data that might reveal identities or resi-
dences are kept anonymous. In order to avoid insiders from complet-
ing the puzzle of a specific person based on different fragments, some-
times pseudonyms are left out.
However, for undocumented people the more relevant anonymity is
their well-guarded invisibility to police and government institutions; it
might be the shame for other members of the community when facing
difficulties; or the relative ignorance of the general public vis-a`-vis ille-
gitimate strategies. The traditional ‘protection’ does not mean so much
when their main worry is if the interview will somehow be communi-
cated to the police or the labour inspection.4 A considerable number of
respondents asked questions to ensure their safety; however, a consid-
erable number of people wanted me to skip these explanations. They
expressed complete trust, as I was introduced to them by a good friend;
their safety was in the person that linked us, not in my academic
procedures.
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Interview methods: Qualitative life-course approach
Social research perspectives have recently paid more attention to the in-
trinsic longitudinal character of research topics and longitudinal analy-
sis would be necessary to understand the dynamics that lead to a speci-
fic (migration, labour market) decision or outcome at a specific point
in time. An appropriate alternative to successive survey waves can be
found in life-course analysis, characterised by its aim to understand
the causes, processes and consequences of change over the life course,
and to assess the interaction of different influences (and for its specific
use in migration studies, see Criado 1997; Hareven 2000; Harris 1987;
Mayer and Tuma 1987; Tang 2002). Within this framework, individual
behaviour is always regarded as a sequence of outcomes, some due to
structural conditions in society, and others to the individual’s initial
characteristics or subsequent experiences. The life course is defined as
a set of inter-related trajectories: in this case a combination of educa-
tional, labour market, legal status, and migration trajectories. A trajec-
tory is the course followed as the subject ages, and each one comprises
a number of transitions: more or less sudden or radical changes of sta-
tus. Studying the life course means reconstructing all the trajectories
and transitions and analysing them coherently as a unit.
Many different approaches exist within this broad field of research
(Miller 2000); a more quantitative and cross-sectional one would imply
collecting the same data for everyone, and base the analysis on general
relationships among a great number of variables. However, different
people may have experienced entirely different events, or they may have
entirely different reactions to similar events, which may lead to different
outcomes; therefore each individual may have his/her own individual
set of relevant variables. As I am interested in how respondents define
processes and motivate decisions, how they live the events in life that
form the process; as I hope to understand the interaction between these
processes and the socio-economic conditions, I resort to an in-depth ap-
proach. The more qualitative life-course interviews I carried out allowed
tracing a variety of interactions between variables, although by its nature
only in a limited interval of time and space. To quote Byron, I also be-
lieve that insight into these daily life issues reveals more about the sys-
tem behind migration, and that they need not be purely descriptive:
The anthropological tendency to focus on a single case in the
study of migration and migrants groups has been heavily criti-
cised (...). Yet the issue of how people cope with the material
and organisational problems of their lives is a very important
part of a comprehensive perspective on the migration process.
(Byron 1994: 12)
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Life-course analysis in its qualitative form is usually carried out
through open or semi-structured interviews in which the respondent
intends to reconstruct his own biography, within the borders delimi-
tated by the interviewer. My aim was not to stimulate exhaustive oral
histories but rather to obtain contextualised cases that are structured
and influenced by arguments and debates produced from pre-existing
guided questions. The interviews consisted of a semi-structured
approach, in which I tried to complement subjective impressions and
explanations with detailed factual information about particular events,
that would allow a link to larger societal and historical processes (Hare-
ven 2000; Jovchelovitch & Bauer 2000). The agenda of topics covered
derived from the theoretical framework developed above: the field of
migration history, social networks, skills in the labour market, and leg-
islative impact. I used the technique of ‘participatory diagramming’
(Mikkelsen 1995: 78), drawing a time line with the respondent while
running through the different experiences. This helped to go back to
the chronology, providing a form of ‘hard’ information, and presenting
it in a condensed and readily understandable visual form. This tool
made communication more effective and reliable and has a corrective
function. However, this preconceived categorisation was flexible en-
ough to leave space for the individuals’ own accounts of how and why
their situations had changed throughout their lives. As the population
was very varied and maybe rather exotic to me, open interviews re-
vealed unanticipated topics; also, many respondents were highly crea-
tive, articulate, and eager to contribute their ideas and the input of
their subjectivity and agency should be acknowledged (Ensign 2003).
In my case, the entire fieldwork was cumulative: all of the information
generated by previous interviews was brought to bear in formulating
questions for each successive interview, therefore altering the very lay-
out of the interview scheme.
A number of choices were left for the respondent to make, with the
underlying goal of making them feel comfortable and thereby optimise
the flow of information (Tang 2002). The first strategy was to make
them more comfortable by letting them choose the place of the inter-
view, as it can influence the power dynamics between the interviewer
and interviewee: settings included their home, my home, a bar, or the
office of an organisation. Second, whether the interview was recorded
or not was also left to them; if they disapproved, I would take written
notes and type out the interview from memory immediately upon arriv-
ing home. Moreover, I took care in question wording to minimise the
sensitivity of certain topics that must be discussed in interviews. The
most obvious example is the question about the respondent’s immigra-
tion status, but also the question whether they ever worked with some-
one else’s papers; or committed other kinds of fraud.5 To relax the
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atmosphere around these topics, I would sometimes explicitly express
my sympathy for necessary informal strategies; this often made them
talk more easily. With Jordan, I noted that ‘many irregular migrants
were quite willing to say that they broke the rules in order to earn, and
that they felt justified in doing so because the rules were unreasonable
and unfair’ (Jordan & Du¨vell 2002:98). Interviews took between half
an hour and three hours, but the standard was slightly more than an
hour. I also paid attention not to rush home; the post-interview period
often proved to be very interesting; in talking informally people can
open up and give more details on a wide variety of topics, as well as
ask questions. These data were typed out upon arrival at home and
then added to the interview document.
Another important point concerns languages. I do not master the
main Senegalese language, Wolof, enough to conduct interviews; nor
do I speak Mandingo, the official language of the Gambia. Without any
doubts, those languages would have led to a more trusting relationship
with the participants; they would have expressed their thoughts and
feelings more precisely in their mother tongue, which would possibly
have resulted in quite different data. Notwithstanding, given that offi-
cial languages of those countries include French and English respec-
tively, and that participants had lived for varying times in Spain and
Belgium, all of them were able to express themselves in one of the lan-
guages offered for the research: French, English, Spanish or Dutch.
Their language skills varied considerably, and there was often quite a
lot of language switching going on, shifting to a native or foreign word
depending on the topic of conversation.
3.3 Conclusion: Limits and advantages of the data
In-depth life-course interviews in two cities were chosen as a way to
find answers to research questions that are longitudinal, comparative
and that link individual experiences with the socio-economic context.
The strategies for obtaining and presenting the material collected for
this study were presented above, and some issues arising specifically
from interviewing a hidden and vulnerable population were explored.
Next to considerable amounts of participant observation, a total of 81
interviews were carried out, aiming to highlight very different profiles
and histories. The evaluation of this material is mainly positive: the in-
terviews are dense and information is abundant in different fields.
However, some critical remarks and comments should be made
about the method itself. A first major problem with life-course analysis
is related to the fact that life histories as told by an individual migrant
are narratives that both interpret the past and make it acceptable,
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understandable, and important in the specific interview setting. This
‘distortion’ is a necessary correlate of the method; on the other hand,
this information allows us to see how things fit together in the minds
of the respondent or how people make sense of their world (Anderson
et al. 1991). A related issue is linked to the reliance on memory in life-
course analysis: the weakness in chronology is one of the greatest lim-
itations of all oral memories. How feasible is it to reconstruct long de-
tailed lifelines in a highly mobile group? However, Thompson (2000)
describes how the initial selection by the brain is by far the most dras-
tic, affecting any kind of contemporary witness. In addition, memory
depends upon social interest and need; migration may be an experi-
ence relevant enough to store. An alternative way to correct subjective
and collective myths and impressions is to ask detailed questions about
particular facts and accounts of everyday life. The cultural dimension
composes another difficulty. In the end, we have few other possibilities
when interpreting other cultural groups than starting from our own ex-
perience; Mikkelsen (1995) points out that we should be aware of the
limitations of ethnocentric interpretations. Briggs (1983) shows how
the intersection of two or more sets of conversational norms (in differ-
ent cultures) can cause problems, and how for instance nonverbal
forms of communication as found in participant observation can allow
better interpretations. Finally, the active participation of the interviewer
means that his/her own biases, fears and enthusiasms influence the
questioning style and interpretation (Adepoju 2004). More than that:
interviews are not about scooping up the facts from the informant’s
talk in some unproblematic way; interviews are social interactions and
therefore part of the social world (Flick 2002).
Second, my own characteristics influenced without any doubt the
processes of gaining access and sampling. On the one hand, the gen-
der dimension clearly played a role: the fact of being a young female
researcher raised at least sympathy and sometimes outspoken interest
from a predominantly male research population.6 This sometimes fa-
cilitated agreement to carry out the interview, although the information
obtained may sometimes have been presented in a way that was de-
signed to impress me. Although the profile of Senegambian migration
is predominantly a male one, I wanted to interview some women as
well, but contacting them proved to be extremely difficult for me. I can
enumerate a variety of reasons why this may have been the case, but
have no answer to which one was conclusive. Maybe because women
tend to speak less foreign languages. Maybe because they generally stu-
died less and consider themselves as less interesting sources of infor-
mation. Maybe because they are busier with organising the day-to-day
lives of their families and have less time. Maybe because the setting of
an interview is too formal for them. Maybe because they saw my hang-
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ing around with Senegambian men as a possible threat. Even when
agreeing, the interviews tended to be shorter and less informative, as
also noticed by Pe´rez (1995). On the other hand, being Belgian also
seemed to play a role: in Spain, I was a foreigner like them, and the
‘outsider solidarity’ meant that a good introduction, open attitude and
empathy towards migrants were enough to obtain consent. It took con-
siderably more effort to convince people to do the interview in Bel-
gium, in particular for undocumented migrants; even the ones who be-
came friends would avoid participation. The main reason for the reluc-
tance in Belgium might lie in the more harsh control upon
undocumented migrants. Potential respondents probably linked me to
the power of the state and its reputation of hostility, control, and repa-
triation; this affected my ability to establish a confident and informal
relationship with participants – basically taking a lot more time (Martı´n
Pe´rez 2006). As one central figure in the Senegalese community in
Belgium told me when I discussed this issue with him: ‘maybe that is
because your country scares people more than Spain?’
If there is a way to cope with these shortcomings, it seems to lie in a
very good understanding of the context of the interview and the re-
spondent, theoretically, statistically, as well as socially. The dialogue
and closer contact during semi-structured interviews allow for a more
precise process of presentation and analysis; in addition, participant ob-
servation offers the opportunity to share ideas, review the data and test
the interpretation, having time to unravel the surprising and at first in-
comprehensible. Another rule of thumb is to be reflexive about one’s
own role in the research, not only by writing one’s own social and cul-
tural position into the research, but by exploring in depth whether any
or all of these aspects of self identity lead to bias. An ethnographic re-
search diary that captures the flux and uncertainty of the process can
provide rich and crucial insights (Mauthner & Doucet 2003). In addi-
tion, more general data such as key person interviews and available sta-
tistics can serve to put specific experiences in context. However, as a
researcher who worked only in two sites, with migrants from one
source region only, I cannot easily extrapolate to speak of experiences
in other sites, persons from other source countries, other specialised
strategies or labour market sectors.
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4 How migration from Senegal and the Gambia
became an institution
Ndogou nodded agreement, took out her notebook and added to
the long list of outstanding payments. Everyone who runs a
business in the village has a notebook like hers. The island’s
overflowing with old men who can no longer fish or plough
their fields – productive in the old days, now reclaimed by
forest – and with migrants’ wives, surrounded by their broods,
who consume on credit, on the strength of a promised money
order. (Diome 2006: 20)
A first step in order to understand the possibilities Senegambian mi-
grants have in the labour market of their host country, is to take a clo-
ser look into the nature of their migration project, the background of
the country of origin, and the specificity of the expatriate community.
The characteristics of migrant flows are often tied with the economic
and/or political situation at home, and even the destinations they
choose are influenced by historical links between both areas. Africa is a
region of considerable, essentially intra-continental migration, consist-
ing of regional movement by refugees, undocumented migrants, and
seasonal labour migrants. Emigrants to northern countries include
skilled workers, students, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and re-
cently autonomous female migrants (Adepoju 2004). Knowing about
the country of origin might help to understand who they are, what they
know, their motivation, their personal aims in terms of economic and
social progress, and the determination to succeed, all of which are
most important in terms of the background to the book. Most of the lo-
cal patterns described below are not necessarily specific to Senegal and
the Gambia; they form part of a global socio-economic system, and are
to be found in different patterns throughout emigration countries
everywhere in the world.
In this chapter, I will explore the driving forces behind continuing
migration from Senegal and the Gambia to Europe over time. What is
more, I hope to show how emigration has evolved from being an occa-
sional survival strategy in rural areas to becoming the most widespread
perception of opportunity for youngsters, a support network spanning
a wide area involved in economic activities, and an indispensable
source of income for families at home. First, I will show how economic
activities in Senegal and the Gambia have narrowed due to ecological
and political factors, resulting in limited possibilities for subsistence.
This will be based on how Senegambian economies and populations fit
into the global economic system. Second, I will examine more closely
the routes into Europe, Spain and Belgium in particular, highlighting
the importance of the existing community in attracting and supporting
more newcomers. Third, I will explain the Senegambian migrant ‘busi-
ness’ concept that functions as an ethnic niche for employment. Final-
ly, I will discuss the relationship migrants keep with their homeland
and the family, the importance of remittances, and the consequences
for the original migration project.
4.1 Why leave Senegal or the Gambia?
The theoretical reasons for migration listed in the introduction have
taken specific concrete shapes in different episodes of the migration
story from Senegal and the Gambia (Barros et al. 2002; Guilmoto
1997; Tall 2002). An overview of chronological patterns will be given
below, based on developments in the region of origin, changes in the
host countries, and the cycles of migration. This shows that there is
no real discontinuity between traditional forms of migration and
more modern waves (Traore 1994); at the same time, my argument
would be that the scale and weight have increased considerably, turn-
ing an occasional temporary solution into a continuous pressure
valve.
The research population is based in a region of origin, West Africa,
the reasons for which have been explained in the introduction.
Senegal and the Gambia stretch along the West African coast from
the Sahel desert region in the north to a moist, tropical south (see
Figure 4.1). As the Gambia is actually an enclave in Senegalese terri-
tory, formed by British colonisation of the otherwise French territory,
there are similarities in geography, environment, population groups,
and history. The main religion is Islam, and similar ethnic groups
are found: Wolof, Fula, Serer, Jola and Mandinka represent the largest
groups.
With a joint population of thirteen million people, both countries
have enjoyed long spells of political stability and democracy since inde-
pendence in 19601 (Jettinger 2005), but this stability has not translated
into economic prosperity, as an economic analysis by the OECD shows
(2005). Because of limited natural resources, poor soil quality in most
of the region, and colonial pressure, the economy is based on cultiva-
tion of one cash crop, peanuts, predominantly for export of vegetable
oil; this makes them hostage to fluctuations in the world production
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and prices of the crop. Senegal is a model pupil of the IMF and WB,
but small poor peasants continue to be disadvantaged in the competi-
tion on the global market. Consequently, both countries rely on foreign
aid to fill gaps in their balance of payments (Conteh-Morgan 1997), as
well as on cash remittances from citizens living abroad.
Figure 4.1 Map of Senegal and the Gambia
Source: www.columbia.edu
Table 4.1 below summarises some key data for both countries. With a
life expectancy of 56, an illiteracy rate approaching 60 per cent and
school enrolment ratios of 38 and 50, respectively, Senegal and the
Gambia belong to the 25 least developed countries: they are 156th and
155th out of 177 countries in the UN Human Development Index
(UNDP 2006). GDP stands at about $1,800 while a considerable part
of the population lives on less than one dollar per day; life with less
than two dollar per day is a daily challenge for 63 to up to 82 per cent
of the population. Total fertility is still relatively high, resulting in a
large young population: 40 per cent are aged under fifteen. Both coun-
tries participate in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative
of the World Bank.
HOW MIGRATION FROM SENEGAL AND THE GAMBIA BECAME AN INSTITUTION 69
Table 4.1 Most recent key data for Senegal and the Gambia, 2004
Senegal The Gambia
Total population (millions) 11.4 1.5
Life expectancy at birth (years) 56.0 56.1
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and older) 39.3 38.0 (est)
Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross
enrolment ratio (%)
38.1 50.3
Gross Domestic Product per capita (PPP US$) 1,713 1,991
Population living below $1 a day (%) 22.3 59.3
Population living below $2 a day (%) 63.0 82.9
Total fertility rate (births per woman) 5.0 4.7
Population under age 15 (% of total) 43.0 40.3
Urban population (% of total) 41.3 53.0
Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2006
Before the 1960s: Colonialism
The history of Africa does not start with colonisation, of course; in a
rich past with empires and conquests, religious wars and economic
crises, temporary or seasonal migration networks between empires and
kingdoms have been an important part of regional livelihood strategies
for many centuries. Aderanti Adepoju points out that African history is
deeply rooted in migration, with the most important mobility patterns
determined by the long distance trans-Saharian trade of salt, gold,
slaves, skins, gum, ivory and spices starting as early as the 10th century
(2004). During the era of colonial occupation from the 17th and 18th
centuries onwards, these goods were exported from the coasts towards
Europe; in the case of the cruel transatlantic slave trade an estimated
ten to twelve million people were transported to the American conti-
nent. Internally, workers would move towards mines and plantations
for export crops as cotton or peanuts, or to the cities as colonial educa-
tion encouraged people to abandon rural life. This disruption, the theft
of natural resources and the cultural stereotypes established under co-
lonial rule, lie at the base of the continent’s backward position today,
and are therefore linked to contemporary migration.
In the case of Senegal and the Gambia, these colonial links ex-
pressed themselves in a variety of migration patterns (Barou 1987; Tall
2002). Facilitated by the fact that all colonial citizens at the time had
both local and colonial citizenship, local troops joined the respective
French and English armies across the world in the two world wars.
Some workers were employed in administration or as sailors on boats
(for a fascinating overview of their links to Marseille, see Bertoncello
2000). Some individuals worked temporarily in France or England in
blue-collar positions. Others studied in French colleges and universities
and some diamond traders settled in Europe (Bredeloup 1993). As a
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French colony, Senegal even had representatives in the French parlia-
ment. Sometimes these people preferred to remain in France or Eng-
land, rather than returning to Africa; they would normally work in sec-
tors where other guest workers were found, in manufacturing indus-
tries and construction.
The 1960s and 1970s: Agricultural crisis
In the 1960s, most people lived from subsistence agriculture; however,
migration was already beginning to form part of the livelihoods of the
countryside. Garnier (1990) illustrates the general process very well,
based on an intensive study of one specific village. In the traditional
system, food self-support formed the basic goal of agriculture; on the
side, some cotton or other commercial crops would be grown, in order
to raise money for the limited monetary needs. However, the need to
survive was complemented by the aim of creating some wealth; at the
same time, the situation on the global market for raw materials turned
negative; and it became impossible to cover the increasing monetary
needs inside the village. In the beginning, farmers would rely on tradi-
tional solutions in times of crisis: they sold part of the harvest or cattle
herd, or one male family member migrated seasonally to work in near-
by towns or cities (Camara 2002).
The start of serious Sahelian droughts that affected the peanut-grow-
ing area in the second half of the 1960s, and particularly in the 1970s,
exhausted the villages’ reserves, and left only migration as a solution
(Tall 2002). The population increase in this period, combined with old
methods of agriculture contributed to this dynamic. The migration of
youngsters (including women) from the rural community into the ci-
ties to join a wage economy became a common goal; those who did not
find employment in one city migrated to another, often ending up in
the capital Dakar. In an illustrative anthropological account of life in
the Casamance region, Lambert (2002) found that most elderly men
had worked in the city before, demonstrating a circular movement of
people and a cyclical experience of families, with young people earning
money in Dakar for the maintenance of the family and to construct the
family house, previous to returning to marry. The population move-
ment shook the existing balance, by sucking part of the labour force
away from the fields, and by creating new needs for socially necessary
goods; in fact, it drastically changed the system from subsistence
economies into monetary capitalism. Inside Senegal, the international
dependency relationship between centre and periphery was reproduced
(Gonin & Lassailly-Jacob 2002), and migration came to represent the
promise of marital stability, economic security, and social prestige.
HOW MIGRATION FROM SENEGAL AND THE GAMBIA BECAME AN INSTITUTION 71
Others found their ways to neighbouring countries, or the more suc-
cessful African regions such as Gabon and Ivory Coast.
A small proportion of these migrants found employment in Europe;
for historical and linguistic reasons (French is the second language),
Senegalese migration was initially oriented towards France. This was
not an adventurous enterprise, but a well-prepared long-term project
supported and financed by the extended family. Parallel with previous
internal forms of migration, the survival of the village and security of
the community was the central aim, expressed in a rotation system:
youngsters were sent abroad for some years, marriages and children in
the home country guaranteed remittances for family and village and
made their homecoming more likely (Barou 2001; Bodin & Quiminal
1991; Quiminal 1995). They returned afterwards to let someone else
take their place; in the absence of visa requirements in France, this did
not present a problem. The celibate young men would usually live in
hostels, often relying on existing social networks, and being integrated
in French industries confronted with a lack of workers. This specific
form of migration first affected the Soninke and Fula from the valley
of the Senegal River (Ndiaye 1996; Traore 1994). After 1973, this sys-
tem changed considerably because of the economic crisis in Europe
and the subsequent closure of borders for migrant workers (Barou
1987; Bredeloup 1993; Diatta & Mbow 1999; Traore 1994). Because of
the Fordist crisis in the industrial and construction sectors, migrants
started to work as entrepreneurs and in businesses.
The 1980s and 1990s: Structural adjustment
In a next phase, the failure of several policies of national development
would add to the livelihood problems, while problems of continuing
desertification and globalisation of the economy deepened the crisis in
the traditional agricultural system (Camara 2002; Diop 2002; Gonin &
Lassailly-Jacob 2002). Foreign debt increased,2 and finally led to the ill-
planned structural adjustment programme (1982-1992) devised and
sponsored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
The conditions of the loans imposed privatisation, cutbacks in the pub-
lic service sector, and opening of markets by removing subsidies; this
led to tremendous economic burdens and austerity measures in educa-
tion and health systems, diminishing salaries in the public sector, and
reduced access to education, health, food, and social services (Conteh-
Morgan 1997). The disengagement of the Senegalese state resulted in
a combination of economic growth with greater poverty: the uncondi-
tional opening of markets meant the progressive destruction of vulner-
able sectors and the population grew faster than the economy. A 50 per
cent currency devaluation in 1994 made life more expensive because
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of the rise in cost of necessary imported items. The opening up of the
country also meant giving up the need for a permit to leave the country
and, at the same time, the devaluation increased the importance of re-
mittances from migrants abroad. The ‘old’ migrants continued to dis-
play the small wealth that they managed to acquire, and make a strong
impression on youngsters during their short visits in their home
country.
Rural migrants were funnelled from the hinterland to Dakar looking
for work and income: the city grew from just 100,000 people after
WWII, to more than three million inhabitants today. The consequences
of the ongoing economic crisis became visible in the urban labour mar-
kets: because of employment stagnation and cuts in services, jobs were
more difficult to find, and even well educated people faced high unem-
ployment rates (Diatta & Mbow 1999). In addition, incomes in the city
decreased because of the mounting competition from newly arrived
rural migrants (annual migration rates of 6 to 8 per cent) used to even
lower incomes (Adepoju 2004; Fall 2003). As a result of the failure of
the state, and the government’s abandonment in 1986 of the policy of
protecting products manufactured in Senegal, they find themselves at
a dead end, not having found what they were in search of, nor being
able to return (Lambert 2002). Only the informal urban sectors grew
(Barou 1987), particularly around the Dakar Sandaga market where for-
eign goods were sold.
Propelled by the globalisation of the economy and accelerated pau-
perisation, more families invested in an international migrant, widen-
ing the strategy to other regions of the country and other ethnicities
(Adepoju 2004: 73).
Thus, migration is commonly used by Africans to ensure the
survival of their families or to pursue economic mobility to sup-
plement dwindling household resources. Households generally
select and invest in a family member who is viewed to have the
greatest potential for generating migrant earnings and sending
remittances.
Despite the new restrictive immigration acts and the economic crisis,
people still attempted to enter France in search of badly paid or infor-
mal employment as the economic conditions in the poorer African
countries had deteriorated even more than in France3. But the orienta-
tion shifted from France to an exploration of a variety of other coun-
tries; Italy and Spain became increasingly popular (Pugliese 2004;
Robin 1996b), although they reached out for New York (Ebin 1990;
Fall 2002; Stoller 2002) and almost everywhere in the developed world
(Schmidt di Friedberg 2000). In the cases where they were unable to
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find salaried work in the shadow segments of mainstream industries,
they integrated in the ‘business’ network of the Islamic brotherhood as
explained below. Notwithstanding the West European protectionist poli-
cies, migration intensified throughout Europe. As return and rotation
became impossible, the men tended to settle and engage in family re-
union while they had often not been able to access decent living condi-
tions. Most women were therefore coming in an induced way, through
family reunion with their husbands.
The most recent trend: globalisation
The 40-year rule of Senegal’s Socialist Party came to a peaceful demo-
cratic end in 2000, when Abdoulaye Wade, a lawyer and a veteran op-
position politician took power. The atmosphere was one of optimism,
even euphoria (Vengroff & Magala 2001), as he promised democratisa-
tion, economic recovery, and good governance reforms; however, Wade
did not live up to the high expectations in his home base (Dahou &
Foucher 2004). There have been frequent changes in ministerial posts,
a lack of transparency in budgetary management, and bombastic but
unrealistic infrastructural project proposals. These various debates un-
derpinned the legislative and presidential election campaigns in 2007,
but on 25 February, Abdoulaye Wade was re-elected with 55.7 per cent
of the votes (De Standaard 28 Februay 2007).
Economically speaking, the situation has become more hopeless. In
agriculture, productivity went down 50 per cent in 30 years – in 2001,
farmers were able to increase production, but due to international fall-
ing prices, heaps of peanuts remain unsold, and incomes fell even
more. Traditional grains like millet fell out of use because people
started to eat bread made from subsidised wheat imported from
Europe; the same applies to local milk production being replaced by
imported milk powder, or onions and tomatoes. Despite structural pro-
blems of insufficient diversification, inappropriate land laws, desertifi-
cation and merciless global competition, the primary sector (also in-
cluding livestock, forestry and fisheries) still employs about two-thirds
of the active population. A study measuring the incidence of poverty in
Senegal in February 2001 found 48.5 per cent to be concentrated in
rural areas (cited in: OECD 2005). The dramatically declining stocks in
traditionally rich fishing grounds is also leading to dwindling incomes
among fishermen; they blame overfishing by massive European and
Japanese trawlers, which are no match for their wooden vessels. The
secondary sector (concentrated in food processing, construction materi-
als, chemicals and textiles, 23 per cent of GDP in 2003) faces a lack of
foreign investment, a limited domestic market, and insufficient institu-
tional support for small and medium enterprises. In terms of infra-
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structure, moving goods and people is difficult, costly and slow; Dakar
currently sees traffic jams at all times of the day, at all days of the
week. The modest tertiary sector is slowly growing, particularly the
branches of tourism, telecommunications and transport, with the har-
bour of Dakar benefiting from an excellent geographic position and the
civil war in Ivory Coast. In a comparative report about shadow econo-
mies worldwide, Schneider shows that the share of shadow economy
in African nations has increased between 1999 and 2003, in the case
of Senegal from 45.1 to 47.5 per cent of official GDP. The limited local
economy means that citizens are often unable to earn a living wage in
a legitimate manner. Working in the shadow economy is often the only
way of achieving a minimal standard of living (Schneider 2006).
A 2002 survey of the labour market in Dakar sheds a light on the
problems faced (OECD 2005). Unemployment in the strict sense of
the word was estimated at 11.7 per cent of the active population. How-
ever, if the number of those working less than the official working
hours and those working for less than the minimum wage is added to
the number of unemployed, underemployment hits nearly 72.5 per
cent of the active population in Dakar. Some 7.5 per cent had relatively
stable jobs in the public sector, where average income was around
$283 per month. The proportion of workers in the formal private sector
was 16 per cent, with monthly salaries averaging $214. The informal
sector was by far the largest one, accounting for 76.4 per cent of work-
ers, bringing home about $74 per month, still below the minimum
wage, despite longer working hours and the absence of social security
benefits. Many families survive by combining several micro-businesses,
varying according to seasons, occasions, and time of the day: selling in
the market in the morning, selling on the streets in the afternoon, sell
cold drinks or snacks from home, day-labour in construction, helping
out friends with shops, braiding hair, carrying water. A high proportion
of families can provide for the daily needs by putting incomes together;
however, any accumulation is impossible, ruling out housing improve-
ments or investment in higher education, and any misfortune (illness,
handicap, death, fire, loss of harvest) leads immediately to disaster. Se-
negal, despite its stability and relatively good position, cannot offer im-
proved economic prospects to its population, whether it is on the level
of survival, welfare or social promotion.4
In the meantime, about three million out of eleven million Senega-
lese are living abroad and sending home millions of dollars in official
remittances each year. On their return visits, even if only after five or
eight years, they bring back a minimum of goods that are unachievable
for their comrades: mobile phones, clothes, radios or TVs, jewellery;
they may have saved to bring over a car, or start the construction of a
house (Kaplan 1998). Those migrants often pretend to be better off
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than they actually are, leading to distorted information that serves as a
strong incentive to migration. However, even if they try to explain the
difficulties of life in Europe, their material condition contradicts their
words. This parade of prosperity is irresistible for the curious, creative,
adventurous, and ambitious young men who do not understand anti-
immigration policies, bureaucracy, and crisis in the European econo-
mies or racism (Kaplan 1998). Respondents in the research mention
all these elements as factors in the migration decision: from dire pov-
erty over ambition and curiosity to being pushed by family members.
Whereas up until the 1980s the educated civil servant was the sym-
bol of success and the point of reference, the emigrant has nowadays
taken his place as role model (Tall 2002). For a whole generation of
young people, education no longer represents social mobility; with just
courage and perseverance, the migrant is able to support his family
and make investments. Migration is at this point seen as the only way
to survive economically and, more importantly, to be someone. This
ideal has affected very diverse groups: the recruitment base in Senegal
and The Gambia currently covers the whole population, all ethnicities,
all brotherhoods, including the higher educated,5 middle classes, peo-
ple with jobs, single women and underage children (Bertoncello & Bre-
deloup 2000a; Tall 2002). With diversification of profiles and destina-
tions, more clandestine and spontaneous migration, the Senegambian
migrants illustrate the general trends developed in the introduction.
Migration turns into a dream and a furious obsession: they are deter-
mined to leave, even if it has become a path fraught with administra-
tive obstacles. It is hard to imagine the extent to which migration has
become a feature of life: young people plan to leave, they work to leave,
they talk about leaving, and they move around in order to leave.6 They
spend their time on the internet chatting with foreigners, flirting with
tourists, working hard to save, nagging parents and family for permis-
sion and money to leave, queuing endlessly in front of different embas-
sies. Once the decision to migrate is taken, families often pool their
economic resources (including remittances) to send one member into
the world to improve their fate back home; an intricate network of re-
cruiters, employers, immigration authorities, relatives, and friends
abroad makes the rest of the process possible.
It is sometimes suggested that the migration flow will slow down
when current migrants would give correct information about the hard-
ship awaiting adventurers. This is, by the way, an underlying reason
for governments’ tough stand of migration and repatriation, as a
means of deterring new migrants. One fieldworker in Barcelona told
me that stories from Gambian migrants have had a regularising effect
on the most recent inflow, because their fellow countrymen tell them
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that there is no work in Spain. Another one, himself a migrant, ex-
plains that honest information does not discourage them:7
If you explain things, look, nothing is easy there, there is no
work, no papers, not this, not that, people are suffering there,
some people want to come back… you get the impression that
they do not believe you. They have in their head this migration
project, which they want to realise, a dream in fact, and they see
you as somebody who is putting limits. They don’t like it. They
say ‘yes, yes’. But you know perfectly well that he thinks he will
succeed. He will do better, work harder and realise his project.
The dominant perception of migration is still one of limited character,
a temporary move in order to make some money that would allow
them to invest in Senegal and generate an income for themselves and
their family (Black & King 2004). But inside the communities in Eur-
ope, one now finds settled migrants at retirement age next to newly ar-
rived undocumented youngsters, students as well as international busi-
ness women, highly skilled specialists recruited by international com-
panies next to women who came for family reunification, some restless
adventurers crossing numerous countries and second generation chil-
dren of the diaspora. This changes the organisation of families and
communities, the meaning of social control, the relationship between
generations, and the links with the home country (Epstein & Gang
2004).
4.2 Making it to Europe
In the face of Europe’s closed doors, immigrants engage in an interac-
tion with the rules, developing strategies to circumvent migration law,
limit the consequences of breaking it, or creatively trying to match con-
ditions. Legal and bureaucratic obstacles to migration and settlement
are seen not as absolute barriers, but as factors to be taken into account
in personal strategies, migration networks and community infrastruc-
tures (Castles 2002). The migration trajectory itself can take a variety
of forms, characterised in the first place by legal or illegal entry, and
then by the direct or indirect nature of the trip, by the means to travel
and so on. Legal entry is the most straightforward, but simultaneously
the most difficult to organise: it requires the standard necessary docu-
ments, ranging from a valid passport, a visa, a sum of cash money,
three month salary slips, a considerable sum of money in a bank ac-
count, proof of health insurance and an invitation or guarantee in the
host country. Another legal way to enter is in the framework of family
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reunification, which implies a different set of conditions to be fulfilled
by the person in the host country. Many migrants come with a tourist,
business, diplomatic or student visa as part of legal or diplomatic mis-
sions, musician or sports delegations;8 sometimes this document cov-
ers a real aim, very often it is used strategically with the goal of migra-
tion (Adam et al. 2001; Black et al. 2006). A surprising number put
their hope on illegitimate visas, false passports, borrowed passports,
fake identities, bribing migration officers, or buying the necessary
documents; and some succeed. Most people become undocumented
when the visa expires or when they travel to a third country. Travelling
by plane with a visa is the main entrance route for respondents: 31 out
of 35 interviewees in Belgium entered this way, and 33 out of 46 in Bar-
celona; improper visa use applied to 24 and 22 of them respectively.
Despite this fact, making the visa requirements for tourism and busi-
ness ever stricter could damage the very engine of western economy, as
this freedom of movement forms a crucial part of the open global
system.
Parallel with the implementation of more restrictive politics in the
field of legal migration, we can note the evolution in clandestine strate-
gies. Those without the connections or budget necessary for a visa have
resorted to long and frequently dangerous journeys as a way of circum-
venting migration controls: hiding in or under trucks or crammed in
boats they risk their lives to enter Europe. Since the beginning of the
1990s the most common trajectory for Senegambian migrants, as
explained by seventeen respondents, involves leaving from home, mov-
ing north by plane, public transport or just walking until reaching a
Maghreb country, most often Morocco (Barros et al. 2002; Bouhdiba
2006; Collyer 2006; IOM 2005). On the way they regroup by national-
ity, religious group or ethnicity, sharing support and information; some
gather in Libya to earn the money needed for continuing the trip
(Tarrius 2002). Once in Morocco they try to enter the Spanish enclaves
of Ceuta and Melilla, or they attempt to cross the Strait of Gibraltar by
small boats and rafts; recently the Canary Islands have become an alter-
native destination. In principle the whole enterprise could be com-
pleted in a couple of months, but some respondents travelled three or
four years in transit, and two made exceptionally long trips (eight and
twelve years) (Collyer 2006). The very fact of making it to Europe is
also an achievement and a source of status and pride, as many don’t
make it or die in the challenging trip; it has almost become a ‘rite de
passage’. After being chased by the police and mafias, deported, locked
up in prisons or detention centres, losing money, seeing people drown
in dangerous nighttime trips across the Mediterranean, and being
scared to death, they are determined not to give up easily.
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The participants’ travelling histories reveal a much more complex
picture than is captured by statistics. The route is often indirect: some
may have travelled to another African country before going to Europe;
others have lived in one or more other countries; still others come and
go more than once; and many end up in completely different countries
than planned. Out of 81 respondents found in Spain and Belgium, thir-
teen started their career elsewhere in Europe (Poland, Russia and Swit-
zerland one migrant each; Italy and Germany three each; France four).
This shows how migration cannot be considered as a simple change in
place of settlement, and even less as a one-time departure and clear
moment of arrival: it creates a set of movements between territories
where the limits cannot be defined once and for all.
Networks are a crucial element in all the steps of a migration project
(Ajibewa & Akinrinade 2003; Boyd 1989). Epstein and Gang (2004)
analyse the influence of others on migration decisions, and show how
both the personal network as well as the ‘herd’ influence the decision
and the choice of location through advice and information. But the net-
work is also important for funding the trip: apart from personal sav-
ings or borrowed money, many have received support from family
members, who sometimes sell everything or take on debts to complete
the necessary sum (Herman 2006). Networks later help during the trip
and, as explained in chapter 5, provide support on arrival in the host
country. As a specific form of networks, the role of brokers, smugglers
or human traffickers and their organisation should be mentioned
(Black et al. 2006; Koser 2000). As shown by the terminology, varia-
tion exists in the degree of organisation, commercialisation, and exploi-
tation displayed in assisting migrants on their trip. Beyond the help
from family members, friends or unknown people, most migrants have
to rely on the paid services of intermediaries for forged documents, as-
sistance for crossing borders and the practical organisation of the trip
(Adepoju 2005; Salt and Stein 1997). Increasingly the existence of
large organisations looking like travel agencies is noted on the market:
they recruit clients and offer them a complete package, with a network
of local agents responsible for part of the trajectory; these organisations
often control the migrant after arriving in the host country, to make
sure he pays his debt. El Paı´s cites a secret report by the UN Regional
Office for West and Central Africa (ROSEN), saying that 300,000 Afri-
cans enter the EU every year, and that 80 per cent of them use the ser-
vices of traffickers’ organisations, which have a yearly trade of 237 mil-
lion euro (El Paı´s 28 August 2006). In addition, Krissman suggests
that studies of international migration networks should include not
only labour-sending hometowns and border smugglers, but also em-
ployers that demand new immigrant workers (Krissman 2005).
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The route to Belgium
For Senegalese migrants, Antwerp is not an obvious choice of destina-
tion, as it is not so established in the mind-set of the migrants in the
same way as France, Italy or the US. Ending up in Belgium is some-
times less of a conscious choice but rather the outcome of random
circumstances, networks or chance encounters. They mostly come with
a tourist visa and an airplane ticket (Adam et al. 2001; Geets et al.
2006). Some of the earliest migrants in my sample, and a second-
generation Senegalese key informant, described the history of the com-
munity in Antwerp. Senegalese workers and students in France some-
times spent weekends in Antwerp to party, and in order to have some
pocket money, they would sell African art objects in bars. A couple of
Senegalese diamond traders were also present from the start. For pro-
fessional hawkers Antwerp was a transit zone when travelling to or
from Italy, France and Germany, to buy or store goods and to take a
rest. Afterwards some found a new job or a wife, or otherwise preferred
to settle in the city, mainly around the train station; this small commu-
nity attracted compatriots. During the economic crisis after 1973, hawk-
ing became the only option for both newly arriving migrants as well as
workers losing their jobs; the 1990s formed the heydays in this sector.
In the regularisation of 2000, a considerable number of them were
regularised and entered the mainstream.
Today, the registered West African community in Antwerp amounts
to some 600 inhabitants (in 2005) but it is a well-known fact that this
does not include a large illegal population. The city centre is clearly the
centre of the community (450 people), based on their hawking tradi-
tion, the closeness to transport and supply infrastructure, cheap hous-
ing, but also through the attraction of African shops and bars (Plan-
ningscel Antwerpen 2004). These are mostly owned by Nigerians and
Ghanaians who represent a larger and earlier African presence in An-
twerp. Some older migrants or individuals who married Belgian wo-
men also live outside the city, in the periphery of satellite towns.
The route to Spain
History
Spain has only recently become a destination country for Senegambian
migrants: it used to be a place of transition. According to several key
witnesses, a small Senegambian community existed in the Barcelona
region at the end of the 1970s, consisting of former students who had
become undocumented in France and sought a more relaxed life, and
others who had been blocked on their way to France when labour mi-
gration recruitment stopped (Kaplan 1998). Throughout the 1980s,
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small numbers of new migrants came in, while the 1990s saw an ac-
celeration of new arrivals, which even increased after 2000; simulta-
neously, family reunion started to consolidate the community and in-
crease the numbers. Next to the factor of geographical proximity, the
presence of family or friends was the first reason for migrants to
choose Spain as a destination; the successive regularisation campaigns
and the clandestine work possibilities without much risk of being de-
ported, were other reasons mentioned (Pe´rez 1995). Catalonia seems to
be particularly attractive because of its vibrant economy. In Barcelona
city, the public records (including many undocumented immigrants)
show about 700 residents from West Africa. At closer look, a remark-
able difference with Antwerp emerges: a more significant community
of Senegambians actually lives in satellite towns around Barcelona (like
Mataro´, Sabadell, Terrassa and Granollers), taking the number up to
4,300 in the 2001 census.9 Economically speaking, these municipali-
ties and Barcelona form a functional unit, in which many industries
are decentralised to the peripheral towns and coordination and man-
agement functions are concentrated in the capital. This coherence is re-
flected in the institution of the Barcelona Metropolitan Area, defined
by the Regional Planning Laws of the Catalan Parliament in 1987. The
geographical configuration of employment possibilities and the cheap-
er housing motivate Senegambian migrants to settle outside the city
centre, contrasting sharply with the pattern in Antwerp as will be
shown in the empirical chapters. This confirms that the location of
workers is determined by the spatial structures of the economic activ-
ities in which they work, as well as the provision of housing.
Recent trends
Increasingly in recent years, the determination and desperation of
African migrants trying to reach Spanish territories has captured the
headlines of local and international press:10 over the summer of 2006,
they adopted the motto ‘Barca ou Barzakh’, ‘Barcelona or the afterlife’.
The ‘patera’ (a small precarious boat) and later ‘cayuco’ (wooden open
fishing boat) arriving on the Southern or Canarian coasts filled with
black immigrants has become the symbol of illegal migration, creating
the image of an invasion, and serving to justify tightening of the laws.
However, the problem with sub-Saharan migration is not the numbers
or the volume, as they compose only 5 per cent of the total number of
immigrants in Spain, but the often tragic circumstances that show per-
haps the bitterest face of migration.11 It is estimated (El Paı´s 16 April
2006) that between 1989 and 2002 almost 10,000 people have died or
disappeared attempting to enter the Spanish territory from Morocco; in
the first six months of 2006, 490 bodies were found on African and
Spanish coasts and between two to 3,000 went missing. A closer analy-
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sis of the evolution of this phenomenon between autumn 2005 and
December 2006 reveals the concrete interplay between the determina-
tion of the migrants, Spain’s policies preventing migration, and the
quick adaptations of traffickers (El Paı´s 3 June 2006). A map of key mi-
grant routes (Firgure 4.2) shows main entryways from north to south,
which runs parallel to chronology: the most northern strategies have
been replaced recently with longer trips starting in the south.
Figure 4.2 Key migrant routes from Africa to Europe
 
Source: news.bbc.co.uk
Spain started to work on a European subsidised integral control system
and invested in collaboration with Moroccan authorities, in order to
prevent illegal crossings of the Strait of Gibraltar and from the
Western Sahara to the Canary Islands. When these measures became
effective12, thousands of migrants regrouped in the bushes around
Ceuta and Melilla in autumn 2005 and jumped the fences in a series
of massive raids. After thirteen deaths, hundreds of deportations and
the decision to increase the height of the fence from three to six me-
ters, migrants discovered another route to arrive at the Spanish shores
via Nuadibou, a Mauritanian border city. More than 1000 migrants in
three days and a couple of diplomatic missions later (El Paı´s 14 May
2006), a repatriation agreement was negotiated. Just days later boats
started to depart from Saint-Louis, the most northern city of Senegal,
making the trip nowadays 1,200 km and eight to thirtheen days long;
later, departure points in Dakar and Southern Casamance were also
identified, up to Guinea Bissau. Summits, presidential visits, the pro-
mise of 35 million euro in development aid as well as 4,000 openings
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for legal migration to Spain, convinced the Senegalese president to col-
laborate in controlling the sea and to accept the repatriation of about
5,000 citizens (El Paı´s 17 October 2006).13 The Senegalese government
hoped that by using smaller regional airports this would pass unno-
ticed and avoid losing public credit in the face of elections in 2007.
Throughout the summer ever increasing records of arrivals were an-
nounced per day, weekend or week; at the end of December, the coun-
ter was just below 31,000 arrivals on the Canary Islands (equalling the
numbers of the last four years together – El Paı´s 27 December
2006)14. The most common profile was revealed by Red Cross research
amongst 667 immigrants detained in Mauritania in the summer of
2006: they were mainly Senegalese between eighteen and 30, with pri-
mary education and previously working in business or agriculture. And
despite wounds and infections from the first trip, more than half were
determined to have another try (El Paı´s 11 September 2006). Over the
year, the traffickers have adapted routes responding to the changing po-
lice vigilance; the market is very profitable, with an endless demand
and prices between 500 and 1,000 euro per person.15
4.3 Senegalese business tradition
When asked about actual or previous activities, respondents mostly
mention ‘business’. In western minds this concept evokes connotations
with bookkeeping, marketing, business plans and cash flows; but there
is another ‘business world’, one of nomadic entrepreneurs, animating
an underground economy of global reach, raising respectable profits
(Peraldi 2001; Tarrius 2002). It is based on trust, verbal promises,
close networks spanning different ethnicities and cultures, mutual sup-
port and collaboration, but also on exploitation and criminal activities.
It involves masters and ‘ants’ (Tarrius 1992), a wide range of formal as
well as informal activities and transactions, often essentially occasional
and not necessarily professional. Snatches from my fieldwork include
the following: I brought the first copy of the new Youssou N’Dour CD
to Belgium in December 2005; the next day, somebody made 30 copies
of it and sold them at four euro each: 120 euro profit. Another person
buys twenty pairs of shoes from a Pakistani friend and sells them for a
ten-euro profit. In the centre of Barcelona, phone cards cost only 3.8
euro, while they are sold in Mataro´ for six, creating a small-scale traffic.
Someone hears about a truck full of T-shirts with a production fault,
and he sells them to a garage that uses them as rags. A woman visiting
Barcelona brings the new fashion in fabrics from Paris and sells them
during her visit. There is no clear delineation between the occasional
hawker and the one who fills three containers every two months, be-
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tween the one who has no papers and the one travelling back and forth
for many years; some activities generate only pocket money; others are
real international businessmen... (Marfaing 2003b). Business repre-
sents an accessible opportunity that inscribes itself in the informal
economy, so familiar in Africa (Torres Perez 2004); at the same time,
the commercial activity is a way of life rather than a job (Barry 1992;
Harding 1992). In this way, business is everywhere all the time, every-
body is always on the watch for an interesting deal, and every Senega-
lese is a potential businessman.16
In the specific Senegalese context, hawking, selling, peddling, im-
port-export and business are partly overlapping concepts, and a term
that respondents themselves use frequently is ‘modu-modu’17. This wide
variety of activities will be explored below, as well as the particular net-
work underpinning the most recent trade diaspora – showing how it
becomes an institution that supports migrants and links them to their
home country.
A wide spectrum of activities
The first and most common method of commerce is hawking or mo-
bile selling, a Senegalese specialisation18 (Diop 1990; Sow 2004; Stol-
ler 2002; Torres Perez 2004; Vargas Llovera 1997). In Spain and Italy,
the tourist beaches and squares are the most popular and lucrative
places. In Belgium hawkers prefer to sell inside bars where they are
more hidden from the eye of the police; the summertime, when people
are out on the terraces, is therefore more dangerous. Some hawkers use
this difference in location to make a seasonal tour of Europe: going south
during the tourist season, back to Belgium during the winter. Hawking
without a permit is forbidden and many of them have no residence per-
mit. This combination makes them vulnerable not only to police checks
but to abuse from bar owners or clients, ranging from racist remarks
over stealing goods to physical aggression. To avoid this, some migrants
have specialised in ambulant selling within their own community, visit-
ing private houses with merchandise targeted at their colleagues and
friends. Finally, a limited number of hawkers have formalised their busi-
ness and sell in markets and summer festivals throughout Europe.
The goods they sell vary, not in the least with the budget they can in-
vest, but they also adapt the merchandise to the place, the weather, and
the latest fashion. The offer can range from umbrellas to leather coats,
ethnic musical instruments, belts, or sunglasses; from reproductions
of famous paintings to stilettos, from towels to strings and from Afri-
can masks to cheap electric toys. A more recent trend in Barcelona is
selling copied CDs and DVDs in restaurants and bars. The profit mar-
gins depend on the goods (and on the days); and incomes range ac-
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cordingly from most precarious to comfortable: two or three euro profit
per CD or DVD, 99 cents per cotton bracelet. However, the really good
business lies in counterfeiting of elite brands: the goods are in high de-
mand and the profit is high.19 A well-done fake Breitling watch re-
quires an investment of 75 euro, but can be sold at 500; although one
is not that lucky every day, it is a chance not to miss. The negative
sides are the higher investment and the more severe penalties when
caught. The most profitable and most dangerous are criminal activities
based on this principle: next to the famous diamond shops in Antwerp,
they sometimes offer fake but identical looking jewellery to clients.
And some people have a role higher up the hierarchy, as the person
producing the pirate CDs and DVDs, or as the broker for counterfeit
goods. The production of this merchandise links into a global econo-
my, with commercial networks bringing it from China, Pakistan, Spain
and Italy down to the hawkers (Tarrius 2002).
A second kind of business is based on larger scale import-export trans-
actions in the informal sector, based on existing price differences. The
economic divide between Europe and Africa (but also the US and Middle
East) guarantees interesting profits for those who can cross borders
without paying duties (Sow 2004; Tarrius 2002). In this profession, mo-
bility in all its forms organises the activities and structures the trajec-
tories (Bava 2000). Travelling through the country on the most modest
level, moving to other countries in Europe as part of business deals; and
the most international businessmen hold itinerant trading in high re-
gard, linking the US, Europe, the Middle East and Africa (Bertoncello &
Bredeloup 2000 a; Diouf 2000). Some places represent central func-
tions like Dakar and Paris, and others are flexible, depending on local
seasonal opportunities. In fact, there are an increasing number of very
successful businesswomen. The new information technologies make
this global network possible (Tall 2003). Although being a successful in-
ternational businessman is almost everyone’s dream, becoming one re-
quires more means than most migrants can ever bring together. The
starting capital represents just the beginning; the supporting network is
another crucial factor, and a small role as link in the profitable chain is a
more realistic expectation than being at the very top.
The goods being traded cover a wide range, following the level of
specialisation and investment: import from Senegal and the Gambia
includes African beauty products, hair extensions, art, cloth, food,
spices, musical video’s, cereals, sweets and incense. Surprisingly, the
product lines show the interpenetration of the commercial networks of
Africans and Asians: braids, for example, are produced and traded in
China or Pakistan in quantity (Bava 2000; Sow 2001; Tellegen 2000).
African businessmen go to buy there, or stock up in wholesale centres
in Paris or import personally from the home country to distribute
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everywhere in Europe. Also exported to Africa are new electronic de-
vices like mobile phones and watches, trendy clothes and sport shoes,
underwear and perfume, toys and household appliances, but also sec-
ond hand clothes, fridges and computers. The most booming niche of
the last two decades is the trade in second hand cars and spare parts
(Beuving 2006; Gambaracci 2001; Nwolisa Okanga 1995): most second
hand European cars look new in Africa, and as they are not used for
private transport but to serve as taxis, relatively high prices are paid.
With more imports coming in, returns have been diminishing and the
high profits have become a myth and an illusion (Beuving 2006).
Thirdly, for all mainstream self-employed jobs, a parallel informal
system exists. Some women have a fully furnished informal shop at
home; some men act as travel agents for air companies and get a free
flight when they bring in a certain number of clients. Others act as in-
formal car mechanics or exchange brokers. I got a nice idea of the ex-
tent of economic activity inside the community at a baptism that I as-
sisted at in Barcelona:
The hostess wears four or five different dresses during the
night, all the ladies look like queens with embroidered African
fabrics, and with hair styles so complicated that they require
days of work. The men and children are freshly shaven and wear
new cloths. Those fabrics must have been imported, sold, sewed;
all the guests went to a hairdresser and women had their make-
up done. In addition, an army of women must have cooked to-
day to provide food and drinks for over 80 people, and during
the evening, two photographers and one cameraman record
everything for the family back home… And then the entertainers
of the evening: three traditional singers, two men for music and
light, and two different percussionists’ bands. (field notes)
Sometimes the commercial character is difficult to define: the same
woman may braid the hair of a friend for free at one point and serve as
a beauty parlour at another; at the weekly gatherings in Business Street
dinner would be cooked for more than fifteen people, yet it was not
one of the existing informal restaurants.
To conclude, the business model developed by migrants shows their
flexibility, in not only registers of commercial practices, choices of pro-
ducts, definitions of markets, modes of financing but also profit margins:
They have thus appropriated the most important reflex of contem-
porary liberal cosmopolitanism, taking advantage of economic op-
portunity: sell whatever is in demand a lower price, always respond
to demand, and acquire captive markets. (Diouf 2000: 696)
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While they are busy, we can think whether they represent ethnic entre-
preneurship, a bazaar economy or whether they are the lowest eche-
lons of an innovative worldwide business.
The Murid connection
A special note should go to the well-documented role of the Murid broth-
erhood in recent Senegalese migration (Bava 2002; Copans 2000; Diouf
2000; Fall 2002; Harding 1992). The Murid brotherhood is a Senegalese
religious group founded in the 19th century by a charismatic leader (mar-
about) named Amadou Bamba, preaching hard work, solidarity, and ab-
solute submission to the marabout. Their economic involvement and
diversification has been aptly summarised by Copans (2000) in the ti-
tle of his article ‘Murids of the Fields, Murids of the Cities, Murids of
the Mobile Phone and the Internet’. Each of these three phases corre-
sponds to specific modes of inscription in space, formulas of financial
accumulation, relationships with the wider world, as well as new repre-
sentations of their community over time (Diouf 2000; Lacomba
2000). In a first stage starting at the end of 19th century, the Murid
brotherhood successfully carved out a space for itself within the colo-
nial system and its economy of peanuts; the money they accumulated
allowed them to become a powerful organisation with a large political
and economic influence in Senegal. Second, some Murid merchants
were involved in peanut trading in cities and colonial ports; later, the
rural migrants became involved in the rapidly developing informal im-
port-export sector. Afterwards, in the age of international migration in
the 1990s, the brotherhood managed to almost seize the monopoly of
the informal trade diaspora. This shows how Muridism adapted flexibly
to economic change, not as a planned strategy, ‘surfing’ on the modu-
modu link the same way they did on peanuts earlier (Copans 2000).
Although the brotherhood itself does not organise ‘business’, the trust
and common identity facilitate the creation of global connections, with a
Murid contact in every city, who has established privileged relations with
local intermediaries, enabling them to obtain products at prices that
other merchants cannot match; they also provide accommodation and
informal lending systems. It offers a personal project for youngsters, a
support network upon arrival, and prevents them partly from engaging
in deviant activities (Lacomba 2000; Schmidt di Friedberg 1994). Its
network of local dahira’s (circle of disciples) links back to Senegal and
to the global community, with Serigne Mamor Mbacke´, the figurehead
of the nomad marabout, guaranteeing continuity and legitimacy by his
trips and advice (Bava 2002; Gue`ye 2002). In addition, the grandchil-
dren of the Mbacke´ family travel around Europe or the US to solve
spiritual problems and at the same time make some money for a cou-
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ple of months. Both in Senegal and abroad, Muridism is a popular
movement attracting a wide population of young, urban, mobile Sene-
galese because of the international linkages and entrepreneurial style
of leadership, its emphasis on adaptation to western-oriented consump-
tion styles while being faithful to religious traditions. This shows the
brotherhood as an illustration of both the fluid and adaptable process
of globalisation and the multiplicity of cultural identities.
4.4 The importance of migration back home
Migration, or perhaps it is better to say remittances, have also become a
cornerstone element of Senegalese society. For most Senegambian mi-
grants the decision to leave was often a family decision; if not, loved ones
and friends are likely to become interested once the immigrant is able to
send money home. In general, migrants show a strong solidarity and per-
sisting relationships with relatives left behind,20 as well as a maintained
attachment to their country (De Jong et al. 2002). As soon as a migrant
arrives and finds an odd job, he will start to send money home; for
most migrants this continues throughout their whole life, and this rela-
tionship may influence important decisions during their trajectory.
People that cut the links with their family after migration are badly re-
garded and none of my respondents even considers this option.
All the Africans in Europe, they did not come for themselves,
they came for their family. If it was only me, I could stay in Afri-
ca; I know I will be fine. But maybe you have brothers, sisters,
they have problems, they want you to help them. (Sadani, 28, in
Barcelona since 2003, undocumented, garbage collection)
Remittances are a hot topic (Taylor 2004): in political conferences and
academic publications all over the world their aim and effect is dis-
cussed, focussing on ‘productive’ versus ‘consumption’ uses, two points
taken up below. Negative critiques point at the unsustainable forms of
dependency they create if only providing consumption goods. These
have been mitigated by a broad recognition of the positive roles of re-
mittances as they affect the social and economic development of nu-
merous countries around the world, if only by sheer scale. There are
different ways to send money, thanks to modern information technol-
ogy: a transfer between bank accounts if both parties have one, or alter-
natively by expensive transfers with Western Union. However, the most
common way is to consign the money to a friend who is travelling back
or a broker; during return visits, many gifts and donations are redis-
tributed, and money is both spent and invested (Asiedu 2005). In most
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statistics these informal transfers are not included, nor are the ‘in kind’
transfers (sending cars or containers filled with goods) leading to im-
precision and underestimation of the flow (Fall 2003).
This section will sketch the important relationship with home, the
money sent there and the future planned there, illustrating how vital
migration has become on both the level of the family and the country.
Remittances and consumption
Research in France in 1998 showed that 174 out of 201 West African
respondents sent money home, 108 on a regular basis (Blion & Witeska
1998). The regularity can vary as well as the amount (a small sum
monthly, an extra budget for festivities or emergencies, presents and in-
vestment during return visits) (Robin 1996a), but in this study it added
to about 10 to 15 per cent of the annual income. A recent study in the
municipality of Madrid revealed that 70 per cent of the migrants sent
money home, with an average of 24 per cent of their salary (El Paı´s 12
February 2007). When an immigrant starts sending money home, of-
ten between 50 and 150 euro a month in my sample and in other re-
search (Diatta & Mbow 1999), it is sent for day to day maintenance.
For many families, regular remittances are a lifeline and the domi-
nant source of income to pay for rent, medical expenses, school fees,
bills or food expenses as well as clothes (Jettinger 2005). A household
budget survey in Senegal in 1994 revealed that between 30 and 70 per
cent of family needs are covered by remittances (Adepoju 2004). The
money is sent to someone the migrant trusts, in order to redistribute it
to the wife and children, parents, other relatives who are living at
home, a second wife and her children, or more distant family in the
village (Garnier 1990). These ‘expenditure linkages’ transmit remit-
tance impacts to other households, including ones that may not send
migrants abroad (Taylor 2004).
The problem in Africa is that there is no social security. The social
security is the immigrants. We are the OCMW for a whole family
andmanymore.Me, personally, I havemore than 500 euro of costs
every month to pay my family, my children back there, et cetera.
(Sheikh, in Antwerp since 2004, undocumented, import-export)
Next to its economic necessity, migration is also bestowed with the
complex cultural meaning of representing success, and remittances be-
come a powerful social activity, accelerating the consumption spiral.
Whether the help is only enough to help with daily expenses of food
and housing, or is invested in education for children, assistance with
health problems, a trip to Mecca for the parents, a second wife for the
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father, or a house with garage on a beach in Dakar, a whole community
is aware of the rising standard of living. At this stage the person who
left is already a hero, probably reinforcing the image of previous mi-
grants and compelling new ones to migrate in search of funds to meet
‘these newly established consumption levels and therefore, social re-
quirements’ (Romaniszyn 2000: 140). The spending priorities of the
family back home do not always correspond to what the hard-working
migrant had planned, leading to painful discussions and misunder-
standings. In many cases the migrant actually pays the orders at a local
grocery store immediately instead of sending the money to the family
(Diop 1990; Ndiaye 1996; Tall 2003).
Remittances and investment in development
Transfers from overseas Senegalese were estimated at $421 million in
2003, representing six per cent of GDP (Dahou & Foucher 2004;
OECD 2005). This figure has risen strongly since 1999 when it stood
at 88.8 million dollars. As in many other countries, remittances are
currently higher than development aid and foreign investments from
industrialised countries together.21 The ‘export’ of migrants and what
they send back represents one of the biggest sectors of economic
growth, accounting for a considerable source of national income. Diatta
and Mbow and others (Ba 1997; 1999) have optimistic views of the de-
velopment potential of remittances: Senegalese living abroad increase
substantially the revenues of families living in the village, and they fos-
ter the development of these localities. Through their savings, invest-
ment and knowledge, they contribute in a significant manner to the eco-
nomic and social development of their country. The fruits of migrants’
labour enable other villagers to remain at home and consequently not
feel constrained to join the exodus. This view is shared by a respondent:
If every family could have one immigrant, ten years from now
Senegal will be different, a lot of people will not even want to
come to Europe. (Sadani, 28, in Barcelona since 2003, undocu-
mented, garbage collection)
As a consequence, remittances are becoming a political factor and emi-
grants are increasingly considered as important agents in the economic
and social development of their country as they actively fill some of the
holes left by the state (Adepoju 2005; Diatta & Mbow 1999; Tall 2002).
The AU’s Vision and Strategic Plan for 2004-2007 also places the dia-
spora at the centre of its aspirations to maximise the benefits of migra-
tion for development in Africa. A ministry for the Senegalese abroad
was created to manage this phenomenon, encourage migrants to be-
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come more actively involved agents in investments, and to reinsert
them back in their country’s economy, sometimes in cooperation with
IOM. However, the reality is more complicated, and the effect seems to
be limited (IOM 2005).
A first investment commonly made is in a plot of land, and later in
the construction of a house (Marfaing 2003b; Tall 1994), often a new
family house in the village, later a house in the capital. Housing has
become a very popular investment as it covers many functions: it is a
way of saving, a productive investment when rented or sold, it may one
day provide accommodation for parents. In the urban environment of
a city like Dakar, Thie`s or Touba, it softens the housing crisis, but on
the other hand it leads to wild urbanisation, permanent construction
sites and rapidly rising prises due to speculation (Marfaing 2003a; Tall
1994). Next, the migrant will try to think about a small profitable activ-
ity for family members, such as a car that they can use as a taxi, a stall
with second hand import goods, a sewing machine to be a tailor, a hi-fi
installation to be a DJ (Grillo & Riccio 2003). Finally, the final inten-
tion of almost every migrant is to invest in a big profit-making project
(Marfaing 2003a) that would allow him to return home as a successful
individual. But many also want to contribute to the development of
their country by applying the knowledge and experience they gained
through the migration experience.
Sooner or later I would like to go back to my country. I think
my country needs me, I did not come to stay here. I am waiting
to have a lot of money, that is what I wait for. But not to keep
my millions in the bank, that makes no sense. I need money to
invest, to give work to the fellow countrymen who don’t have a
job, to help them, that is how I see the development of my coun-
try. Because if I have my money here and I stay here, I help to
develop Spain, not my country (Pape, in Barcelona since 2000,
regular status, shopkeeper).
In the early days, a grocery shop would at least allow the migrant him-
self to come back and even carry some status; small-scale regional tour-
ist accommodation (‘campement’) was a popular investment for a while.
Later on, communication centres with phones and computers became
attractive, and most recently the people who managed to construct a
number of apartments in Dakar are able to realise the comfortable re-
turn they always imagined. Following the general trend in the Sene-
gambian economy, most migrants nowadays dream about a business,
often in import-export. Despite this generalised intention, Blion (1998)
finds that only 30 out of 201 respondents in his study reported produc-
tive investments in the home country – and it is important to ask why.
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A number of obstacles stand in between the vague dream and its
successful realisation. A first element is the unfavourable climate for
investment in the home country, with the unpredictable administration
and infrastructure leading to a lack of trust. Second, with the increas-
ing competition of other migrants, only a very specific plan in a pro-
mising sector can really make a difference: possibilities are specialised
informatics’ services, renewable energy, or industrial waste dealing.
However, thirdly, most migrants are not in a position to be capitalist
entrepreneurs or create a rentable economic structure because of a lack
of business background. Finally, the sum of money needed for a suc-
cessful return home is often considerably higher than expected; people
without a background in informal business often misjudge the budget
for even a modest project. Given the generally low migrant incomes in
Europe, the periods of unemployment, and unexpected costs for the fa-
mily at home, it takes longer to save that amount.
In addition, the early migrants to France organised themselves in
associations based on ethnicity, brotherhood, or region of origin, who
would gather monthly contributions and invest them in community
provisions: sanitation, a small hospital, an ambulance, a school or a
mosque (Daum 1993; Grillo & Riccio 2003; Kane 2002; Marfaing
2003a; Ndiaye 1996; Quiminal 1993). These translocal development
organisations were seen as vectors of development, and they did very
good jobs, but they suffered from similar critiques as western develop-
ment aid, including increasing dependency. In Catalonia a more
advanced vision of co-development is heavily supported by the local
government, explicitly linking cooperation with the migrant groups
present on the territory (Diao 2004; Gime´nez Romero 1997).
One can easily note that the contribution of remittances to develop-
ment in terms of job creation or innovative entrepreneurship is rather
limited. There is a clear impact on construction and commerce, but
many products are imported and are thus not pure added value for the
home country. In order to seek to leverage more remittances into eco-
nomic development, common recommendations include the strength-
ening and speeding up of formal transfer mechanisms at lower prices,
the involvement of migrants’ associations to stimulate collective remit-
tances for community development, and support for credit unions and
other micro-finance institutions (Diatta & Mbow 1999).
4.5 The sample
This background information provided the starting point for a sam-
pling procedure. The aim of the sample was not, as explained above, to
be representative of the whole Senegambian population, but to cover a
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variety of groups and migration experiences. An overview of the sam-
ple sheds some light on the composition of the flow, as presented in
Table 4.2. In the first place, it illustrates how economic migration is a
factor of selection in itself: the ones who leave are not the ill or elderly,
not even the poorest and hungriest, if only because you need a mini-
mum of money to be able to leave. Instead, migrants tend to be the
strong and healthy youngsters with capacities, motivated and well pre-
pared. Given the male tradition of migration in this population, and
the relatively early stages of migration to Spain and Belgium, it comes
as no surprise that the profile is one of young single men: the majority
of the respondents are bachelor males under the age of 35.22 As for
previous education and work experience, the general image is one of
lower educated people, at least from a European perspective, and of
people leaving the insecure informal employment discussed above.
Table 4.2 Overview of respondents by key categories
Antwerp
N=35
Barcelona
N=46
Gender Men
Women
32
3
35
10
Age group Younger than 35
35-50
Older than 50
18
14
3
29
15
2
Ethnicity Wolof
Peul
Others
21
5
9
6
12
30
Family situation Single
Married, family in Africa
Married, family in Europe
17
5
13
23
11
12
Legal situation Documented
Undocumented
23
12
30
16
Arrival in Europe After 2000
In the 1990s
Before 1990s
10
13
2
22
17
7
Level of previous education Only Koranic school23
Primary education finished
Secondary education finished
Higher education finished
1
13
15
6
14
21
9
2
Previous work experience Fixed formal job
Informal job
No job
8
13
14
3
33
10
The group does include, however, a smaller but considerable group of
people with higher degrees and fixed formal jobs prior to leaving;
many of whom left out of ambition or curiosity.24 The profiles as
shown in the figures repeat the main categories found by other
research, and confirm that I covered the most important groups
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(Anguiano Te´llez 2001; Kaplan 1998; Marfaing 2003b; Pajares 2005;
Pe´rez 1995; Vargas Llovera 1997).
The moment of arrival in Spain and Belgium shows some very early
migrants in the 1970s and 1980s; they were the exception, because
France was a more common destination at that time. However, the
1990s saw a large increase, continuing in Spain after 2000. In terms
of legal status, the majority had a residence permit at the time of the
interview, but most had previously been undocumented; a considerable
number of undocumented migrants were interviewed as well. I had no
problem finding people from all Senegambian ethnicities in Spain, re-
presenting the most isolated rural corners of the country. In Belgium,
however, I found respondents mainly from the Wolof and Peul groups;
in addition I noticed that they tended to come from the capitals Dakar
or Banjul, or Thie`s, Senegal’s second city. Closely linked to this is the
fact that respondents’ educational level in Antwerp is generally slightly
higher than in Barcelona. If the migrant is married, another interest-
ing difference is reflected in the numbers: in Antwerp, the majority of
migrants has their family living with them, while in Barcelona, half of
the families live in Africa. These differences will be developed in more
detail and linked to other parts of the research in chapter 7.
4.6 Conclusion: Senegambian migration
This chapter discusses why and how contemporary Senegal and the
Gambia, like many countries in Africa and around the world, are
marked by disequilibrium between the available resources and the
needs and hopes of the population. The crisis of the traditional agricul-
tural system, the lack of perspective in industrial or service sectors and
the problems deriving from global competition are the main reasons
why people emigrate. Because of this push-dimension and the subse-
quent dynamics of chain migration, the flows no longer correspond to
Europe’s labour needs; far from being an invasion, we should remem-
ber that most migrants just move to neighbouring countries inside
Africa. However, when they manage to arrive in Europe, the Senegam-
bian community carved out a niche in the informal business sector
that enables immigrants to jumpstart a career. The networks provide
support, goods to sell, as well as information; all these elements facili-
tate integration. Thirdly, for the families at home, the remittances have
become a structural and indispensable source of income; the country
as a whole is also adapting to this structural dimension. In short, mi-
gration has been a permanent part of history and tradition of the peo-
ple, but the transcontinental option has nowadays become a structural
institution, a shared dynamic of survival on the level of the individual,
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the family, the brotherhood and the country. However, precisely be-
cause migration is used as a means of crisis management, it is not ne-
cessarily the best solution for all problems (Adepoju 2004):
The sending country does receive big flows of money, but the
money is atomised in many ways: the number of people sending
it, the sporadic nature over time that it is sent, and the different
sectors in which it is used, for distribution and consumption
only, not so much for investment or business. It is me and my
friend sending home 200 when we can, used to buy a fridge
and to refurbish the house and send somebody to school and
cure somebody in hospital. But at no point it provides an in-
come for the government with which things for the common
good can be organised or a project can be launched (Franc¸ois, in
Antwerp since 2003, regular status, in training).
This chapter also showed how the world is interconnected in continu-
ous and complex ways, and how changes in politics or consumption
patterns in one place evoke ‘answers’ or adaptations elsewhere, how dy-
namics transcend geographical borders in short spans of time. Migra-
tion, development, and international relations are closely linked. Many
respondents mentioned that migration is unavoidable under the pre-
sent circumstances; the only long-term perspective to limit the immi-
gration flow is development in the countries of origin. This should not
be based on help, but on transformations of the economy: the economy
must be modernised, diversified, and decentralised in order to make it
a tool for reducing poverty. Beyond this, it is necessary to improve pub-
lic policy and to modernise social relations and the institutional envir-
onment, stressing coherence and efficiency and transparency. Without
Afro pessimism, one can only start to imagine the amounts of money,
energy, and effort that should be put inside. In the meantime, the mi-
gration pressure is likely to continue.
The next three chapters will present the empirical material on the ex-
periences of migrants once they arrive in Europe. They will describe in
depth the trajectories and strategies of Senegambian migrants, both in
the labour market and on a more general level, in the specific context
of Antwerp and Barcelona. An ideal-type chronological approach will
be developed, starting with life as an undocumented migrant, without
suggesting that all migrants will necessarily follow the steps in this or-
der. The mainstream experiences shared by many respondents will be
represented first; next to this, there will be substantial room to show al-
ternatives or atypical routes that other individuals develop, or to stress
changes over time for different cohorts of arrival. The relevant differ-
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ences found in experiences of the interviewees will be explicitly linked
to a comparison of the macro characteristics of both cities.
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5 Survival strategies as an undocumented migrant
Look at Wagane; now, he’s a real role model, a worthy son of
our village. He’s been to the ends of the earth to make his for-
tune; now he’s spreading it around. Leave, go where you can,
but seek success instead of just staying here […]. Go and look for
work, and don’t forget, my sons, every scrap of life must serve to
win dignity! (Diome 2006: 84)
The example of previous successful migrants is the manual for the
newcomers in Europe: the old fisherman in Diome’s novel encourages
the youngsters idly playing football to migrate, work hard, earn money,
and do all of that with dignity. Little does he know about the reality of
life and work as an undocumented migrant… The shared aim and am-
bition of Senegambian migrants is to build a better life for themselves
and their families back home, to raise the family income as well as to
ameliorate their future prospects. Given the agency-focus of this study,
the central theme in this chapter will be on the strategies people adopt
to reach that goal in the host societies, the resulting trajectories, and
how far they get. There is a consensus that the rather extreme term
‘survival strategies’ is not appropriate for most groups in Western Euro-
pean welfare states; however, in the case of new migrants, particularly
those arriving without residence permit, one might consider using it.
The uncertainty and the insecurity of their existence justify the notion
of survival strategy.
The full spectrum of survival strategies includes undocumented as
well as formal work, periods of unemployment or support by transfers
from governments. Van der Leun and Kloosterman (2006) stress how
a wide interpretation of ‘labour’ is necessary to understand migrant la-
bour market trajectories, and developed the schematic representation
below.
It shows the different spheres of the economy where migrants can
work, based on the degree of regulation by a government. The most
strongly regulated domains are the ones of governmental positions. At
the other extreme non-monetary transactions are located, based in an
exchange- and gift-economy by family and friends. In the middle, we
find monetary relationships as in salary or self-employed positions,
which can be subdivided into a formal and informal economy, and a
criminal and non-criminal one. Policies differ from country to country,
and from theory to practice. For undocumented migrants only the left
side is accessible, unless false or borrowed papers allow them to pass
on to the right side. I make a distinction between the formal or infor-
mal economy but this does not overlap completely with people being
undocumented or not, which makes it difficult to classify people or
jobs. A migrant without papers (undocumented) can do formal work
with another’s papers; documented migrants can do informal work.
Figure 5.1 Domains of economic help
       Degree of regulation by authorities  
Limited regulation                                                  Heavily regulated 
  Exchange & gift economy  Monetary  Government commissions 
Family    Friends               Informal   Formal   
Criminal    Non-criminal  
Source: Van der Leun and Kloosterman (1999: 121)
In this chapter, the labour market experiences of undocumented mi-
grants will be the primary topic; I will look at entry jobs and the devel-
opment of later trajectories, with special attention to the different co-
horts of arrival. Subsequently, I will present additional survival strate-
gies; as undocumented migrants are not entitled to state redistribution,
these will be located in the reciprocity sphere.
5.1 Work experiences of undocumented migrants
A majority of respondents, 60 out of 81, have entered the countries of
destination illegally, or became undocumented a few months after their
arrival; either way, they went through phases where they did not pos-
sess the necessary documents that allow a normal entry into the labour
market. According to Soenen, legal status influences labour market tra-
jectories in three ways: through exploitation by employers, by concen-
tration in lower wage jobs because of difficulties to maximise returns
to their human capital, and because of a lower reservation wage. This
means that undocumented migrants are ready to accept lower wages
(or worse conditions) due to a lack of other support systems such as so-
cial welfare, or due to precarious positions (Soenen 2003; Van der
98 GETTING BY IN EUROPE’S URBAN LABOUR MARKETS
Leun & Kloosterman 1999). Below, I will sketch how these elements
lead to specific trajectories in the two cities. By definition, they have to
rely on alternative circuits of information, and they can only access the
informal jobs, often concentrated in specific sectors. However, undocu-
mented migrants can sometimes participate in the official labour mar-
ket, by working with someone else’s work permit. At that point, their
trajectories will form the subject of formal labour market behaviour –
showing that there is no absolute correlation between being undocu-
mented and working informally.1
In Antwerp
Upon arrival in Europe, migrants follow the traces of friends or family
from home, and they may arrive in Antwerp, be it planned or by coin-
cidence. The path often leads to a shared apartment such as Business
Street number 13,2 a house known for hosting Senegalese hawkers:
In Business Street, the first three months, the accommodation
and the food were free. In the meantime, the friends explain a
bit how the business works, I borrowed some money from dif-
ferent people, I learned about the police and the good addresses,
and I started to go selling myself. Business Street is almost a
business-school. Afterwards I started paying 100 euro per
month for the rent, and then contributing for the food. I started
and it worked very well, I could even send money home. At first,
business was very good, I could send home about 100 euro per
month. (Bakeba, in Antwerp since 1993, regular status, unem-
ployed)
A more vivid picture of this existence, together with the changes in this
sector over time, will be given next, as well as some examples of re-
spondents developing alternative strategies in the world of informal
labour.
The hawking sector as an entry into the labour market
For the overwhelming majority of respondents informally arriving in
Belgium (nineteen out of 27), hawking was the start of their labour
market career, and most continued doing this until the moment they
were able to obtain a residence permit by marriage or regularisation.
Not only active members of the Murid brotherhood participated, illus-
trating the centrality of business networks for Senegalese migration in
general, as discussed in chapter 4. Hawking is a rather evident path to
take upon arrival as an undocumented migrant when the social context
pushes in that direction.
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Many did not have any previous experience in business or selling in
Senegal – and more than one was very surprised to discover the way
the legendary migrants, portraying themselves so successfully and rich
back home, actually try to make a living. However, after a couple of
days or weeks, they accept that there is no other way, other than crim-
inal activities; instead, they prefer hawking as an honourable and hon-
est way of earning some money.
When I came to Antwerp I saw the people leaving with the bags,
and I was surprised and later shocked. I did not understand in
the beginning; but when I heard about the selling in bars, I was
shocked. You know, I lived very well in Senegal; I had everything
I wanted, and I could not imagine doing this for a living. You
loose your dignity in selling: the goods are not good, you lie to
people, and you make them pay more when you discuss the
price. Also, in selling you will never get any respect, people feel
pity or despise but never anything good. But I also had to do it,
there was no other way; I had to eat and pay the rent and live.
But I was so ashamed; I had never done anything like business
and I did not like it. But also I don’t want to steal. (Youssou, in
Antwerp since 2000, undocumented, working in horticulture)
Previous education, work experience, or diplomas do not play any role:
hawking absorbs both the immigrant who only went to Koranic school,
and the one who studied in university, as explained by a former mathe-
matics student:
The modu-modu they live in their own universe, they don’t go
out to understand, to learn, they don’t know. In my case, in
Brussels, as they speak French, maybe even without papers I
could do something there, they have organisations for that, to
continue studying. But when I arrived here, the modu-modu
they think only about money, and they contaminated me, I for-
got my studies. The people don’t even believe that I am a univer-
sity student, so much I was completely contaminated. Even my
wife when she arrived she asked me why do you live like this?
You speak French, you have studied; you could have had a differ-
ent life in Brussels or Lie`ge, I told her she was right but it was
too late to change (Aziz, in Antwerp since 1994, regularised,
shopkeeper).
To avoid being caught by the authorities, they cover their merchandise
(and intentions) in supermarket bags, university labelled back packs or
laptop cases; to avoid being seen or caught with large quantities of
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goods, some have a network of distribution points where they leave the
stock, taking only samples on their journey. They are not only afraid of
the police; they are often confronted with abuse, racism and threats
from barkeepers or customers. Because of their undocumented status,
it is difficult for them to rely on protection by the law, leading to a de
facto impunity for those who want to attack them.
But it is not a nice job, sometimes people say bad things, or they
can even beat you, or take things without paying, and you can-
not do anything because if the police comes it will be you who
has the problems. Therefore, you have to tolerate it. (Bakeba, in
Antwerp since 1993, regular status, unemployed)
As explained by Bakeba above, the immigrant network is central in the
whole process, from the early days’ subsistence support in accommoda-
tion and food, over possibilities to borrow money for an initial set of
goods to sell, to more experienced hawkers sharing experiences about
the police or bar owners. Their working day starts in the early evening,
at about 6 or 7pm, and can continue until late at night, particularly in
weekends. With the unsafe climate of the 1990s, they were pretty
much confined to the environment of the shared house for the rest of
the day, spending their time cooking, eating, talking, and watching TV
together. These particular characteristics of this hawking life lead some
people to muse nostalgically now that they have moved on.
The level of income depends on the period, the skills, the experience,
the range of articles for sale and respective profit margins, the presence
of a fixed run of customers, the amount of time and energy spent in
going around, but is in any case variable. It is difficult to estimate, but
it can range from almost nothing on bad days to about 1,500 euro or
more a month (in the heydays of the 1990s). People have to plan and
distribute their income over longer periods, covering the days or weeks
when they do not sell anything with savings from the good days.
Since 2000, life has become more difficult for new cohorts arriving,
and income for the hawkers has diminished, due to a combination of
policy elements showing increasingly strict controls. The Antwerp po-
lice started a persistent campaign of heavy scrutiny against the numer-
ous counterfeit shops and businesses at Falconplein, the main supply
centre in Belgium; the subsequent controls, arrests and fines for all
kinds of breaches of the law caused the shops to close over a couple of
months and (probably) move elsewhere. To show a firm attitude
against criminal activities, symbolic and highly visible police actions
are undertaken in well-known immigrant areas such as North and De
Coninckplein3. After the 2000 regularisation, police currently target
their identity checks in different ways, focussing more on specific activ-
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ities (like hawking) and places (like communication centres) rather
than people walking on the street. A third element making life difficult
is the proliferation of cheap shops selling Chinese import goods at very
low prices, undermining the competitive edge of the hawkers, as ex-
plained by Malick:
The situation has changed a lot; the business is not working as
well any more. Now every street almost has a cheap Pakistani
shop where you can buy sunglasses and t-shirts, the very things
that we used to sell in the bars. The cheap prices have arrived
everywhere, also in the markets every week you can find them.
(Malick, in Antwerp since 1989, regularised, industrial cleaning)
Alternatives and further trajectories
As mentioned before, the majority of hawkers remained in their busi-
ness until the moment they obtained legal residence status; two of
them started a larger business filling containers. However, a small
number of respondents managed to find alternatives outside hawking.
Two musicians came from Senegal to France and the Netherlands re-
spectively with temporary permits linked to their profession, and be-
cause of prospects for next concerts or unexpected travelling to third
countries, became undocumented; they just continued their music ac-
tivities. A married undocumented woman worked informally as a hair-
dresser, while one of the rare women who came to Europe on her own
initiative to earn money, found a job as a waitress, showing how the
African neighbourhood in Antwerp creates networks of employment:
One day there was a festival in De Coninckplein, and I assisted,
I was sitting in a Gambian bar. The woman had seen me a cou-
ple of times before, and I saw her very busy, lots of clients. As I
used to be a waitress before in Gambia, I asked her if I could
help her out that day… and I did, I worked there the whole day.
Later in the evening, she asked if I needed a job, and I worked
in this bar from the next day for a couple of months. (Ndeye, in
Antwerp since 1996, regularised, unemployed)
Some people really hate the hawking and try to escape; two of them
managed to do so with links to the wider Belgian community, finding
work in construction and renovation:
I had no papers, so I started selling as well, but I always tried to
talk a lot to the people in the bars, so I got to know many people
and they would buy me drinks and discuss. Like this I got to
know a man who took me for a job in construction; well actually,
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in demolition, of a very old building. I was very happy because I
hate the bag and the selling, I prefer every kind of job to selling,
I prefer a job. And for that I was very motivated and working
very hard; so the man liked me. Afterwards a friend of his took
me and I was working in construction with him for eight
months. (Youssou, in Antwerp since 2000, undocumented,
working in horticulture)
Two other respondents have taken up work in horticulture, mostly
picking tomatoes and chicory. When looking closer into their employ-
ment situation, a strange contradiction arises: they need papers in or-
der to work informally. Employers fear the labour inspection, and pre-
fer a legal worker to an undocumented one, even for informal work, as
the fines are lower. The undocumented migrant borrows papers from
someone else, is hired officially for a couple of hours a day, but then
works many more hours at informal conditions and without contract.
Personal problems occur frequently: conflicts with a boss or col-
leagues, misunderstandings, gossip, jealousy; it is difficult to make the
difference between an interpersonal conflict and a racist attitude. How-
ever, the process that is described in the case of undocumented work-
ers quite often goes as follows:
You know, when you have no papers, you feel you have to take
every chance and not spoil it, so you work very hard, harder than
everybody else, and you are more flexible, you want to work all
the hours that are possible. So sometimes, the boss needs some-
body in the evening or in the weekend, or one week not every-
body needs to come as there is not enough work to do. He will
choose you because you work very hard. This will create jealousy
in the people who were there before you and are not picked. If
they know you have a different name in reality, or you have told
them before about the false paper, they will tell the boss and you
will have to go (Musa, in Antwerp since 2004, undocumented,
import-export)
Another observation is that undocumented migrants can only very
rarely mobilise their human capital or professional experience, and
they do not have higher salaries than those without qualifications
(Adam et al. 2001). A migrant with an English graduate degree has no
better chances and is picking tomatoes all the same, as his borrowed
paper does not show his real qualifications. Undocumented migrants
have to accept socio-professional downgrading.
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In Barcelona
After the first days with friends or family, a different pattern tends to
develop in Barcelona:
My first job was in the first week, after three days, it was the
boss of one of my cousins, and he said he needed someone for
one week. It was in a flower field, the ones we call chrysanthe-
mum. I was disillusioned very quickly, because it was painful,
and it was so different. In Senegal, we talk and we don’t control
ourselves during work, but even my cousin, when I want to talk
to him, he told me not to talk during work, when the boss can
see us, so me too I shut up. So, we work, I don’t know at what
time we will stop; when we take a break to eat, I thought we
would stop, they tell me ‘you, where are you going with your
bag, we are only taking breakfast’. We ate, and we spent the
whole day there; from 8 to 10 am, then till 1 pm, then we have
lunch and everyone is talking. At the end, we went home at 7
pm. For me it was very cold, the month of April, and I was wear-
ing my coat. I told everyone I was very cold. The boss also knew
that I just arrived: when he speaks to me, I just look because I
don’t understand what he’s saying, he just asked my name. That
is how I spent the first week working. […] He paid me in pese-
tas, many notes in red and green; the others when they received
their envelopes they were smiling, but me I don’t know how
much I earned, I don’t know, I asked another one, how much is
it, he told me this one, the 1,000 pesetas note, is 3,500 CFA in
Senegal. I counted how many notes of 1,000 I have… it was a
lot, a lot. For this first week they paid me 27,000 pesetas. I was
very happy as well. Afterwards my cousin told me to go to the
market to buy a chicken, but I told him I will not eat, I want to
keep the money (Thierno, in Barcelona since 1999, regularised,
construction).
This quote sheds early light on some dimensions of employment as an
undocumented worker in Barcelona: the generally poor knowledge
upon arrival, the difficulty of adapting to the work rhythm and ethic,
the difficulties in different language and climate, but it also shows how
rewarding the first payment was (approaching a month’s salary for edu-
cated people in Senegal). More importantly, it brings up two points that
need further elaboration: job-hunting strategies are located within the
migrant community; and agriculture is the main sector for first entry
to the labour market. Subsequently, I will explore how careers develop
after this first occupational experience.
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Job searching strategies
In the informal sector, there are by definition no mainstream institu-
tions involved in job hunting, although the process can be rather well
organised, as will be shown below. A very common start for respondents
in Barcelona is to ask friends and relatives whether their bosses need ex-
tra workers; indeed, the employers often take the initiative by asking
workers they trust to bring friends for jobs. A variation of this can be
found in construction, where subcontractors tend to call at migrants’
houses to find workers. All undocumented immigrants in the sample
combine this ‘searching through friends’ with the ‘asking’ strategy: this
implies going round workplaces checking if vacancies are available. In
the municipalities around Barcelona, this is a tradition mainly in agri-
culture; people walk around in the fields and around glass houses to ask
employers for a job; ‘walking’ can be used also in industry, but is not as
popular or efficient. This shows a general knowledge of job locations
and eagerness to work, particularly as many Africans have just arrived
and have limited knowledge of Spanish (Mendoza, 1998).
When I arrive, I go to look for work, on my own; my cousin did
not help me. Of course, I don’t speak Spanish, but my brother
tells me, if you know ‘hello’, you will learn something every day,
with strength, with the necessity and with the hardship, and
after one week I knew enough to find a job. I saw a man in a
field, I day, ‘‘hello sir, I look for work if you have it’’; some say
yes, some say no, like this. (Amadou, in Barcelona since 1983,
regular status, plastic industry)
In major agricultural regions, such as the south of Spain, a day-labour
system exists for seasonal work; Brussels has some similar sites as
well. Men and women, mostly of migrant origin, look for employment
in open-air markets by the side of the road, at busy intersections, in
front of home improvement stores and in other public spaces (for an
extensive overview in the US, see Valenzuela et al. 2006).
These are illustrations of collective networks, in which the commu-
nity as a whole channels and is channelled into a specific sector of the
informal economy; in contrast, some people have a more individual
network without much community backing, but often based on parti-
cular skills (Geets et al. 2006). The next respondent is an illustration
of this difference. He was a carpenter in Senegal, acquired skills in
construction in Portugal, and built an informal employment network:
So when I come here, the things go a little bit well, I have no
papers but I am working with so many bosses. Sometimes in a
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workshop, because I have many skills, sometimes also in con-
struction, welder… this kind of things. Also assembly, where my
brother is working, so as I can understand this kind of work, I
am doing it for him: also I work here in cleaning; here in Spain,
to clean the train lines. Sometimes someone sends me to Barce-
lona to work, constructing grids in gardens, tennis fields; swim-
ming pools, you know. But always for limited time, and without
contracts, always by people who know me, but without contracts.
(Bara, in Barcelona since 2002, undocumented, construction)
The agricultural sector as an entry into the labour market
From early on, there has been a substantial presence of the hawking
tradition in Spain amongst Senegalese migrants (Sow 2004; Torres
Perez 2004; Vargas Llovera 1997), as in any other country, and six of
them were interviewed.
But a more significant number of respondents (thirteen) started
their informal career in Spanish agriculture, a sector mentioned in the
economic analysis of Spain before. The importance of this sector for
black immigrants is confirmed by key informants in the employment
sector and in other publications (Bell 2003; Hoggart & Mendoza 1999;
Kaplan 1998; Mendoza 1997; Pe´rez 1995). Some of them work in
rather small family-based enterprises, other in ultra-modern highly
computerised glasshouses, but the jobs are generally unskilled in na-
ture. Possible previous experience in farming in Africa is not useful as
the techniques and crops are very dissimilar. Specific skills used by
African workers (like pruning, driving machines, etc.) have mainly
been learned after leaving their home country. Key informants agree
that agriculture has some of the worst labour conditions in the infor-
mal sector, because it operates in a sector under global competition.
Agricultural workers need to be available (often staying at the farm, or
get to work early in the morning), flexible (ready for overtime, long
days of up to eleven hours and weekends in peak times, but sometimes
there is no work at all), and hard-working (physically hard conditions,
in different weather conditions, often in stooped positions, often carry-
ing heavy loads). Salaries are low: common incomes in agriculture ap-
proximate three euro per hour; employment is never long-term or se-
cure, as an early autumn storm or late frost can lead to massive unem-
ployment; many positions are part-time, short-term, seasonal, or even
casual. In conclusion, Martı´nez Veiga (1999) argues that the Spanish
agricultural sector is almost entirely secondary in nature if we exclude
proprietors and their family: almost all work is temporary, with clear
wage discrimination and housing discrimination. Mendoza (1997) con-
cludes that the competitive advantage of African workers in agriculture
lies in physical endurance and job flexibility.
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A very particular example of temporary farmer work flexibility is
shown by people following the pattern of subsequent agricultural cam-
paigns of olives, asparagus, potatoes, strawberries and fruit picking
over different regions across Spain (Martı´nez Veiga 1999). Each peak
period of employment in specific crops attracts workers from all over
the area and even abroad. This system is informal and badly organised,
resulting in conflicts when more workers show up than work is avail-
able (Santana 2000).
Over time, the time people spend searching prior to encountering
their first job in agriculture has changed, probably due to increasing
competition and control. Migrant cohorts entering the labour market
in the 1980s until the end of the 1990s mention found a job in a mat-
ter of days or weeks, and were often guaranteed an income over a long-
er period of time: employment lasted for over a year up to ten years.
For the cohorts entering after 2000, the situation has become a lot
more difficult: new laws impose heavy fines on employers hiring clan-
destine workers and even many family enterprises are scared off. Re-
spondents mention more casual work than before, or indicate that they
need to work with someone else’s papers.
For a long time I did not work. Oh yes, very short jobs, maybe
two or three days, or one week, and then finished. Then I stay
one or two weeks without anything, no work. It is always in the
fields, never in factories, but gardens, flowers. I look and search,
but I cannot work. You know, I look for money, it is my goal.
But nowadays it is very difficult. So difficult. There is no work,
many people, a lot of harassments. Maybe tomorrow there are
possibilities, but now I cannot find them. Every day I leave for
searching, but they always ask papers, if you reply ‘no’, it is fin-
ished. If you have no papers, it is difficult. You have to work to
get papers, but the work is easier to find with papers. If you
have papers you can start tomorrow. (Sadani, in Barcelona since
2003, undocumented, casual work)
Alternatives and further strategies
Several respondents found informal entry to the labour market through
other sectors: mainly in construction sites (six) and textile workshops
(three). But, what is more important, several of those who started in
agriculture changed sectors and started working in small industries, in
slaughterhouses, and hotels later on in their undocumented career (re-
latively similar results in Alicante (see Vargas Llovera 1997)). Some can
stay several months; others combine odd jobs, like distributing publi-
city, parking cars or being night guards in construction sites or on a
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private holiday compound. A divorced mother of three who left her
children in Senegal while preparing a better life for them started clean-
ing informally in a hotel. Oli is doing an unpaid ‘internship’ in a textile
workshop, hoping the employer will hire her later. In addition, one re-
spondent was hired to work in a Gambian phone centre, where his
university degree with some computer experience proved to be useful.
Undocumented migrants cannot access self-employment, but they of-
ten do provide the cheap labour necessary in this ethnic niche.
Commuting times are often long, two hours is not exceptional,
because construction sites change regularly, and because people change
jobs so often that they cannot move houses every time. Most work in
small enterprises, without contracts and cash payment, and as they do
not generally specialise in one type of job, but go from one sector to an-
other, they are not able to climb the socio-economic ladder (Engbersen
& Van der Leun 2001). As in agriculture, those who entered these sec-
tors after 2000 often mention working with someone else’s papers, as
employers are not prepared to take the risk of control. In order to avoid
checks from work inspection, several respondents mention adapting
their search strategies and going three or four stops away from the cen-
tre of towns, working even more at night or during weekends. Smaller
companies as well as the domestic sector are also less likely to be regu-
larly checked by state officials.
It can safely be argued that undocumented migrants are chosen be-
cause they are cheap, flexible, and more willing to accept hardship; in
other words, their precarious situation is their competitive advantage
(Sole´ et al. 1998). Apart from a few good employers, respondents men-
tion considerable exploitation (Pajares 2005), ranging from impossible
working times, no protection in dangerous situations (e.g. in construc-
tion, or chemicals in agriculture), to withholding salary. Pay may range
between 600 and 750 euro per month in general, for more than full-
time hard work. The fact that people do not complain about the exploi-
tation they suffer4 does not mean that they are not aware of being
exploited, but they know that in their circumstances they have no
choice. The inequality between undocumented worker and the employ-
er is accepted; both have their place and know it, because the spirit of
survival (and the need for a breadwinning) underpins all other consid-
erations. Many respondents face long periods of unemployment,
mostly due to the unstable nature of employment in the black labour
market.
The recent evolution towards tighter controls implies a cohort effect
and has forced people to shift towards hawking, in particular selling
copied CDs and DVDs. In recent times, people who did not consider
this kind of work feel they are forced into this business:
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To find a job, right after I arrived, I went to the fields, I see that
wherever I go, they ask me for papers, but I did not have them.
For the laws of Spain, if you don’t have papers, you cannot work,
and I stayed like this for a long time. When I saw that there is
no solution, my friend told me the only thing left to do at this
time for people who have no papers is to go out in the streets
and bars and sell cds and dvds. It was not at all what I wanted
to do, I don’t want to be in business, I wanted to work as I did
before. But I started selling cds and dvds, and till now that is
what I do. I was very disappointed: the stories of Senegalese mi-
grants coming back home are wonderful, and they bring home a
lot of money, but nobody tells you how exactly they have earned
the money. (Habib, in Barcelona since 2003, undocumented,
hawking)
Out of six hawkers, four mentioned that they took this up out of des-
peration, and all of them arrived in the last three years. In the Spanish
context, the control issue is less pronounced than in Belgium, because
selling in streets and beaches is not prohibited; however, selling coun-
terfeit objects is. In the centre of Barcelona, a campaign of increased
control has been launched to chase the hawkers from the main
squares; this has inspired some hawkers to move to the suburbs or
neighbouring towns.
In general, the sketch above has shown that for the position of undo-
cumented Africans on the Barcelona labour market it seems to be of
little relevance what their experience is in the country of origin. Educa-
tional or professional records do not seem to play a role, except for
some opportunity windows for technical skills immediately useable in
Spanish environments. Some examples include Salif who trained as a
welder and worked illegally in France, Italy and Spain; or Segui who
learned about construction, painting and decoration in Libya and
worked in construction in Spain. Assane wanted to pursue a profession
and through his Spanish teacher started training to be an electrician. It
was a significant sacrifice, as he needed to pay for the course, study
and work at the same time. However, his actual job in a textile work-
shop is more inspired by the wish for papers than by his knowledge.
Some respondents take language classes, as many schools do not check
residence permits; however, most postpone investing in education until
a later stage.
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5.2 The functioning of the informal labour market
Despite the lack of permit to stay and thus to work, and the absence of
legal employment, we have seen that living on the margins does not
present an absolute obstacle to some form of economic integration.
The industrialised countries include an important informal economy
relying on undocumented migrants for low-skilled, unattractive and
underpaid work. Some respondents have left jobs where they consid-
ered the working conditions as unacceptable; hawkers can definitely
make more money after building some networks and experience; and
people who find longer-term employment can manage to reach a level
of stability. This makes some authors suggest the existence of forms of
social promotion even without papers, in the US (Borjas & Freeman
1992), but also in Belgium (Soenen 2003): by gaining specific human
capital, like fluency in the language or creating larger networks, undo-
cumented migrants can increase their incomes over time. In this re-
search, I see more evidence for the statement of Van der Leun and
Kloosterman (1999) in seeing no promotion at all, only short jobs with
a low income, both for people of low education and high education.
Despite people moving between jobs all the time, calling this a ‘career’
is impossible at this stage.
What is more, the employment status is sometimes difficult to deter-
mine, given that it may change from day to day, or that the income
generated is not always linked to the hours of work done. A hawker,
for example, may be working full-time (or more), but making only fif-
teen euro a day; work in agriculture can be casual, temporary, part-time
or, often, all such classifications at once. Odd jobs may include every-
thing from helping a couple of hours for unloading a truck, to keeping
a friend’s shop open when he is travelling. Engbersen (1996: 64)
found that ‘even when using a broad definition of work, including odd
jobs, casual employment and prostitution, I found that about one third
of the research group was without work at the time of interviewing’.
This number is clearly less pronounced in our sample, but respondents
do find themselves regularly in and out of employment and frequently
face periods of unemployment in between jobs. The busy employment
pattern of other undocumented respondents also suggests that unem-
ployment is simply not an option for illegal migrants (Perez 1995). This
stresses the typical characteristics of a reserve or buffer labour force.
Comparing the trajectories in Barcelona and Antwerp, we have seen
first a significant difference in the relatively uniform choice for hawk-
ing in the case of Belgium, and the wider variety of patterns in Spain
where people generally start working in agriculture, but can also be
found in other sectors (see Table 5.1). The reasons for this difference
will be explored below, be it in a tentative way, taking a closer look at
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the political and economic configuration influencing the informal
labour market. Numbers show that both Belgium and Spain score high
on the share of informal work in the total economic production, up to
20 per cent (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions 2005); for the reasons behind the different em-
ployment patterns we will have to dig deeper. One suggestion is raised
by Van der Leun and Kloosterman, who mention that the crucial vari-
able in determining the distinctness of undocumented workers is, next
to the employment laws, their enforcement regime (Van der Leun &
Kloosterman 2006). The particular experience or specialisation of
Senegambian migrants on the labour market will also be put in the
wider context of migrant employment in both countries, showing dif-
ferences or similarities in sectors, status, or jobs.
Table 5.1 Overview of jobs in Antwerp and Barcelona for undocumented migrants
in the sample
Antwerp Barcelona
First Later Now First Later Now
Hawking 19 - 7 6 2 5
Agriculture - 3 - 13 6 4
Construction - 1 - 9 9 0
Industries 1 - - 2 6 3
Services 4 1 1 3 8 2
Unemployed 3 - 2 - - 2
Total number of
undocumented migrants
27 - 10 32 - 16
Sectors
For Spain, one notes the above-mentioned dominance of agriculture as
the entry job into the labour market, closely followed, however, by con-
struction and hawking. What is more, a considerable number of people
change sectors after their first employment (sometimes several times,
explaining why the numbers do not add), with strong presence as un-
specialised workers in industries (frequently textiles) and services
(Mendoza 1997). These are to a large extent the sectors mentioned in
other research in Europe (European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions 2005), heavily subjected to the stra-
tegies and practices of post-Fordist flexibilisation described in the theo-
retical chapter. However, as the numbers show, they are present to dif-
ferent degrees and articulated in significantly different ways in An-
twerp and Barcelona, depending on the modes of labour market
regulation, and forms of industrial relations.
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Santana (2000) sketches the developments in agricultural industries
that opened a niche for immigrant employment. Since modernisation
took off in the 1960s, Spain has seen traditional agriculture give way
to technological innovation in (mainly) small and medium family
enterprises. The mechanisation of many areas of the production pro-
cess led to a decline of the proportion of the population working in
agriculture from 22 to 8 per cent between 1976 and 1998, a concentra-
tion of companies and more intensive use of smaller areas of land. For
the most recent decade, Bell (2004: 43) stresses the ‘context of highly
intensified, industrial and ferociously competitive form of agriculture,
often dominated by supermarket chains, with no attention to the social
and environmental conditions in which the production takes place’. In
this context, a manual workforce is almost all that is needed for fruit-
and vegetable production, and particularly in periods of pruning and
harvesting. These activities are affected by climatic uncertainties, come
in seasonal peaks, do not guarantee stable (year-long) employment and
are characterised as low-skilled, hard work that demands high mobility
of workers. Local workers do not accept these conditions any longer
because they can ‘escape’ to other sectors in the growing economy;
because the internal Spanish inequalities have softened (previous
Spanish workers came from Southern regions), and because they can
rely on forms of social welfare support. In intensive family-based agri-
culture enterprises, the labour demand problem tends to be solved with
the temporary employment of foreign workers: between 1990 and
1998 the increase in foreign workers was 1.882 per cent; many tempor-
ary schemes have been launched, and many undocumented workers
find jobs in this sector. Martı´nez Veiga concludes that the agricultural
sector, with the exception of proprietors and their family, constitutes al-
most entirely a secondary labour market (Martı´nez Veiga 1999).
In construction, large companies have over the last twenty years re-
duced their own workforce and hired subcontractors for the simpler
jobs (Honsberg 2004). In addition to the characteristic atomisation of
the process and large cyclical economic variations, it creates possibili-
ties for a huge secondary labour market with temporary contracts, low
wages, job insecurity, health and safety problems, and on the job train-
ing. The fact that undocumented workers have no state support and
less negotiation power pushes them more than natives into this sector;
private consumers are also ready to employ undocumented workers for
renovation. For Spain, Schierup’s chapter studying the building indus-
try illustrates this very well (2006: 238); and again, Martı´nez Veiga
concludes that a large share of construction industries is secondary in
nature (1999).
The character of industries in Spain and Catalonia also changed dur-
ing the 1980s: an accelerated and thorough process of industrialisation
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took place in a context of increasing international competition; this
forced plants and companies to close down or to reduce costs. Still, a
considerable number of small and medium enterprises, often family
based, are fighting for survival. Flexibility and precariousness increased
in the absence of a strong welfare state, with the emergence of a shadow
economy that was easier for immigrants to enter. This tends to take the
shape of ‘invisible factories’, often found in Catalonia (Magone 2004).
The significant share of migrant workers without a residence permit
and bad conditions has been documented, for example, in catering and
the confectionary industry in the Netherlands (Van Naerssen 2002). Of-
ten undocumented work is part of a larger informal share of employ-
ment in these sectors, much done by residents or legal foreign workers.
In both the remaining manufacturing and in the new service indus-
tries in Spain, there is an ongoing demand for flexible labour and a
continuing stream of employment opportunities, which do not require
high educational levels, pay low wages and offer little regulation. Sec-
tors that grow in general in the formal labour market, but in an atmo-
sphere of marginalisation of workers, contribute to, if not push, an in-
creased participation of immigrants in informal economic activities
(Kloosterman 1996). Immigrants, probably more than other groups,
have seized these new opportunities and participate significantly in in-
formal economic activities.
These sectors also exist in Belgium, and very similar processes of ca-
sualisation and subcontracting have occurred over the last decades, yet
we did not see any Senegambian presence. That does not mean there
would be no informal jobs in these economic sectors in Belgium. On
the contrary, construction, agriculture and horticulture (particularly
glasshouses and the seasonal peaks in fruit picking) and catering
reportedly rely heavily on informal and/or undocumented labour. How-
ever, Senegambian migrants do not seem to have access to these jobs;
the reasons for which will be explored below.
The reasons for differences between Barcelona and Antwerp
A first reason could be the size of the Senegambian community, which
is far bigger in Barcelona than in Antwerp. It is generally noted that
informal migrant social networks, once established, tend to push new-
comers along already mapped trajectories in the labour market, leading
to concentration in specific places or enterprises. In these reduced
niches, they do low-paid work (Geets et al. 2006; Mendoza 1997; Van
der Leun & Kloosterman 2006). In that sense, a larger community
may provide more variety of information, with more options to follow.
However, the use of social networks may also be a consequence of,
rather than a reason for, the segmented nature of labour markets, com-
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bined with the particular opportunity structures that arise from pecu-
liarities of national economic circumstances. Observation and statistics
reveal an ethnic specialisation, with many Polish women working as
cleaners, while Philippines and Ecuadorians work more as internal
domestic workers; horticulture attracts male Polish workers, but also
Romanians and Moroccans, while construction is the domain of
Eastern Europeans (Verbeken 2005: 12). In Spain, Polish are in the
sector of renovation, and Moroccans in regular construction sites
(Colectivo IOE 1998). This ethnic specialisation explanation holds for
the hawking specialisation of Senegambian migrants; but it does not
help us to understand the wider variety of job options in Spain.
A second reason might lie in the different size of informal labour
markets in both cities. The theories mentioned earlier were not able to
give us a decisive answer. For Belgium, it was suggested that higher
tax and social security burdens, together with strict labour regulations,
might render informal employment more attractive than in the more
flexible labour market of Spain. On the other side, the argument goes
that the tradition of a dual labour market with a large informal econo-
my provides an ideal setting for the post-Fordist informality. Surpris-
ingly, the informal labour market in both countries is large and about
the same size. According to a study by Schneider, Spain and Belgium
are at the top of GDP generated by informal economies (along with
Greece, Italy and Portugal), with percentages of 21 and 22, when the
European average is 16 (2006).5
The different rationales behind these comparable figures might be
an explanation for the behaviour of undocumented Senegambian mi-
grants. The possibilities in the informal economy may link with the
economic structure and development. In the high-skilled and highly
regulated formal Belgian labour market, with little economic growth,
the logic is one of an inflexible labour market, where undeclared work
is relied upon to cut labour costs by tax evasion. Some highly competi-
tive sectors may feel they need to adjust the level of effective workers
to the cycle of production, as well as to limit drastically the fixed costs
of production by avoiding social contributions. Given the sectoral com-
position and the degree of specialisation, a large part of informal la-
bour may actually be performed by skilled local or legally foreign work-
ers, and only a smaller share may be left for unskilled work. A recent
OECD report based on 5,422 prosecutions for irregular work shows
that in all sectors where foreigners do irregular work (agriculture, con-
struction and catering), the share of nationals is far higher, and foreign
irregular work constitutes only 23 per cent of the total sum; the part of
undocumented migrants must be considerably lower (OECD 2005:137).
The booming Spanish labour market represents a truly dual system,
where a relatively regulated labour market and welfare regime protects
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part of the citizens, while a large traditional informal sector has re-
cently started to harbour (and exploit) mostly immigrants in the quest
to enhance post-Fordist flexibility (Schierup, Hansen & Castles 2006).
The main economic sectors, like agriculture, construction and tourism,
and their structure (the predominance of small companies) lend them-
selves more to these developments. In these lower segments of the de-
regulated labour market, productivity is relatively low, and may provide
much better opportunities for undocumented migrants, which function
more as a reserve labour army. A careful hypothesis could be that infor-
mal work is done mostly by locals in Belgium, and by undocumented
workers in Spain. Therefore, a wider range of options might be avail-
able to undocumented immigrants in Barcelona than in Antwerp.
A third element is variations in implementation and enforcement of
the law. In a recent report about undeclared work in Europe, the
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions concludes that the frequency and extent of controls of the
implementation of tax, labour and social security provisions are in-
adequate in most European countries. The lack of determination in the
fight against undeclared work may be linked to the positive effects that
employers benefit from, but also to the indirect advantages for (middle-
class) individuals that make governments and labour unions reluctant
to fight it (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions 2005). To change this, the European Commission
is currently considering a new directive that might result in employers
of undocumented migrants facing jail in the near future. For the
moment, differences remain in the priorities given to measures to
reduce undeclared employment in different member states. Research
by Le Voy et al. (2004) suggests that the governmental priority in com-
bating undocumented labour is higher in Belgium than in Spain where
it ranges from medium on the national level, to low on the local level.
Belgium has over the last decade made consistent efforts to fight un-
declared work (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
and Working Conditions 2005), firstly by getting a grip on the domes-
tic service through a system of ‘service cheques’, which provide a rela-
tively cheap official alternative for childcare, ironing or cleaning.6 In
addition, the chances to identify undeclared work administratively have
been increased through a system whereby all new employment must
be declared immediately to the authorities, and through administrative
checks of the files of tax authorities and other governmental bodies.
Another strategy is inspections by specialised teams, often in alleged
high-risk sectors, coordinated by a permanent unit, with legislative mea-
sures to prosecute cases of social/employment fraud. Employers risk
fines when they employ undocumented immigrants, while the latter
will be deported when caught. The head of inspection services com-
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plains that 800 people controling all the sectors in Belgium are not
enough for a large-scale systematic offensive, and the probabilities of
being caught are relatively low. The strategy is therefore one of well cho-
sen actions to make employers think about the risks (Verbeken 2005).
In Spain, the government embraced a relatively lax attitude in con-
trolling and imposing sanctions on those employers who hired undo-
cumented immigrants. ‘Politicians are not keen on intervening in the
informal economy which is often of crucial importance in some parts
of the country and specific areas of activity, as the business involved
are often struggling to survive in an increasingly internationally com-
petitive environment, or the targeted families have hired people to fill
gaps left by the welfare state (care for children and elderly)’ (Moreno
Fuentes 2000: 18). In the dual economy sketched above, undeclared
work is almost an accepted and approved social practice, a structural
feature of the national, regional or sectoral economy and employment
(OECD 2003). Labour inspections are relatively rare; the government
relies most on inadequate tax authorities. There is also a long tradition,
consolidated by the Franco regime, whereby the state carries out only a
moderate supervision of private activities. When illegally employed
workers are discovered in companies, it is difficult to prove how long
they have been working and the penalties are therefore small
(European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions 2005). Even the OECD suggests that strengthening labour
inspections (if necessary), would be a cost-effective complement to bor-
der controls (OECD 2003: 18).
The fact that the informal economy is more controlled in Belgium
than in Spain, may increase the importance of the ethnic recruitment
strategies mentioned above. Two elements may play a role: for the em-
ployer, ethnic recruitment is cheaper, and it may serve to guarantee a
selection of committed workers, minimising the risk of complaints to
unions or inspections. For the ethnic community, it may increase the
groups’ chances to protect their section of the competitive informal la-
bour market. In this way, Senegambian migrants in Belgium may find
it more difficult to access informal work in construction or agriculture,
given that the dominant ethnicities in these sectors protect their ‘terri-
tory’ by recruiting inside the community. In Spain, with a more boom-
ing economy and less control, there may be more open recruitment
networks. This is a highly speculative hypothesis, not backed up in any
of the literature available, and needs further investigation.
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5.3 Reciprocity strategies
The analysis of labour market trajectories above raises many questions:
how can recent migrants survive with the minimal incomes they
receive? How do they overcome the frequent periods of unemploy-
ment? How can they still send money back in these circumstances? In
order to find answers to these questions and to understand the labour
market behaviour better, we need to include other crucial dimensions
of the migrant experience: housing, solidarity mechanisms within the
community, relationships with the host society.
Given the precarious nature of many employment situations, and
given the limited income levels in the labour market, people may have
to develop strategies in other spheres of integration from time to time.
They need ways in order to smooth consumption and to protect them-
selves against loss of income or unexpected expenditures. Extra income
could in theory be provided by redistribution mechanisms, but this op-
tion is almost excluded in the case of undocumented migrants; only
asylum seekers can receive financial and material support during the
time of their application, and very few respondents are in that situa-
tion. In Belgium, two men in different stages of the asylum received
material support (housing, food) in the first stage of the application,
and a subsistence income in the second phase. The third possible
source of income and support is reciprocity, which will be explored in
terms of the dimensions of accommodation, food, and organisation of
life in general.
Housing
Most immigrants travelling had a point of reference in Belgium or
Spain: a close family member, a distant relative, a childhood friend, an
acquaintance, the brother of a former neighbour, someone from the
same village of origin, or just a vague phone number. The first accom-
modation upon arrival is then obvious, based on the relationship or
general solidarity: they stay for free in a spare room, a spare bed, or on
the sofa, for some days, weeks, or months. However, the new migrant
is bound to feel a burden or a parasite, and many express their embar-
rassment about this dependency. Most try to find a job as quickly as
possible and start to contribute to food, rent and expenses, becoming
an equal participant; others move out because of personal conflicts or
long commuting distances. Normally three to eight people put money
together to buy food, and they take turns in cooking and cleaning; this
turns the evening meals into social gatherings, with friends and other
people visiting (Stoller 2002). In the continuous flow of new arrivals,
some addresses develop as more hospitable or reliable, and become
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real residences of passage, as the old hotel in Breixia, Italia, that is
known as Little Senegal. Here, even the unconnected migrants can
find a place to stay. A respondent explained how it worked (on a smal-
ler scale) for houses in Antwerp; there were several in the same area
functioning in the same way. The quote also illustrates how in this
stage, the shared house is the basis of the network providing food, sup-
port and friendship.
After staying with my brother and my cousin, it was a group
house, a landing place, for people who just arrive and leave after;
if you count, maybe you will see that more than 100 people
passed there. It was a very popular house, everyone knew it, but
the police never entered. We never had problems. Even now all
of us we like to return and meet for meals, every Wednesday
(Aliu, in Antwerp since 2001, regular status, unemployed).
Sometimes religious confederations can provide housing as well, the
Murid brotherhood manages a system of houses throughout Europe.
Within this system of sharing apartments and co-residing, people
move around a lot; visiting my original contact eight times over four
years, I never found him in the same apartment.7 This makes Adam
(2001) say undocumented migrants live ‘like nomads’, ready to move
quickly at every moment, which proves to be very stressful. Chavez
proposes that by creatively forming and reforming coresident groups,
undocumented migrants strategically and effectively use social organi-
sation as a way of coping with changing conditions (Benson 1990;
Chavez 1990). The reasons vary from changes of jobs and arrival of
new friends and relatives, fear for police to problems with landlords,
orders to leave the country but most often the community life itself is
pointed at: gossip, problems over money, conflicts between house-
mates, the ‘owner’ forcing others to share rooms with more people.
It is very difficult to live together with people, that is the pro-
blem; me I moved seven times… not for work, just for living to-
gether. When you are many in a house, the problems become,
and then I go, because I am not a problematic person. If you are
not the owner, you cannot do anything, so you go. Everybody
has his way, you know, to cook, to organise, to clean, and people
don’t understand each other. People leave early for work, others
just arrive, and there is noise in the house. And at the end of
the month, when the bills arrive, the problems start. (Babacar,
in Barcelona since 2000, regular status, transport)
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Finding new accommodation is not easy for an undocumented mi-
grant: regular signed contracts with proper names and bank accounts
are out of the question. They have to mobilise networks to find a land-
lord who is ready to rent within these conditions; this often involves va-
cancies announced within a group of acquaintances. However, recruit-
ment through networks does not necessarily mean noble intentions; in
many cases, the quality of apartments is very bad, and conditions are
often poor. The Spanish Secretary for Migration recently published a
report on housing in Spain. According to this report, 47 per cent of the
migrant population gain access to housing through sub-leasing and 19
per cent live in less than ten square meters. In addition, more than
12,000 use the so-called system of camas calientes, a practice which
consists of the use and payment of a bed only for a limited number of
hours (www.migrar.be).
The combination of characteristics that undocumented migrants
look for in accommodation easily lead to a concentration in specific
neighbourhoods8. The presence of more settled migrant communities
who can support the undocumented ones, next to relatively cheap pri-
vate renting or sub-renting housing possibilities, often takes them to
low quality housing in deprived areas (Engbersen et al. 1999) and tran-
sition zones (Martı´nez Veiga 1997). In cases of danger of exploitation,
undocumented migrants are vulnerable because of their judicial infer-
iority and incapacity to negotiate. But if a house is declared unfit for
human habitation by the authorities (as some NGOs in Antwerp strive
for) the inhabitants have no choice but to look for another slum dwell-
ing as the few transit dwellings from the municipality are not meant to
be for undocumented people (Frederix 2005).
In sum, housing is one of the most elementary needs for immi-
grants upon arrival and throughout their stay and reciprocity within
the Senegambian community is definitely the main sphere of integra-
tion. Shared housing forms the link between spatial organisation and
social structure (Martı´nez Veiga 1997). This corresponds with Chavez’
statement that coresidential strategies are the undocumented immi-
grants’ first level of defence against the economic and political con-
straints on their lives (1990). Burgers and Engbersen (1999) expect a
weak housing position for migrants who do not belong to large settled,
socially integrated communities (as the Moroccans in the Netherlands),
as they have no choice but to rely on the market; however, in this Sene-
gambian sample the solidarity seems to stretch quite far in most cases.
This allows migrants to cope with limited incomes, to minimise dis-
ruption and to alleviate personal loneliness and social isolation.
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Restricting activities
Life in the community is also a way to save money, to avoid spending.
In an early phase, migrants limit their own life because all investments
are made back home: many people share a room, no internet, never go
for a coffee, no car, no trips, cutting costs on food, just go to work as
much as they can and sleep.
When everyone comes home between 8 and 9pm they are tired
after a long day of work, someone needs to cook for the evening
and for all of them to take something for lunch the next day;
they need to wash and iron, call home and send money. Work,
lack of work, extra hours of work, red eyes from the paint X
uses, night work, and being tired are the most important topics
of conversation and determine the exhausted atmosphere in
house. (fieldnotes Barcelona)
Investing in education or training are mostly out of the question; partly
because it rarely forms part of the migration project in the early stage
of illegality; partly because of financial and administrative difficulties.9
The odd person paying membership fees for an athletics club or buy-
ing a book is laughed at for being distracted from the main aim: earn-
ing money and going back. A labour union social worker tells us: ‘it is
impossible for people to think about learning the language or take
trainings, it does not make sense: what they are interested in is work
and papers, papers, papers’.
In this phase of the migration project, or even when planning to mi-
grate, many people delay marriage or the formation of a family due to
the precarious and temporal employment:
I am not married yet, not here not there not anywhere. I am
scared to marry, because of those reasons. I don’t think about
marriage because I think about other things. Marrying today
would mean more responsibilities, and raise more issues…
(Bubacar, in Barcelona since 2002, undocumented, agriculture)
People who were married before leaving and left a wife and/or children
behind in Senegal have to put the family life on a hold. In more har-
monious couples and families, the fact of being separated for years in
a row is hard to bear and leads to fundamental loneliness. But in other
cases, the migrant may have to solve the problems arising from this
situation of long-distance relationship. The women tend to live under
supervision of their family in law, taking care of the house, the chil-
dren and possibly the elderly. Social control can be tight, particularly in
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the case of young women; divorce becomes more common as couples
grow apart over time and distance, or as the fatherhood of children is
debated (Barou 2001). Conflicts between wives and families often arise
over the distribution of remittances of the migrant, who may have a
difficult time trying to solve family arguments at long distance. At the
same time they often feel they are not meeting the family expectations,
because it is difficult to explain them the reasons, and the hard eco-
nomic circumstances add to the insecurity and lack of safety.
Survival in group
The support of a large network is of crucial importance in facing many
of the standard challenges at every stage of the migration process: from
taking a shower and get help on the first day of arriving, to find emer-
gency housing, to borrow their papers, and to share worries. Theoreti-
cally speaking, a wide network with a diversity of resources would be
ideal; however, their network tends to be very homogeneous and very
Senegambian. Both in the field of housing and work, social support is
not of a kind to allow significant steps forward; it rather helps to over-
come yet another problem.
It would be wrong, however, to interpret these networks only in the
light of unconditional African solidarity. Sometimes there are clearly
limits to the solidarity, particularly when it comes to substantial or
long-term financial or social help. This is linked to the nature of the re-
lationships: what brings them together is often need rather than shared
interests or backgrounds. In addition, relationships suffer under the in-
secure nature of their labour market conditions, as Aliu explains:
I know a lot of people, but nothing lasts. You meet because of cir-
cumstances, often you don’t share similar background, one just
needs a place to live, and after some months this leads to ten-
sions and conflicts. Even with people that do become real friends,
if you come back in one year, one has found a job somewhere
else and has moved there, another went to Italy or Germany to
find better luck… you loose contact and you forget each other.
(Aliu, 30, in Barcelona since 2001, legal and in agriculture)
In many cases, financial support among respondents is confined to
small and incidental help. Sometimes help is even refused indirectly,
as in cases where the contact number from close friends or relatives
seems to have been strategically changed.
I had one Senegalese friend in Brussels, I started calling him
and leaving him messages, but he never picked it up or replied,
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and after one week the number was not valid any more. I was
left without knowing anyone here. (Ousman, in Antwerp since
2004, undocumented, unemployed)
The increasing size of the community in Barcelona opens the possibi-
lity for a turn towards in-group competition instead of ethnic help, as
in the case of Polish migrants in Brussels (2005). I did not find indica-
tion of this, but the flipside of community life entails also distrust, dis-
loyalty and deceit. When Ousman arrives, his host tells him another
friend would introduce him to selling cds and DVDs. What follows:
But this guy saw me as a competitor, he was not there to help
me at all, he just left me in a dangerous point while he was
further down the street. I displayed my stuff on a piece of cloth
and tried to sell. I did not even know what a police officer looked
like. When the first one came close to me, I offered him a dvd.
They took my entire luggage and told me not to start again at
any price. (Ousman, in Antwerp since 2004, undocumented,
unemployed)
Engbersen (1999) distinguishes between three patterns of incorpora-
tion at the ethnic community level: ‘communal sharing’, ‘bounded soli-
darity’ and ‘market patterns’. The first pattern of incorporation refers
to substantial help given to an exclusive group of close relatives, cover-
ing a wide range of fields and often for long periods of time. This can
be found mostly in the case of organised migration within a transna-
tional community, for example, among Turkish residents in Rotterdam
who bring over family members. The second pattern entails ‘bounded
solidarity’, where aid is given to a less exclusive and larger circle of
compatriots, but the support provided is limited and restricted. The
African groups in the Amsterdam Bijlmermeer are his example. Final-
ly, the market relations are forms of redistribution, which are paid in
one form or another. I do not think that the Senegambian community
can be given a particular place in this classification: the different mod-
els can be found, as relationships change over time and within the
group.
Occasional support
The interviews show some evidence of the existence of occasional
material and financial resources of private origin, expressing support
from family and friends through borrowing or savings. As seen in the
section on accommodation, absolute support is most evident between
close relatives in early stages of the migration; in other cases, help is
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more limited or conditional; in still other cases, one might talk about
exploitation or market behaviour. Next to the individual solidarity, there
are also organised forms of reciprocity: these take the form of informal
organisations based on Islamic brotherhoods, region of origin or ethni-
city, which collect money on a monthly basis. This money can be used
to support members who have family problems back at home (e.g. a
fire has destroyed the family house, or a child is seriously ill), those
who need to travel or, in the worst-case scenario, when their bodies
have to be repatriated to the home country. But given that the commu-
nity itself tends to be at the bottom end of society, the help is rather
weak, uncertain and limited in time, and never sure or consistent en-
ough to provide for life in difficult times. Rather surprisingly, two peo-
ple mention receiving money from family members in Senegal, a real
turn-around of the expectations and roles of migrant and family, illus-
trating that middle-class families also have migrants. Help from local
Spanish or Belgian friends is never mentioned at this stage, nor did I
find many signs of reliance on the solidarity of civil society through
charity organisations giving food or shelter to undocumented migrants.
However, in Belgium a peculiar form of reciprocity arises when mi-
grants have successive relationships with Belgian partners. Cases of
real love happen of course, but some respondents are quite explicit
about the advantages of such relationships: the Belgian partner may
give you food and a hot shower, maybe a place to live for some weeks
and, if you are lucky, also Dutch classes, presents, pocket money or
even a holiday. An extreme example is a man who has an older mar-
ried woman paying his phone, the rent, clothes and food; and in the
meantime looks for other relationships.
I try to sell sometimes but it is very hard, as I don’t know any-
one around, and I do not really want to enter business again,
the papers [ from another migrant] are not taking me anywhere.
So it is very hard, I know women sometimes, they pay your res-
taurant and you can stay with them for a while, or they give you
a little bit of money… ‘on fait le gigolo’ and I find it repulsive,
but what can I do? (Ousman, in Antwerp since 2004, undocu-
mented, unemployed)
We might consider this strategy of having multiple partners for extra
resources as a mild form of prostitution. In her discussion of male
prostitution, Van Bergen describes forms that lie outside pure market
relations, and border more on reciprocity. In these cases there is no
formal payment and ‘the interest of the prostitute is income, housing
and maintenance, while the client desires intimacy, sex and company’
(Van Bergen 2003:245). Often feelings of friendship, attraction or even
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love may lay at the beginning, but the material and financial power of
the ‘client’ always play a significant role, as made particularly clear in
the case of big age differences between both partners. This is a gender-
sensitive topic, but a very similar strategy has been described for
Congolese women by Soenen (2003).
So for many years I was selling and living with girls. I did not
think about marriage because I did not want to stay here. I was
sure I would go back to my country, so I did not care too much
about the papers. But I was very young, only seventeen, and I
was not thinking very well. I went selling, I met a woman, she
took me to her village and told me to stay inside the house
because the police would check me in the street and send me
back to my country. I believed her, but she only wanted me to
stay with her all the time. Afterwards other girlfriends came and
told me not to go selling because they would be ashamed to tell
their friends, or maybe somebody would recognise me in a bar.
They don’t understand and they think about their own benefit.
(Idrissa, in Antwerp since 1993, regular status, unemployed)
In the case of a successful marriage or relationship, this dependency
continues:
If you don’t have papers, you don’t have the right to look for
work. If you try to find a job, they will ask your papers. So I
have to stay like this and it is my wife who carries all the
charges till now. That is hard, you know. That is something very
hard, someone who takes charge of you. It is not good, you
know. I think it is not normal. I am a 34-year-old man and
someone has to take care of me. It is not a nice thing. (Mustafa,
in Antwerp since 2002, undocumented, unemployed)
The option of giving up
The next question then is: if people earn so little money, while living
in bad conditions, why do they not give up their dream and go back to
their country of origin? Why do they stay? This is question is some-
times raised by family members when a migrant complains about his
situation without papers: ‘if it is really so bad, why you are still there?’.
Some respondents have in this phase considered going back to Senegal
or Gambia, but they were unable to pay back the money family has in-
vested in the trip, or they were not allowed to do so by moral pressure
of their family (Dahou & Foucher 2004; Geets et al. 2006; Nwolisa
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Okanga 1995). From the beginning, the migration project was a family
strategy, that would at least result in visible economic prosperity of the
wider family stayed behind, and, if possible, in a triumphant return of
the migrant, with a project that allows to provide a better future for his
whole family. In many cases, the limited remittances that migrants
send home at this stage already represent an economic contribution
that would be missed painfully:
Also, I called my mother that I wanted to come back and that
she should try to send me money, because I wanted to go back.
She shouted at me, saying I was crazy… ‘So many people are try-
ing to go to Europe and you who are there you don’t want to
stay? Impossible, I tell you to stay there. A little bit of money is
a lot of money here, you can make all the difference for us, you
stay’. (Ndeye, in Antwerp since 1996, regularised, unemployed)
But second, if one would return without realising the shared expecta-
tion, so many others apparently succeeded, he must be an ‘imbecile or
a loser’ as one respondent put it, and the whole family will share in
the shame. After all the efforts they made, it would be difficult to ac-
cept that the money and time spent to come to Europe were useless;
going back would be a public display of failure (Burgers & Engbersen
1999). Migrants therefore try to hide the ordeals and the suffering that
they had to face throughout their life as a migrant, almost taking it as
a ‘rite of passage’ typical for their generation.
I cannot go back, that would be the ultimate shame, facing
everybody, my wife, my children, my family, my friends, my col-
leagues. They don’t know what I live here, not at all. My son is
six and has his own computer and electric car, paid with the
money I sent when in Italy. He is so proud of me, and he knows
I am in Belgium, and he tells everybody he is ‘Belgican’. How
can I go back and disappoint him? (Ousman, in Antwerp since
2004, undocumented, unemployed)
Also I was ashamed to tell this at home. In fact I would have
liked to go back, but even though that would not have been a fi-
nancial problem, I was too ashamed. They would see other peo-
ple who live in Europe and succeed, so I would have been a fail-
ure, not working hard enough, not being man enough, so I
stayed and did what it took. (Youssou, in Antwerp since 2000,
undocumented, working in horticulture)
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As an illustration, Segui was repatriated to Dakar after trying to make
it to Europe for nine years without succeeding, and without money.
When he called home, his mother was so ashamed about the gossip
and humiliated by comments from family members, that she preferred
him not to come home. This pushed him to leave again.
Instead of giving up, many undocumented migrants move around to
look for better opportunities: between neighbourhoods, cities, and
countries. Normally, people follow the advice of relatives or friends and
go to stay with other members of the migrant community. Some of
them even found themselves in countries as diverse as Portugal,
Ireland, France, Italy, United Kingdom, and Poland before being an
undocumented migrant in Barcelona or Antwerp, and I know of four
undocumented migrants who have moved countries after the interview.
Schuster (2005) confirms in her study how geographic mobility is very
common due to financial difficulties, ending up somewhere else than
planned. This shows their determination to try their luck in Europe in-
stead of returning to their home countries.
Survival realised, but …
Using these strategies, financial needs remain limited in this phase of
the migration trajectory, and they help to explain the employment pat-
tern discussed above. In the initial period, financial needs for housing
and food may be zero – everything earned can be sent in remittances.
Afterwards, people calculated that in Spain, the very minimum an im-
migrant needs to survive is 200 euro a month (80 euro a month for
meals, 50 euro a month for a shared bedroom, plus some transport
and phone calls). In Belgium, people say 500 euro allows you to live a
decent life as an undocumented migrant. This allows for periods of ca-
sual work, even short-term unemployment, or jobs that generate lim-
ited incomes. Their situation is precarious but temporary; any money
made beyond this tight budget can be sent home to the family. As
Leman puts it: ‘they thus understand all too well that they are in em-
ployment because others do not want to work under such conditions.
They are able to accept and tolerate this situation because their ideas
are permanently set on their region of origin and because they do not
feel as if they ’live’ in the host country’ (Leman 1997:33; see also Van
der Leun & Kloosterman 1999).
Notwithstanding this African frame of reference in terms of living
conditions and consumption patterns, after a few months they can
already stow away their dream to become quickly very rich and return
subsequently to their home country. They do indeed send money
home, which is initially a source for a feeling of success, but this
allows only for daily consumption needs of the extended family in
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Senegal. Making the savings necessary for an investment project that
would continue to generate sufficient revenues for the whole family is
more difficult. In addition, after the satisfaction of having arrived in
the mythical paradise, they start to discover a reality that is difficult,
lonely, and complex. Most respondents have never lived away from
family before, and being alone in a house or a room for the first time
may be a upsetting experience. Many knew they would have no papers
but did not assess the consequences in daily life; they have made it to
Europe, yet they have to continue a very African way of life. They see
that being a regular migrant has many advantages, in terms of protec-
tion in the labour market, the possibility to travel home, and the secur-
ity of residence. Therefore, the immediate aim changes in a next phase:
they start thinking about trying to obtain legal residence and work sta-
tus, as discussed in the following chapter.
When you arrive in Europe and you do some months, you start
to see another problem: the life conditions. If you don’t have
papers, you cannot work. If you want papers, you need work.
But if you want work, you need papers. The life conditions are
difficult. With papers you can find more work, that is sure, and
better work also. (Sadani, in Barcelona since 2003, undocu-
mented, casual work)
5.4 Conclusion: Better off in Spain
For me as a researcher, it was extremely interesting to gradually under-
stand the functioning of a world parallel to the official one, at times
completely separate from it, yet intrinsically linked, as Jordan also
notes (2002: 114):
What is interesting is to discover how self-sufficient this shadow
world of undocumented commercial exchanges is in London,
and how little need its participants have for the official world of
recorded, tied transactions, registered workers, recognised citi-
zens and legal entitlements.
In relation to the hypotheses that were formulated earlier, some find-
ings should be highlighted. First, in terms of labour market participa-
tion, the general pattern of employment for undocumented migrants is
necessarily one of precariousness, with low salaries and high levels of
exploitation; unskilled devalorised manual jobs constitute the bulk of
work, and migrants have mostly unstable jobs. The structure of the la-
bour market provides them with limited economic resources. Search
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strategies are limited to count on fellow countrymen, family members
and friends, and word of mouth. Because most are stuck in these
ethnic networks, they are pushed into the same sectors. At the start,
they have a very low reservation wage, because they need to provide for
themselves; with time, it gets better; a larger network and some knowl-
edge of the language seem to guarantee more options. In the informal
economy, no highly educated jobs exist, so illegality makes human ca-
pital and skills disappear. Van der Leun and Kloosterman (2006) call
this a legal ceiling, preventing the matching of skills and income.
Some explicit differences have arisen from this analysis, resulting in
two ideal-typical trajectories, one in Barcelona and one in Antwerp.
Collective networks seem to push undocumented migrant workers into
hawking in Belgium, and into agriculture in Barcelona; however,
Barcelona seems to have other informal sectors open for them as well,
such as industries, services, selling. The exact role of economic and po-
litical factors in this pattern is difficult to identify. In both cities, recent
trends have made entry into the two most common economic activities
(agriculture and hawking) more difficult for the latest cohorts of arrival
(also found in: Engbersen 2001; Van der Leun & Kloosterman 2006).
Although they cannot afford to lose a job, because they have no
safety net, they are often unemployed. They make big efforts to keep
working: mobility between areas and jobs has been shown to be of cru-
cial importance in the lives of these immigrants. However, they are
stuck in the shadow economy where they are vulnerable to abuse by
employers and cannot ameliorate their position. In Spain, longer-term
contacts often indicate that the worker has a bigger aim that makes
him accept the circumstances: obtaining papers. For regularisation pur-
poses, they need a contract, no matter how abusive, or they do not
want to be expelled. In both Barcelona and Antwerp there seems to be
increasingly difficult labour markets for undocumented migrants, due
to increasing control or mounting competition or both.
The available openings or limits for undocumented immigrants are
to some extent a consequence of elements of the economy and result-
ing labour markets, different degrees of control and regulation and, dif-
ferent welfare states and immigration policies. If legal work permits
are organised to meet the need for high-skilled workers in the post-
industrial labour market, the clandestine migration seems to feed by
the underground economy with its need for low-skilled flexible jobs
(Bribosia & Rea 2002). The Senegambian migration illustrates this
best for Barcelona, but other groups fulfil a similar function in
Belgium (eg. Polish construction workers).
Second, a relatively generous policy of reciprocity solves problems in
all other areas of migrant life. In the face of an exploitative labour mar-
ket and a hostile state, free sharing of housing, food and emotional
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support is crucial to their very survival. It allows them to lower the
budget necessary for their own needs, and enables them to fulfil par-
tially the obligations towards the family at home. The role of the state,
the third structural factor, has received relatively limited attention in
this chapter. However, because the only escape from this limited life is
acquisition of papers, the strategies linked to this new aim will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter.
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6 Documentation strategies as
an undocumented migrant
Foreigners are accepted, loved, and are even in demand only if
they’re outstanding in their field […]. As for their integration
policy, it only applies to their national football team. (Diome
2006: 125)
After having entered a country illegally, or overstayed a tourist visa,
there is no easy way to obtain a residence permit; a new and different
set of strategies has to be developed by responding to opportunities and
actively trying to create improvements in their legal status. The differ-
entiation between survival and documentation strategies can be debated
as for many people being able to stay or seeking residence permits is
simultaneously a survival strategy for themselves and their family, as
they provide the basic material needs by living here (Adam et al. 2001).
In his attempt to describe the diversity of lives of undocumented mi-
grants in Brussels, Leman (1997) launches a basic distinction between
‘migrant employment illegality’ and ‘migrant residence illegality’1. He
states that the first group involves people who clearly know and accept
that they are residing illegally in a host country and do not expect
much from institutions. They try to solve problems using their own re-
sources or contacts; their aim is not integrate but to earn a given sum
of money and go back. The second group, on the other hand, intends
to regularise their situation in the host country at some stage; they
may entertain certain expectation of institutions and see the host coun-
try as their new home country. In the case of Senegalese migrants, I
would certainly argue that this distinction is not so clear-cut or better,
that people move from one category to the other over time. After realis-
ing that earning the hoped-for capital may take somewhat longer than
planned, Senegambian undocumented immigrants want to regularise
their stay: to be at ease from a legal point of view, to have access to bet-
ter jobs, and to be able to visit home.
Before you have papers, you can only think of surviving. After-
wards, with the papers, you can think about other things, other
plans. You can think to find a proper job, to study something
like the language; you can plan to go back home, to see my
family, my wife. (Elhadj, in Barcelona since 1999, regular status,
construction)
Sometimes migrants are unable to maintain a new status because they
no longer meet the conditions linked to the residence permit, or because
of legislative changes in the country of origin or destination; this shift-
ing between legal categories is called ‘status mobility’ (Schuster 2005).
The central questions in this chapter are: how do people try to lega-
lise themselves and how are these strategies related to or influenced by
migration legislation and its implementation? This section will be di-
vided in two parts: firstly, a discussion of the strategies people develop
to be physically able to stay (to avoid repatriation), and secondly, the
strategies in order to be administratively allowed to stay (to obtain a re-
sidence permit, to enable settlement).
6.1 Being able to stay
There are significant differences in trying to live as an undocumented
migrant in Spain and Belgium, the rights attached to this status and
the risks involved. This is not a coincidence: I follow De Genova
(2002) in that being illegal is as much a relationship to a state and an
economy as being a citizen, that it is not a random side product of a
system but rather a core element linked to society’s structure. The dif-
ferences will be discussed therefore in relation to the wider economic
and political framework developed above.
Rights in daily life
Senegambian migrants tend to be hosted by friends, family or un-
known co-nationals during the first days and weeks; the lessons they
pass on about daily life as an undocumented migrant are rather diver-
gent in both cities. According to PICUM, the international platform de-
fending the rights of undocumented migrants, Belgium and Spain
score generally well in guaranteeing a set of basic social rights linked
to the international convention on human rights, compared to other
European countries.
In Belgium, the exclusion of undocumented immigrants is very
strong in every domain of life in the society. The foreigner who is not
authorised to stay or settle in the country is by definition excluded
from mainstream systems of housing and education, from social, med-
ical and legal aid, and therefore from a dignified human existence.
Contrary to Spain (see below), there are no rights attached to a valid
passport or other proof of identity. For example, undocumented mi-
grants in Belgium cannot have a bank account,2 because they do not
have an official address, and a year ago, it became impossible to send
money through Western Union (Vlaams Minderhedencentrum 2004;
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Vuylsteke 2006). It has nowadays also become standard practise to ask
for an address when buying a mobile phone. Until recently, undocu-
mented workers could not be members of labour unions – two unions
have opened their doors for them in 2006.
However, undocumented migrants do have a set of basic social
rights, and information is generally not passed on to the authorities,
which makes the situation far less extreme than in Sweden and
Austria, for example. Children under the age of eighteen are subjected
to mandatory schooling, even if they are undocumented. A procedure
for Urgent Medical Care has been elaborated for undocumented mi-
grants, according to the Royal Decree of 12 December 1996 (PICUM).
This system is quite comprehensive and includes preventive as well as
curative interventions. From respondents’ accounts, it sounds a rather
complicated process, which poses immigrants with serious barriers in
using it, to define what exactly is urgent is not easy, and mostly the mi-
grant has to run from one service to another before everything is
arranged to start up the procedure. At the same time, figures from the
Ministry of Social Integration show that both the number of benefici-
aries of the procedure as well as the costs have strongly increased over
the last five years (De Standaard 15 June 2006), showing that gradually
the procedure is becoming known. Their non-citizenship and lack of
social protection, makes them dependent on the efficiency of humani-
tarian logics and actions (Fassin 1997). Doctors still see numerous
cases of neglect and bad working conditions including diabetes and
hypertension, but also small injuries, back pains, dental problems, in-
dustrial accidents; the most common strategy is hoping it will go away
but in fact learning to live with it (Frederix 2005).
In Barcelona, on the contrary, migrants go as fast as possible to in-
scribe in the local residents’ registry (padro´n municipal),3 a system
which allows undocumented migrants to register in a safe way with
the commune based on possession of a passport and proof of housing/
address4. This step gives them the right to universal health care, and
education of the children. What is more, with their valid passport5 they
are able to rely on administrative services such as opening a bank ac-
count, and to be a member of the library, etc. The preconditions of re-
gistration at the town hall, however, excludes a number of groups from
access to health care (for example, those who were never registered in
their countries of origin) and a number of special health care centres
focuses on those groups (PICUM 2001).
Concealing undocumented status
A rather common strategy that crosses the survival/documentation di-
vide is to borrow, rent, buy or falsify somebody else’s documentation,
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or what Engbersen (2001) calls ‘manipulation of identities’, to conceal
their illegality.
In Spain, this strategy is mostly related to work opportunities; in
Belgium to a lesser degree. One party, the legal migrant, has presently
no job contract in his name: he may be travelling to his home country
for some months, trying his luck in another European country, or he
may be involved in informal activities.6 The other party is the undocu-
mented migrant who borrows the residence and work permit (or a
copy) to obtain an official job using another name.
With papers it is easier to work, that is sure. The bosses they are
scared, they don’t take you if you don’t have papers. But you know,
the black people, there are white people who cannot recognise us,
like me, my picture, I can take the papers of someone else and I
say it is me, but it is not true, but they cannot recognise us. (Ibu,
in Barcelona since 2004, regular status, unemployed)
This strategy can be risky in unanticipated ways. One respondent was
working with the papers of a certain Samba, when he heard this person
had been involved in drugs dealing in France; scared to be arrested for
some else’s crime, he told his employer his father was dying in Senegal,
and that he have to leave and quit the job. In other cases, there may be
debts or unpaid bills behind the new identity one embraces; the person
may have no qualifications, and you cannot present your own skills. An
undocumented person working as a garbage collector with somebody
else’s papers had a bad cut in his foot treated in hospital. The proof of
this treatment may serve in a legalisation campaign, so he registered un-
der his own name; as the resulting sick note did not correspond with
the name on his work permit, he went cleaning streets with the fresh
stitches. Finally, the one who lends out the papers may get in trouble as
well. During a trip to Senegal, Laye had given his work permit to a close
friend; years later and working on the Canary Islands, he wanted to re-
ceive an unemployment benefit, but the social worker told him a con-
tract was registered under his name in Barcelona. Until he proved to be
the legitimate owner of the identity, his account was blocked. Conflicts
between the two parties involved can easily arise when talking about
money, as illustrated in the fragment below:
A friend had recently got his papers and travelled to Senegal, so
he gave me his papers to try and find a job. It was a construction
site (…). But when he came back, he had spent all his own
money, had some financial trouble and wanted to take a loan.
But in the bank they saw that there was more than 2,000 euro
on the account, my money, so they did not understand and did
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not want to give him a loan. So we made a deal between us, I did
not really want to but I could not refuse as I was working with
his papers. He borrowed 1,500 from me and promised to pay me
back after three weeks; if he had not found the money, he would
sell his car to reimburse me. But after one month there is no
news, I go to talk to him, we have an argument and he asks his
papers back – I did, but I never saw my money again. Up to now,
he owes me money; he only paid me back 700. And all my hopes
were gone, because I had lost the papers as well. (Ousman, in
Antwerp since 2004, undocumented, unemployed)
In case of a regularisation (see below) the short-term strategy of bor-
rowing papers may prevent a long-term solution, as the contract does
not give proof of your presence in the country; it may even be difficult
to confess to the employer and ask him to give the ‘real you’ a refer-
ence or contract.
In Belgium, some people use this strategy to work in agriculture,
but it is more common as a defence against identity checks and the
possible consequence of repatriation. As an extreme example, there
was a time when four Belgian respondents shared the same paper,
everyone holding a photocopy, but they had to be careful never to go
out together.
Yes, I have been checked but I had papers. I had other papers
from someone who had asylum. Yes, I walked with this. And
him also, he had his papers, and me a photocopy. Yes, you
know, in a photocopy everyone looks the same. A copy of a
picture of a black man, even we ourselves cannot recognise the
person. Because the control was not so strong, you know. Be-
cause the most important it is that they don’t find you doing bad
things. […] Because sometimes the police, they understand that
the papers are not yours, but they let it go. They don’t say any-
thing. You understand? Because one day, a police officer told me
this: ‘This is not your papers. But you, Senegalese people, you
are not dangerous. You only do business that is your only pro-
blem. I let you go’. And he let me go like this. Just like that.
(Sal, in Antwerp since 1998, regular status, temping)
Checks inside the territory7
In Belgium, possible checks by federal and local police are manifold, in
addition to control of the external borders. Particularly prior to 2000,
when few black people held residence permits, police were said to be
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very tough in randomly checking people’s identity on the street, in
neighbourhoods with high concentration of foreigners, or in bars at
night (Bernard 2000; Leman 1997). Because of this, risk reduction or
‘operating strategically in public space’ (Burgers and Engbersen 1999)
is very important in the every day life of undocumented migrants in
Belgium. Undocumented respondents in the 1990s reported a very im-
mobile life after migration, trying to stay at home whenever they can,
particularly in the evening, avoiding bars, public places and crowds;
despite this, most of them had confrontations with the police at some
time.
In the beginning, we were all illegal, nobody had papers, we
would only leave the house in the evening, just to go out and
sell, and buy new stuff. It was a very hard and difficult life. It
was because of police checks, because often there was so many
checks, you don’t dare to wander around in the days, because be-
fore, now things have changed, but before, you go out here, you
are African, you go out, they ask you automatically your papers.
We would take small streets and back ways to get where we
wanted. Yes. Because you walk with a big bag. You leave, before
leaving first you do a lot of prayers. Yes, seriously, a lot even, in
order not to meet anyone, if they see you most often you have to
be careful because they look at your instinct, they look if you are
scared or not. For instance, when you see them, you have your
bag, you see them, you run, and they find you immediately. But
if you see them, you pray, you start to pray and you continue to
walk… you pretend like it is not you, but then as soon as you go
out of sight, you start to run. Or you enter a bar to have a drink,
not take out the merchandise but just have your coke. This is
what we did. If you stay cool, maybe they will not do anything.
(Sal, in Antwerp since 1998, regular status, temping)
More recently, after the regularisation in 2000, attention has shifted to
more targeted spaces, but without difference of colour or race: social
inspection in work places or after being reported as undocumented;
special actions against penal offence or crimes (like dodging fares on
public transport or rack-rentings); or by chance in case of traffic acci-
dents. In case of an arrest, they can be fined but not prosecuted for an
illegal stay but they can be deported, which represents the worst pun-
ishment for most of them. According to Adam et al. (2001) and more
recent undocumented respondents, by behaving strategically the major-
ity of them have never been confronted with the police. Respondents
say they avoid contact with authorities by being calm, behaving well, at-
tracting as little attention as possible, and keeping away from the
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known targeted places (Engbersen 2001). They will avoid living in a
dwelling shared by too many inhabitants, particularly if this goes to-
gether with too much movement, noise or conflicts in the building;
they fear this may be perceived by the neighbours as suspicious and
may form a reason for being detected (Soenen 2003). But these days it
is possible to have a tea or walk the streets without being asked to
show documentation.
In Spain, on the other hand, control inside the country seems to be
more relaxed, as in other Southern European countries (Geddes 2003).
In Barcelona and in city centres there are more checks, so people move
away to avoid them. A house that I used to frequent and where a cou-
ple of respondents lived was actually located on top of a local police
station; agents and undocumented migrants would exchange friendly
greetings in the mornings and evenings. Bubacar was once checked on
the road; he showed his health care card and police let him go, as they
considered it not to be illegal.
Till today I don’t have papers, I am illegal, I have no papers. But
still, there is an amount of liberty for the moment in Spain, you
can move, not cross borders but in different cities yes. I am not
scared of the police, if you don’t cause problems or you don’t go
there where there is prejudice. I don’t enter in jobs that could
bring me problems. Sometimes they do carry out random con-
trols, but that did not happen to me yet. (Bubacar, in Barcelona
since 2002, undocumented, agriculture)
Repatriation
The ultimate touchstone for the influence of alien policy on social rea-
lity is the ability to make undesirable aliens leave (Caestecker 2000).
Enforcement can take place at the border, and within the country, but
both types usually capture only a fraction of illegal immigrants. Despite
governments and police forces declaring that controlling illegal migra-
tion is a top priority (for Belgium, see De Walsche 2005), there is a
consensus in Europe that it would simply be impossible to repatriate
the millions of undocumented migrants, due to the financial and logis-
tic costs, and because of the civil protest this ‘hunt’ would provoke
(Engbersen et al. 1999). The immigration and local police often com-
bat only those illegal immigrants who cause inconvenience and display
criminal behaviour, and the others are tolerated. The implementation
of the rather strict policies leaves freedom of interpretation or arbitrari-
ness for the authorities in charge of checks.
In 2006, the Spanish government repatriated 97,715 migrants, 5 per
cent more than the year before (El Paı´s 9 January 2007). A closer look
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at the numbers shows that the majority of migrants, 67,440, had been
intercepted and sent back on their way to Spanish territory or at the
border control; another 18,892 had returned voluntarily. This suggests
that Spain prefers to control illegal immigration at the border rather
than undocumented migrants inside the country (only 11,383). When a
migrant is caught without a residence or labour permit, he can be ad-
ministratively expelled, through an order to leave the country; this is
rarely translated into a physical expulsion, except for some people who
were caught in criminal offences. The order to leave has no conse-
quences, though in case of a regularisation campaign this may prevent
them from introducing a file. A labour union representative told me
the following story:
So, honestly, this morning there was a case, a Senegalese boy
who asked me, really, he is here, he does not find work, no pa-
pers, he told me: ‘What do I have to do for them to send me
back?’ because he has nothing, he wants to go back to his coun-
try, really. ‘What do I have to do, should I steal? I don’t want but
I want to go back to my country.’ But we only expel administra-
tively, not physically.
In the specific case of Senegambian migrants, the same story applies:
until very recently they were not physically repatriated, not even upon
arrival because there was no return agreement with most sub-Saharan
African countries. After the summer of 2006 brought many thousands
to the Canary Islands, Senegal accepted the repatriation of 4,870
Senegalese migrants (El Paı´s 8 November 2006). These are mainly im-
migrants who were sent back from detention centres in the main arri-
val spots (such as the Canary Islands); in general, they are not the
result of checks in daily life. As a result, respondents in Spain do not
mention high levels of fear of repatriation.
In Belgium, a migrant who does not have the required permission
to enter or to stay, can be expelled at any time. Different checks inside
the territory result in about 30,000 orders to leave the country per year;
many of those migrants disappear without anyone knowing where they
are (De Standaard 20 July 2006). Some 3,000 migrants return volunta-
rily each year with support from IOM; in 2006, only eleven of them
were Senegambian (IOM 2006). Distancing from the territory is fre-
quently the method used by the authorities: statistics from the Belgian
Aliens Office show that there are some 12,000 expulsions per year (De
Standaard 20 January 2007). Upon seizure, the local police unit con-
tacts the Aliens Office which decides whether the migrant is allowed to
stay, receives an order to leave the country, or is transferred to a reten-
tion centre, where they can be held for three months waiting for their
138 GETTING BY IN EUROPE’S URBAN LABOUR MARKETS
expulsion (Vuylsteke 2006). An NGO key informant explains that
criminal involvement is an important criterion for reference to a deten-
tion centre; other factors that play a role are the countries of origin and
repatriation agreements (Demets 2003). Respondents are aware of the
existence of a list of priorities for physical repatriation, as Engbersen
also notices (1999) and avoid criminal activities. In Belgium, fifteen
Senegalese and one Gambian were expelled in 2006; despite this being
a relatively low number, this policy is rather effective in its scaring
effect:
Repatriation happens, and it leads to big big fear. Here in the
house people speak of nothing but that. We only talk about two
or three recent cases, we never relate it to the total number of
people around, but this is enough to make all of us very scared.
Every couple of months we know of somebody who is in prison
or on his way to be expelled. Recently a woman was in that si-
tuation, she had only been here less than a year. They can be
checked in a phone shop, in the bus, in a car in a traffic check,
just in id checks. It leads to a lot of tension and fear. (Franc¸ois,
in Antwerp since 2003, regular status, in training)
People cannot be physically repatriated if their nationality is not identi-
fied. Although most respondents do have a valid passport from their
country of origin, they never carry them with them; in case of a check,
they may give a false identity or address. Orders to leave the country
have to my knowledge never lead any of my respondents to go back;
they throw the paper away and continue life as before, although it is of-
ten a humiliating experience. An artist with a visa for France for con-
certs was working for a while in Belgium and experienced first hand
the tough approach of the Belgian police.
They took our fingerprints and they put us in prison, they put
us handcuffs. In Senegal, handcuffs is something very bad, they
don’t put it for small checks and things like that, we don’t know
it, it is only for big criminals. So that hurt me because I didn’t
do anything, I only came [ from France to Belgium] to play, I
didn’t steal, I didn’t do anything bad, and they put me in prison,
from the morning till three o’clock. They told me I have to go
back to France, leave the territory, because I don’t have a Belgian
visa. But because it was written in Flemish I did not even under-
stand what they wrote, I took the paper and threw it away and I
continued my work. (Mbaye, in Antwerp since 1995, regular sta-
tus, musician)
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However, there are many techniques for the police to find out, by phone
numbers or people asking for you; and in case you manage to pretend
being from another country, the prospect of being repatriated to un-
known territory is scary enough to say the truth. The Senegalese em-
bassy often collaborates with the Belgian authorities to identify citizens.
Emotional consequences
Living in these conditions has emotional effects. Frederix cites a psy-
chologist who says: ‘Everyone living in illegality has a significant
chance of psychological problems. People have no safety, no stable
place, little meaning in their lives or perspectives for the future, living
in fear and isolation... the symptoms are head aches, stomach pro-
blems, insomnia, psychic and physical exhaustion. This so-called syn-
drome of Ulysses8 is typical for refugees and is similar to a depression
without suicidal tendency’ (Frederix 2005: 40). Burgers (1999) also
shows that stress and depression are the main problems for undocu-
mented migrants, and more so when they stay illegally for a long time.
Looking at the adult population, Leman (1997) uses a threefold typol-
ogy of medical afflictions of immigrants: imported pathologies,
acquired diseases, and adaptive pathologies. The latter two are the most
important because they relate respectively to life conditions in the host
country (nutrition, housing, climate, employment) and socio-cultural
adaptation (mainly psychological and social).
In the case of Senegambians in Spain, those who made the trip over-
land and by boat do report traumatising experiences. In later stages, it
is mainly the dependency on employers, the hidden racism and exploi-
tation, and the separation from family and friends, that creates frustra-
tion and depression.
The trip only was a surprise, but once I arrived here, I had pro-
blems but it was not sooooo hard. People helped me. Life without
papers is a bit difficult but I have forgotten. Because if you are al-
ways thinking, you think work, you think papers, you think your
family, you think many things… Oooooo, you will become crazy.
(Assane, in Barcelona since 2001, undocumented, textile industry)
For migrants residing in Belgium, rather than the traumatic trip, the
continuing atmosphere of fear and hopelessness create mental pro-
blems. Some respondents confess that they drink too much, and some
make an explicit link to their undocumented status:
I am ashamed of myself. I feel very bad, and even when I am
with other people I am away, gone, somewhere else. I cannot
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enjoy things, I don’t dare to watch myself in the mirror, I am so
sick of this life and cheating and begging. I don’t respect myself
anymore and I can see how people would become mad in this
kind of situation. (Ousman, in Antwerp since 2004, undocu-
mented, unemployed)
One person who had some indications of mental problems back in
Senegal tells how the different problems in his life in Belgium have
made him fall back into psychoses that he might not suffer when stay-
ing in Senegal.
I felt that I was falling behind compared to my friends who
stayed in Senegal, I was not making progress, not going any-
where. And it takes so much energy to adapt to the conditions
here, things not going the way you want them to go, and not
much you can do to change it. Life as an undocumented mi-
grant is difficult and hard, and you have to carry it alone. All of
this triggered my illness (Sal, in Antwerp since 1998, regular
status, temping).
In this context, people find refuge and support in their religion and
spirituality; many people pray to ask for safety or health, a considerable
number puts its faith in amulets and other protective measures
(Nimako 2000; Nwolisa Okanga 1995). Leman (1997) shows how ma-
jor religions offer specific religious services to undocumented mi-
grants, as an ethno-religious extension of social life of home country,
where they live without being there, and it fills in the gap. Undocu-
mented migrants look for country mates and the atmosphere of home;
sermons can offer support in terms of easing their guilt, or by main-
taining a sense of ethno-religious self-esteem. The idea that fate is in
someone else’s hands makes it easier to accept everything that happens
in their undocumented situation.
In Belgium, you cannot do anything without papers. The only
solution is to pray a lot, faith helps to live these conditions.
There is a lot of checks. (Bakeba, in Antwerp since 1993, regular
status, unemployed)
Others react in a different way: even though in an illegal situation, un-
documented immigrants have acted politically, often supported by
civilian society. Solidarity movements created around church and pub-
lic building sit-ins in both Spain and Belgium have raised the interest
shown for the precarious situation of the undocumented immigrants
in both the general public and political circles. This has resulted in
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support for regularisation campaigns and easing of some of the most
unrealistic and iniquitous aspects of control, but of course not in
radical changes in the direction of political decisions (Bernard 2000;
Vuylsteke 2006).
6.2 Being allowed to stay
Not having a residence permit has many unattended implications in
the bureaucratic welfare states of Western Europe, ranging from the
impossibility to travel or visit home, to the lack of social protection and
administrative rights, and the stress of continuous hiding and extreme
vulnerability. In order to realise their original and ultimate goal of sav-
ing a considerable sum of money, many people adopt a new mid-term
aim: they try to obtain papers, in order to start a ‘normal’ life and there-
by increase their chances of success. In the next sections, some direct
and indirect strategies for ameliorating one’s residence status are dis-
cussed (Wets 2001): asylum and regularisation are direct strategies, in
which the goal and the act correspond perfectly. Marriage and job
offers are indirect documentation strategies, as the right to stay in the
country is a consequence of the person’s status in another dimension
of life.
Table 6.1 Number of years in illegality before being regularised in Antwerp and
Barcelona
Antwerp Barcelona
Regularised Still waiting Regularised Still waiting*
2 years or less 4 5 11 5
Between 2 and 5 years 7 5 5 9
More than 5 years 7 1 0 0
* Nine of these people had introduced files for the regularisation campaign February-March
2005; five others were trying to fulfil the conditions. In Belgium, the people waiting had no
immediate prospect.
As an introduction, Table 6.1 gives an indication of the number of
years people spent as undocumented migrants before obtaining resi-
dence permits. A first difference is that no one in Spain had been
undocumented for more than five years, while eight people in Belgium
had. In the same line, a large group of undocumented migrants was
regularised in Spain within two years of arrival; in Belgium, this num-
ber stood at only four. This is a very rough indicator for generally long-
er waiting times in Belgium than in Spain. Below, I will explore how
this reflects the different migration policies in both countries.
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Asylum applications
In the absence of lasting civil war or political repression in Senegal
and the Gambia, most western governments decide not to consider
political refugee status for residents of these countries. However, some
respondents do mention relying on the asylum procedure, mostly for
improper aims such as gaining access or winning time.
Many black Africans entering Spanish territory by boat or through
the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla upon arrival declare themselves refu-
gees from one of the numerous countries at war. During the investiga-
tion of their case, they cannot be expelled and receive a temporary per-
mit; if not given refugee status, they just join the many undocumented
migrants and wait for a regularisation campaign.
When I entered in Ceuta I did two months, they give me the pa-
pers of refugee, residence card. Because there you don’t declare
your normal data, you have to name a country that is in war or
that is very bad economically, and Senegal does not know these
things. If you say Senegal they will send you to Senegal, and at
that time there was war in Guinea Bissau, so I said that, so they
give me paper for refugee and they transfer me to Spain. After
one year, they know about how people cheat, so they invite
everyone to come with the real passport. (Babacar, in Barcelona
since 2000, regular status, transport)
Senegambians arriving in Belgium in the 1980s and 1990s would
commonly apply for asylum, arguing they fled their country because of
the war in the southern province of Casamance, the political troubles
of 1988 (between President Abdou Diouf and the opposition), or the
incidents with Mauritania in 1989. Knowing that these reasons were
never really accepted for a refugee status, their aim was to have some
time of relative freedom as their presence would be tolerated in case of
an identity check. With the then long delays in the procedure, includ-
ing the inevitable appeal against a negative decision, they might be safe
for some months or even years. As Adam et al. mention (2001), people
feel they become undocumented only after the final rejection of their
case, although they were technically undocumented before. Some
might even try successive asylum applications under different names.
Some people take on a fake identity, make up a corresponding refu-
gee story, and continue to defend their case as such. An example are
the Senegalese pretending to be Mauritanian; often original from the
border region, they may have family on the other side or have spent
part of their lives there, which makes it easier for them to pretend con-
sistently. The common argument (that can only be used by lowly edu-
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cated people, as a higher-educated migrant mentioned) would be that
they used to be slaves there and if they would go back now they would
be killed.
Europe is very sensitive to slavery, they cannot accept it at all,
and it works very well. But you need some family members
there to get some papers, et cetera. Only people from the north
tend to do it. (Musa, in Antwerp since 2004, undocumented,
import-export)
If successful, as the three respondents in Belgium (see Table 6.2) an-
other kind of problem arises: all documents linked to the original iden-
tity, like diplomas but also wedding acts and recognition of children
are unusable now.
Regularisation
From Table 6.2, we can see that regularisation is the main strategy for
obtaining residence permits in Spain, with twelve people succeeding in
regularising their stay through this channel. Another nine were partici-
pating in the latest regularisation campaign (February to May 2005)
that took place while I was finishing my fieldwork in Barcelona; many
of them were accepted and are now regular workers.
Table 6.2 Successful documentation strategies in Spain and Belgium
Antwerp Barcelona
Regularisation 5 (2)* 12 (9)
Marriage 13 (1) 0
Work permit / Contingente 1 3
Refugee 3 0
* Bracketed numbers refer to people who are in advanced stages of a procedure that is not
yet finished.
For Belgium, marriage is the dominant solution, which was successful
for thirteen respondents. Five respondents were regularised, all of
them during the one-off campaign in 2000. The legislative background
to this outspoken difference will be explored below.
Spain
As mentioned in chapter 2, the subsequent regularisation campaigns
in Spain coincide with changes in the law (Gorta´zar 2000). In 1985,
the first ‘Foreigners Act’ was introduced and with the objective of lega-
lising the stock of undocumented foreigners generated by the previous
regulatory vacuum, 38,000 immigrants obtained a residence permit.
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In 1991, pressures came from the considerable growth of the stock of
undocumented immigrants, but also from the EU Schengen require-
ment to introduce visas for Maghreb countries. Regularising many of
the Moroccan immigrants in exchange seemed a fair deal, and there
was a substantial consensus among political parties, NGOs, and public
opinion regarding the need to find a feasible solution: 109,000 new
work permits were issued. In 1996, changes were introduced in the
regulation that defined the application of the 1985 Law. For those who
had lost residential status and for relatives of legal workers this re-
sulted in 21,000 working permits. In 2000 and 2001, the regularisa-
tion coincided with new legislation again, resolving the undocumented
status of 164,000 and 235,000 migrants respectively. Information
about this policy choice is communicated widely among Senegambian
migrants:
Now my papers have expired, I have no papers here. It is very
difficult. I chose Spain because everybody says when you got
there is easier to get papers then other countries where you have
to marry somebody that has papers. Here, when they are giving
papers, you are lucky. So people say just try, here in Spain is
safer. They police is not very hard, so even if I don’t have paper,
they will not deport me. So here I can try to have paper that is
why. (Fatou, woman, in Barcelona since 2003, undocumented,
textile industry)
The first campaigns were marked by the absence of a specialised
agency staffed by experienced personnel and supplied with the neces-
sary resources; later ones drew on the active cooperation of third-sector
organisations, trade unions, and immigrants’ associations. The initial
one-year work permits issued need renewal on a regular basis, with
early preconditions about proven employment representing a big diffi-
culty for workers in a precarious labour market and undoing the effect
of the campaigns; later ones were more flexible. Residence and work
permits in Spain are always temporary in the beginning; they need to
be renewed. A migrant should have contributed half the time of the
permit to social security in order to renew it; this means having a
labour contract, unless one has the statute of self-employed.
As a direct effect of the change of government, the latest regularisa-
tion campaign ran from February to May 2005 and gave renewable
one-year legal residency to any foreign national who could show that
he had a job contract and lived in the country for more than six
months. This shows the main rationale behind the process: illegal im-
migrants and their employers, particularly in the agricultural, domestic
and construction sectors are harming the economy by not paying taxes
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and social security. In addition, it was a solution for security problems
on the level of the cities where they concentrate, as well as a symbolic
issue for the socialist image. However, the conditions for regularisation
of status were criticised by street-level organisations, who claim that
the conditions were impossible to meet. Particularly the link to a la-
bour contract was hard to obtain, which leads Domingo (2000) to
point to an almost ridiculous spiral for an earlier campaign: to find a
job an immigrant needed papers, but to get those papers he needed a
job contract. Next to stimulating all kinds of frauds and insecurity, it
also leads to an important dependency on the employers, as discussed
below. In the case of Senegambian migrants, some key informants
point out that the hawkers experienced problems: by the nature of their
work they do not build the personal relationships to employers who
may give them a job offer or pre-contract for obtaining papers, and
they were therefore excluded from the regularisation process. In addi-
tion, the people working with somebody else’s papers, or those for
whom registration in the city register was impossible or scary, did not
meet the conditions, and would thus remain undocumented. It is esti-
mated that 573,000 residence permits were handed out.
On the other hand, employers use the system to tie workers to them.
For most immigrants it is key to find an employer that would be pre-
pared to give them a contract; this is more likely in a context of perso-
nal ties, a relationship of appreciation and trust, and therefore more
probable in relatively small enterprises. This influences people’s job
strategies: Bubacar gave up a better-paid job in a Gambian phone shop,
for harder work in agriculture, hoping that this may lead to a contract.
With some respondents mentioning that ‘contracts’ are for sale at high
prices, there is no need to say this strategy may lead to bad situations
of dependency:
You know, many Spanish, they don’t want black people to have
nothing. They pay us three euro per hour, that is nothing, and
they think we don’t know that. They think we don’t know noth-
ing, but we do know, we know. But we have to follow our inter-
est, you know, that is why; we have no papers, that is why we
accept. But we know it is little money (Mbacke´, in Barcelona
since 2000, undocumented, agriculture).
One year after this regularisation, Spanish authorities reported that
there are again about one million undocumented migrants living in
Spain (El Mundo 6 May 2006). This includes people who did not meet
the conditions as well as new arrivals. The Socialist Party explicitly ex-
cluded a new regularisation, probably inspired by difficult position vis-
a`-vis the European partners. The avalanche of migrants arriving at the
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Canary Islands over the summer of 2006 drove Spain to ask for help
from European partners, who were reluctant to assist after they were
not consulted about the unilateral Spanish regularisation decision.
Fears are that immigrants benefiting from the amnesty will then be
able to move freely throughout Europe. However, the ambition of a
common EU immigration policy has been undermined by other mem-
ber states signalling their readiness to regularise the status of undocu-
mented migrants (Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and France).
The job offer is officially a way to recruit a particular foreigner for a
job that is not filled by local work force; a good example is a percussion
musician hired by a Belgian band. However, it can be used to regular-
ise migrants already present in the country illegally, as happened in
this case. For the three migrants in Spain, this involved going back to
pick up the visa in the Spanish consulate of his/her country of origin,
which is quite risky in case it does not end well. Therefore, an inven-
tive system of paid local stand-ins partly solves this problem, requiring
the immigrant to return only when the visa is stamped and ready for
collection. However, as a flexible response to urgent needs in the la-
bour market the system fails, because there is too much administration
and check to verify if no local or EU worker can do the job. The re-
marks about dependency and exploitation ‘balancing’ the promise of
papers, apply here in the same way as described above for common
regularisation. Some established migrants ask their employer to do a
favour for a relative back home; in that case, a new migrant comes over
with a work visa, but in fact, there is no job waiting for him. The new
arrival can legally try to find another job and maybe renew his resi-
dence permit showing he worked enough time. Over time, more than
150,000 immigrants have been regularised this way.
Belgium
When the migration stop was declared in 1974, it was followed closely
by political actions and, as a consequence, a first mass regularisation
for the foreign workers in irregular situations9 (Ouali 1997). Some
7,500 work permits were granted, mostly to Turkish and Moroccan
people (Bernard 2000). A second regularisation, and the last one so
far, took place in 2000, due to a combination of societal factors.
In September 1998, Semira Adamu, a rejected asylum seeker from
Nigeria, died during the state police’s sixth attempt to expel her forci-
bly. This caused a shock in the general Belgian population and media,
led to the dismissal of the minister of interior affairs, and proved to be
a turning point for both the general awareness and the mobilisation of
a movement to defend the rights of undocumented migrants (Kagne´
2001). The solidarity movements created around church and public
building sit-ins in the winter of 1998 later diversified and extended,
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mobilising artists, scientists, universities and schools, but the socialist
and Christian-democrat government did not give in. The 13 June 1999
elections brought a new government with both Walloon and Flemish
socialists, liberals and ecologists, the last ones most closely associated
with the social groups pushing for immigrant’s rights. A stricter
asylum policy was accompanied by a second and far larger regularisa-
tion campaign in January 2000 (Martiniello 2003). This aimed at a
rapid regularisation of people meeting a set of individualised and pre-
cisely defined conditions: showing to have truly been in Belgium from
1 October, and fulfilling one of the following:
– having been engaged in asylum procedure for an abnormally long
period without having been informed of a decisions (four years in
general, three for families with minor children), if not a danger for
public order and no breaches of the law after entering the procedure;
– not having the objective possibility of returning to one’s country
due to external reasons, for example, war;
– suffering a serious illness, or;
– having lived for six years in Belgium, showing humanitarian cir-
cumstances and lasting social ties.
More than 36,000 applications were handed in, involving more than
50,000 people, with large representations of the Moroccan and
Congolese communities (Martiniello 2003). Some 25,000 files have re-
ceived a positive answer, 6,000 a negative answer, and 1,240 are still
being treated. Walckiers (2003) summarises two major complaints: the
procedure was not transparent enough for the migrants (communica-
tion did not reach everyone, lots of details unresolved, no central infor-
mation point, interpretation of arguments was not made clear) and the
procedure was too slow to deal with the applications, with bad psycho-
logical consequences. Some respondents who participated are still wait-
ing for the outcome, be it because they bought part of the necessary
proof. Not everyone was reached by this campaign: some precarious
(but not illegal) statuses were excluded, others did not trust the govern-
ment and institutions, did not meet the criteria, did not possess proves,
or were simply not informed (Adam et al. 2001). In Antwerp, almost
5000 applications were made, often including several people, 32 per
cent residing in the North area, and 19 per cent in Borgerhout; five
Senegambian respondents also took part in this procedure.
Today, there is no perspective of a new regularisation campaign. The
only other possibility consists in case by case regularisations based on
article 9, paragraph 3 of the 15 December 1980 law. This stipulates that
a demand to obtain a residence permit when one is in the territory can-
not be filed, except in ‘exceptional circumstances’. The law does not
make this precise, but seriously ill people, victims of human trafficking
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or people who have been in the country very long have a very small
chance to be regularised. The obscure conditions contributed together
with the rigidity in other channels to the build up of an important
backlog of files: many of my undocumented respondents have tried
their luck, and some repeat the application again and again, knowing
very well that they have no new elements for their file (Frederix 2005).
In 2006 the individual applications of 10,207 people were accepted,
most of them because of unreasonably long asylum procedures (De
Standaard 22 January 2006).
Common features
In both countries, new rumours about regularisation come up every
year, often without clear reason, but most of the time taken seriously by
desperate people. In order to be prepared for this mythological quest for
papers, undocumented people try to find all kinds of proof of presence
from the beginning of their stay. This includes registering as an inhabi-
tant in the municipality in Spain, going to hospital for urgent medical
care, having library cards made, having letters sent to you at a specific
address, all of which they hope may serve as the proof they have been
present in the country for the required time in case of a regularisation.
Next to the majority of ‘deserving’ immigrants following the cor-
rect way to apply, corruption, abuse and money-making from all
kinds of middle-men is rife;10 sometimes lawyers take advantage of
people to give them hope and earn considerable amounts of money in
the meantime, independent of the outcome (Burgers & Engbersen
1999). In the regularisation campaign of spring 2005 in Spain, people
needed a job contract and a registration in the municipality for six
months; almost immediately, these documents were for sale (Sole´ et al.
1998). A Senegalese civil servant is well placed to give some
information:
The government creates people who will sell contracts, registra-
tion in the municipality, false papers, that is all. You have to pay
to have a contract, and you pay with your labour or with money.
In the beginning of February the price for a contract was 4,000
euro, that is on average the salary of eight months of work, and
now it has gone down to 3,500 [euro]; and of course you pay
your own social security contributions.
In Belgium in 1999, one of the conditions was proof of integration
and five years of residence in the country. As people were prepared to
pay 250 euro for a proof of being in Belgium during five years, it
stimulated an industry of fake or copied papers. The quote below
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shows how to buy them, and at the same time illustrates how multiple
sets of papers and identities discussed above can come about:
In 1999 when I was in Belgium for some months with my stu-
dent visa, the regularisation was announced. I had an undocu-
mented cousin in France who wanted me to introduce papers
for him. I went to buy the documents, wrote his name, put my
picture on it, and introduced the file. Where I bought the
proofs? People who wrote letters for somebody photocopied
them afterwards, or maybe others did it for money, anyway
many were photocopied many times to serve a lot of people, with
only the name changed. Also doctors and embassies helped. My
cousin was 34 years old, but he died shortly after in a car acci-
dent in France. His documents are still in Belgium, so I can use
it if I want. I use it only when I want to work, as I cannot do that
with my student visa, but otherwise I lend it to other people.
(Musa, in Antwerp since 2004, undocumented, import-export)
The administration discovered the abuse and is now checking every-
body using the same witnesses.
To avoid mass arrivals of undocumented people from other countries
when a country launches a regularisation campaign, or an attraction ef-
fect for criminal organisations, they are usually announced suddenly
and unexpectedly, and application is limited in time. In addition, the
government may considerably re-enforce its border checks ahead of
and during the campaign.11 Despite these efforts, my sample shows ex-
amples of people trying their luck several times, sometimes in other
countries, until they are successful. They either go somewhere or send
money and papers to have someone else take care of it.
I left Belgium to go to Italy in 1998 to get the papers there. I
got them and it was not difficult to renew them every time. But
now it has become more difficult to renew them. But mine are
‘license of commerce’, not a working one, so I can still renew
them without contracts. Italy used to be more open and friend-
lier to foreigners, but things changed rapidly for the worse.
(Pate´, in Antwerp since 1996, undocumented, restaurant)
However, despite this ‘regularisation-tourism’, it is not clear whether
and to what extent large-scale regularisation campaigns generate addi-
tional illegal migration. Critics believe that this policy encourages im-
migrants to make often-dangerous journeys to the EU in the hope that
they too will eventually be allowed to remain; evidence about this phe-
nomenon seems hard to find in the European literature. In general,
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the economic picture of home countries would make it absurd to think
that migrants need something to ‘call them’, although the relative ease
to obtain papers may influence the choice of country.
This description shows how regularisation operations in some coun-
tries of the European Union is more a ‘policy of fait accompli’ than re-
lated to a new policy of immigration (Kagne´ 2001), because neither
country intends to make steps towards structural regularisations.
Marriage
In Spain, only one respondent mentioned the possibility of a marriage,
and also the elements that keep him from making the step:
I cannot participate in the regularisation, so maybe I should
marry. I say this because sometimes you need to be egoistic, you
know, to get what you want. But also I don’t want to hurt
anyone. For me it is not good to marry a woman that you don’t
love, and then after she gives you the papers you throw her on
the street and she will suffer, and this for me is not good be-
cause I have sisters, and I don’t want them to live that situation.
Therefore, I say it sometimes, but I think a lot… but in the end
for me the person is more important than the papers. (Matar, in
Barcelona since 2000, undocumented, shopkeeper)
In contrast, a marriage with someone legally residing in the country is
generally seen as the only way out in Belgium. This seems to indicate
that actively searching a marriage with a local is not the first choice in
order to obtain a residence permit, but a final option turned to when
no other perspectives exist. It was successful for thirteen Senegambian
respondents, and is even recognised as such by outsiders.
I contacted a lawyer in Brussels, the best for migrant problems,
just to make an appointment to explain my case for a regularisa-
tion. But hearing I was Senegalese, he said ‘Senegalese? No
chance whatsoever. Just find a girl and marry her’. (Ousman, in
Antwerp since 2004, undocumented, unemployed)
Large settled communities like the Turkish and Moroccan, may provide
marriage partners for undocumented members of the ethnic group
(Burgers & Engbersen 1999; Staring 1998); in the absence of a pool of
legal counterparts, Senegambians have to look at other nationalities,
mostly Belgians. The standard strategy is to go out to particular bars,
festivals, or squares known for multicultural music and encounters, a
way to maximise their chances to find a girl, or a woman: in a consid-
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erable number of cases, middle-aged women are part of the market12.
Finding someone for the night is reported as very easy, as also ex-
plained in chapter 5, but finding someone who is prepared to marry is
more difficult and may require some strategic profiling:
You will not stop the relationship because marriage will solve
some of your problems. If she wants to go to cinema and clubs,
you will go with her because you are not free to speak your
mind; but once you get the papers you can show your real char-
acter and say what you think and then she can decide whether
she still likes you. (Sheikh, in Antwerp since 2004, undocumen-
ted, import-export)
Whether these are sham marriages, marriages of convenience, or based
on genuine affective feelings is always food for questions from the sur-
roundings of the couple: family, friends and civil servants. In my sample
and fieldwork, I have not encountered signs of real sham marriages,
involving people who never had a relationship, but where one partner
paid the other; key informants confirm this. Much more common is
what one respondent calls ‘comedy marriages’ in which the foreign part-
ner pushes a girlfriend into wedlock prematurely. Other cases are based
on friendship, with the marriage as a gesture for the undocumented mi-
grant. Still others, and the majority, start with mutual attraction, love
and shared plans for the future; the girl may really want to help because
she understands the situation and may want to build a life together.
The fight against marriages of convenience was considerably in-
creased in the last ten years (Bernard 2000), with a number of docu-
ments required and an obligatory pre-marital interview by the authori-
ties. Whether a marriage of convenience or not, this procedure tends to
raise nerves:
They do not look at the love and the depth of our feelings for
each other; and the possible consequences if they would not al-
low us to marry, how sad we would be. Really I love her a lot
and that is why I want to marry her, she is a really good girl and
will be a good wife. But they prefer to watch the negative things
and to look for problems, it is their job, I understand. So now
we will have to wait for the decision in a couple of weeks. If they
want to repatriate me maybe I will be fine home with my family;
but what about my wife? We will both suffer a lot if I am going
to be expelled. I know many Africans get divorced, but me not,
it is not everybody who is going to leave his wife after he gets
the papers. We live in Antwerp now, and we are very happy to-
gether. I never thought I would live in Belgium, but love can
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change things. The heart has its reasons. (Youssou, in Antwerp
since 2000, undocumented, working in horticulture)
Afterwards, some stay together as a married couple; others leave the
girl relatively quickly after the papers have come. Still others struggle
with cultural differences and unequal positions (Bendadi 2005):
You know, it is not easy with two traditions; it is difficult to stay
together. I always say nobody has ever seen an old mixed couple;
really, it is always small problems because we don’t understand
each other, so we divorced. (Mbaye, in Antwerp since 1995, reg-
ular status, musician)
This strategy may interfere with established family life back in Senegal.
On the one hand, a wife back home may understand the need for this
step:
I do not go out and try to pick up girls, because my status as el-
derly person prevents me from doing that. But my wife told me
to marry if that is going to improve my situation, she helps and
supports me, we have been together a long time and she would
understand this kind of decision. (Khadim, in Antwerp since
2003, undocumented, hawking)
In other cases, it can intervene in a bad way, as summed up nicely and
surprisingly openly by this respondent:
Why so many marriages fail? You have to look at the interest of
the people. The man’s interest is always to have the papers, so
some of them marry somebody they don’t love so much and
leave it after they get the papers. Also, sometimes they don’t
earn anything and depend on the wife, and it is not easy to be
like that, to depend on your wife, or to have a husband who
depends on you all the time. Also, sometimes people are not
very honest and don’t tell you they have a wife and/or children
in Senegal. Or maybe their family will not accept a white wife,
so they take you to their country, but they present you somebody
else’s family, so nobody finds out. Sometimes the family in
Senegal will make you marry a cousin or a relative, so you have
two wives, one in Belgium, one in Senegal. And some Belgian
women accept, particularly as they are sometimes a bit older,
maybe divorced already, so they accept this situation. (Musa, in
Antwerp since 2004, undocumented, import-export)
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Residence permit realised, but…
In general, respondents refer to the acquisition of papers as the single
event with most impact in their lives as a migrants, because of work
and because they are geographically mobile again, with the possibility
to visit family and friends at home (Schuster 2005). Some authors
mention that the dichotomies of legal versus illegal immigrant are dif-
fuse (Engbersen & Van der Leun, 2001), particularly in Spain where
the short permits obtained in legalisation campaigns may be difficult
to renew (Mendoza 1998). In my sample, I did not encounter examples
of workers passing from illegal to legal and vice versa on several occa-
sions. Only in the case of migrants who obtained residence and work
permits in one country and then moved to another European country,
their status is changing and volatile. However, it should be reempha-
sised that the apparent trajectory towards documented status is unat-
tainable for some migrants.
If they did obtain the residence permit, many dimensions of life
change. Particularly in Belgium, people need an official address where
they live alone; sharing houses has fiscal consequences. The costs for
rent, food, electricity and gas are suddenly considerably higher than
before, in the arrangements between undocumented migrants. In
Spain, migrants necessarily have to look for jobs in the official sector,
given that the renewal of their permit depends on proven employment.
In both cases, migrants need to pay taxes and have the opportunity to
bring wives and children over.
Yes, life changes with the papers… more individual, less com-
munity. When you have papers, you need an address, and with
that you start to live like the Belgian people do, but we do not
like it. We keep eating together with friends and family till today,
many people come here or we go to eat somewhere else. Also
you need to take a real job, it is too difficult to work in business
with papers, too risky. You will need a car to go to work, you
need a house for your family… and you need more money, just
like Belgian people. (Bakeba, in Antwerp since 1993, regular sta-
tus, unemployed)
This even leads to Bakeba getting nostalgic and longing for the simple
life without documentation:
Life was a lot better when we had no papers, now I am filled
with nostalgia for the hawking days. They are two different
styles of life: to have a house or a room alone, to be officially re-
gistered somewhere, to manage your life, an official life, fixed
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address, pay all the bills that continue to come every month, try
to save for the taxes – now everything is about rules and follow-
ing the rules, you cannot create any problem. Before, that was
less important. The life of a businessman is outside the laws,
outside administration. The business life is flexible, and the
community life is so good for us… Once you have the papers
you are channelled, you cannot take risks. (Bakeba, in Antwerp
since 1993, regular status, unemployed)
Many people underestimate the rising costs of living a ‘western’ life, re-
flected not only in increasing levels of financial expenditure, but also
in terms of goal displacement. The mid-term goal becomes a better
economic position; the focus of attention shifts to the family in the
host country. The strategies need to change again, and return to the
home country is postponed once more.
6.3 Conclusion: Different ways of ‘being undocumented’
A first surprising element emerging from this chapter is the difference
between the Western European adherence to administrative procedures
and rules, and the flexibility of papers and identities in African social
life. The ‘holy faith’ in the paper reality in Europe, is in Africa comple-
tely unknown. This is expressed foremost through the use of false
identity papers, as identity, age, nationality, even marriage are not ne-
cessarily unchangeable facts as we tend to see them.
If I want to be someone else tomorrow, I can buy the documents
today. (Modou, in Antwerp since 2004, regular status, temping)
This can take shapes that European administrations can hardly ima-
gine: someone got in trouble with one false name he had been using
in Belgium to get married; he divorced, cancelled the name, got a new
identity in Senegal (next to the real one that still exists) and came back
to remarry the same girl but with a different name. Fake names and
identities of course raise issues that continue to conflict with adminis-
trative rules: how to obtain a family reunification if one has a different
nationality? This game with identities then extends to spheres of work,
health insurance, driver licences, travel permits.
Second, the differences between documentation strategies in
Antwerp and Barcelona have been highlighted in this chapter, and they
confirm the hypotheses formulated above. Spain offers an easier life
for migrants without papers, and the perspective of a next regularisa-
tion campaign is always present; Belgium is stricter and offers less per-
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spectives. As anecdotal evidence, the circumstances under which I was
carrying out the fieldwork can illustrate this difference. In Antwerp,
my fieldwork coincided with the announcement and first activities of
the ‘X-stra’ action in which targeted neighbourhoods were controlled
door to door, in order to record social or housing problems and provide
help.13 As this information was passed on to the public prosecutor, civil
rights movements and undocumented migrants were clearly scared
that this would lead to repatriation. My Spanish fieldwork, on the con-
trary, overlapped with the discussion about and the launch of the last
regularisation, which gave hope for a new life to hundreds of thou-
sands of migrants. In short: for undocumented migrants life in Spain
is better than in Belgium. Contrary to reality, many immigrants attri-
bute this to a perceived longer experience with immigration in Spain
than in Belgium. However, some respondents point to a factor that
may be closer to the reality of undocumented migration:
In Spain you have seen it, almost every year they give papers to
the people, and Italy as well, because they need workers, so they
regularise because so that the migrants can work for them. But
Belgium does not do that at all. (Mbaye, in Antwerp since 1995,
regular status, musician)
The specificity of the Spanish economy and migration legislation in
the last decades has created an immigration process in which phases
of irregularity are almost standard for the large flows of newly arriving
migrants. After making it into the country, they search and find work
in the informal economy; degrees of internal control are low, repatria-
tion practically non-existent, and they have a number of rights and ac-
cess to services. In short, migrants’ lives can be characterised as ‘quiet
lives in the margins of society’. Afterwards many of them have suc-
ceeded to regularise their stay within reasonable timeframes (Pajares
2004), with the six waves of mass regularisation campaigns over the
last 22 years presenting the main documentation strategy. That is not
to say that life in Spain is easy, it is to say that the feel of repression is
far less. For the hundreds of thousands who find themselves in irregu-
lar situations, the existing migration policy has conditioned a social fra-
mework that systematically promotes marginalisation and exclusion
(King & Rodrı´guez-Melguizo 1999). The pending promise of ‘papers’
binds them to jobs and employers, providing Spain with a vulnerable
and therefore obedient labour force for the informal sector. As Calavita
(1998: 538) puts it:
‘To preview the argument I make here, Spain’s immigration
laws – which systematically marginalize third world immigrants
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but do not stem their immigration – provide the Spanish econo-
my with precisely the type of vulnerable workers required to im-
pose post-Fordist discipline on at least a substantial segment of
the workforce.’
In Belgium, the situation is clearly different, with far smaller inflows
of undocumented immigrants and stricter implementation of the law
through active internal state control. Many areas of life are rendered
difficult by the lack of identification and the subsequent lack of rights
and access to services. The risks of police control and deportation
causes restricted mobility; exploitation and abuse can be even worse
than in Spain; a dignified human existence in general is difficult. In
addition, because of the very small chance of obtaining papers in the
future, Senegambian migrants are driven in the direction of marriage
as a documentation strategy. Life as an undocumented in Belgium is
clearly more stressful on a daily basis because of the active opposition
of the authorities; it can be characterised as a ‘hidden existence’. As
Chavez puts it for the US: ‘their continued presence in the US is an
act of defiance to the powers that conspire to limit their opportunities
and to keep them outside the society’ (Chavez 1990: 58).
In the next chapter, I will take a closer look on how migrants try to
organise their lives as documented migrants, through integrating
themselves on the formal labour market, make different housing
choices, stabilise family life and invest in education. The driving force
is the wish to ameliorate their position, which is why ‘mobility’ strate-
gies is an adequate term.
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7 Mobility strategies as a legal migrant
So, under the grey European sky, or in unexpected sunlight, I
walk on, counting my steps, each one bringing me closer to my
dream. But how many kilometres, how many work-filled days
and sleepless nights still separate me from that so-called success
that my people, on the other hand, took for granted when I told
them I was leaving for France. I walk on, my steps weighted
down by their dreams, my head filled with my own. I walk on
and have no idea where I’ll end up. (Diome 2006: 3)
The most important change over an individual’s migration time line is
to obtain a residence permit: most respondents say regularisation chan-
ged their lives in a positive sense. In addition, the people who arrive
legally enter the analysis now and start their careers at this point. Both
situations allow job searching strategies and procedures to enter the
official and regular labour market. However, they are bound to meet
new challenges:
Life with papers is not easier; you will find other barriers and
difficulties, so it is the same. You push, but always you meet
new barriers: first it was the papers, now it is the work. (Ibra, in
Antwerp since 2002, regular status, temping)
This chapter deals with the strategies migrants develop when they have
papers, in order to improve their situation and with the aim of getting
closer to their original goal. This includes looking at work experiences
as well as strategies in other dimensions of life in order to secure a
form of social mobility.
7.1 Work experiences for documented migrants
After regularisation, or upon legal arrival with a work permit, migrants
normally enter the formal labour market, or they are at least entitled to
do so. This changes their possibilities: to start with, they can use main-
stream and more effective channels to find work; jobs are also better
paid and come with guaranteed civil and legal rights, which allows
them to have a ‘normal’ life. However, they soon discover that papers
are not the only threshold: from now on, they will be faced with new
barriers such as language, diplomas, and education. As they lose the
competitive advantage of being undocumented (and therefore cheap),
they may find that finding a job becomes more challenging.
This is the point where I should introduce the limited number of
women respondents in the sample, as they mainly enter as regular mi-
grants through family reunion (Marfaing 2003b). The biggest group of
Senegambian women spend some years at home, taking care of chil-
dren, prior to entering the labour market (Bodin & Quiminal 1991;
Tellegen 2000). In Belgium, women can work officially from the first
day they have received a residence permit. In Barcelona, on the con-
trary, an administrative difficulty is that women coming through family
reunification do not automatically have a work permit, only residence;
they have to change their status with a job offer, very much in the
same way as the men regularise themselves.1 The economic and finan-
cial dependency on the husband as a result of not having the right to
work, is in stark contrast with the wish for integration and emancipa-
tion of immigrant women.
With or without working permit, many women engage in some forms
of extra cash earning; most common are braiding hair of friends, cater-
ing meals or snacks or selling Senegalese products at home. Outside
the ethnic community, informal cleaning is the most common activity,
often using connections in the children’s schools or from friends. Once
working officially, it looks like their main sector is cleaning,2 care for el-
derly people and temping – at least in Barcelona, where enough wo-
men have reached this stage; the Belgian respondents have mostly not
entered this stage yet. Both Pajares (2005) and Anguiano Te´llez (2001)
note that black women are moving on to commerce, hotels and ser-
vices. One illustration is Aisatu who is currently working as a cultural
mediator. After five years caring for her children, she started cleaning
in order to get a work permit; then a succession of temporary jobs in
the environmental service of the municipality, in a plastics enterprise,
cleaning in a hotel, to finally becoming a cultural mediator in the mu-
nicipality for two years now. However, the largest group of respondents
consists of men, and their trajectories will be analysed below.
In Antwerp
This new documentation situation requires some more explanation on
the changes in job hunting strategies and the experience of temping
and unemployment, as well as a closer look at some deviant strategies
or trajectories that imply following courses and training.
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Job hunting strategies
Friends remain a very important source of information for jobs in the
formal sector. Many migrants find jobs through networks: someone
who is working knows about a vacancy in this enterprise, and tells his
friends about it. One example is someone who was offered a job in a
slaughterhouse, but did not have the car needed to go there; he there-
fore informed another friend who went and took it. An exceptional
illustration of this process is one particular industrial cleaning com-
pany in Antwerp, an enterprise that also sponsors the shirts of the
Senegalese football club. Because of a Senegalese manager higher up
in the hierarchy, up to six respondents have been able to work there at
some point of their career. As one explains:
My brother was working in industrial cleaning where they
needed somebody, so I went there and worked for 3.5 years, until
June 2004. Many Senegalese were working there, no Belgians;
only immigrants. But they like Senegalese; they always ask if we
know somebody to take a place, because they know we do well.
(Idrissa, in Antwerp since 1993, regular status, unemployed)
The kind of friends therefore make a difference: Senegalese or ‘local’
friends provide different ways of access as seen in the informal strate-
gies. A local wife or girlfriend can make a considerable difference.
Temping agencies are the second main channel through which jobs
are found in Antwerp; the official Flemish employment agency is
another central source of information and support; written sources are
rarely used (Geets et al. 2006). Many people register in all agencies
and go around every week to ask for a job in order to show their moti-
vation to work. Two factors seem to help facilitate the process: speaking
the Dutch language is a condition, and in addition, a car seems to be a
prerequisite. Jobs are often located in industrial zones that are difficult
to reach by public transport, particularly for work in shifts or at irregu-
lar times – someone without a car therefore misses out on jobs.
I was lucky; I found jobs in interim very easily. For some people
it seems to be more difficult. It is very important that you are
able to speak the language, and also to have a car. Because
sometimes you need to work outside the city if you cannot find
something here. I took a language course but no job training.
They are just the normal requisites, like for Belgian people.
(Ibra, in Antwerp since 2002, regular status, temping)
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In Antwerp, the Dutch language is often mentioned as problematic
when looking for jobs. Many picked up some words or studied a little
bit before regularisation (Geets et al. 2006), but most of the respon-
dents are ready to admit that they don’t speak Dutch well, even after
several years and some courses. Then why do they not speak it, while
Spanish Senegalese very quickly speak the local language? Next to the
fact that Dutch and Spanish stem from different linguistic groups, with
Spanish closer to French, and Dutch being rated as more difficult, one
respondent explains that you will always find people in Antwerp who
speak English or French, resulting in a lack of practice. In addition, the
city of Antwerp organises language classes, but has had long waiting
lists in recent years. Therefore, when applying for a job, language is pro-
blematic, and people are told to go and look for a course prior to starting
a job. However, from the side of the migrants there are some doubts:
Yes, they always tell me, because, you know, in the temping
agency where I was, the woman, the girl, she is very difficult,
she always tells me that I have problems with my Dutch, and
she is partly right. Because if I talked well, very well Dutch,
maybe I would not have so many problems to enter the labour
market. But the work that they give me, this requires no Dutch…
because surely Dutch, we, we cannot understand it like they
want it. And they can always get you on this, they get you easily.
Many agencies do what they refuse to say: they privilege the
Flemish, the Dutch, the Flemish I mean, they give them first.
(Sal, in Antwerp since 1998, regular status, temping)
The first step: Unskilled temping
Upon receiving a work permit there is a clear tendency for people in
Antwerp to leave the field of business and hawking and to look for reg-
ular jobs that give more secure employment and social security rights.
For most this opening of other sectors comes as a relief. Others would
have liked to use their commercial experience, skills and networks to
achieve the formal status of businesspersons, market seller or other-
wise, but key informants say that regularising hawking is impossible
because it would require the permission of all bartenders. To be a stall-
holder on markets you need a special permit, which is easy to obtain if
you are Belgian, but foreigners have to prove ten years in the country.
It could be a job, if they organise it, for those who have this
experience, they could continue to do it, paying taxes and every-
thing, being self-employed. I think this could be a solution in-
stead of chasing the people to forbid it, there should be a
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licence, put taxes on it, the state would benefit and the hawkers
also. I think it could be a solution. (Aliu, in Antwerp since 2001,
regular status, unemployed)
As shown above, a disproportionate number of respondents in
Antwerp work in one specific industrial cleaning company. In addition,
some three Senegambian migrants work in horticulture, mainly toma-
toes and chicory; as noted above, they are partly formally but largely
informally employed. Another four do unskilled jobs in a variety of
industrial sectors. This corresponds with the distribution found by
Desmarez et al. (2004) where Africans in Belgium are concentrated in
the temping sector, others in catering industry or agriculture and horti-
culture; they particularly notice the underrepresentation in construc-
tion. However, it is difficult to decide on sectors of employment, as a
typical trajectory could be as follows:
Sometimes I still work in the cleaning, some weeks or days to
replace someone else. With a drivers licence I could start again
tomorrow. So after, I work with temping jobs. I found a job,
washing dishes, in a company canteen. I did many things… let’s
see… I worked as a worker in factories, I washed dishes, some
time picking apples or being handyman… it was not easy; there
were long periods without work. (Bakeba, in Antwerp since
1993, regular status, unemployed)
When looking at levels of education or training prior to migration,
there is little or no difference: the people who have some university
education can be found in selling, industries, construction, and shops;
the less-educated are found in the same sectors.
On the level of wages and earnings, it is clear that respondents are
overwhelmingly in low paid positions; this comes as no surprise, given
that they are in sectors that are not attractive to locals because of the
nature of the job combined with low salaries (Pajares 2005). Even in
cases where hourly wage may be acceptable, employment is almost by
definition unstable and insecure, resulting in volatile monthly earn-
ings. Though migrants have many more good months than bad
months, it is the case for many that their annual earnings approach
the poverty threshold. Salary rises are rare, even after increasing experi-
ence, promotion is almost impossible for people hired exclusively on
temporary contracts.
Several respondents mention examples of racism in the work envir-
onment, both from employers and colleagues: they are the first to be
blamed when something went wrong or if something was stolen, they
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are confronted with negative remarks. A person managing to achieve a
higher position says this:
For racism, you need to struggle two or three times more than a
Belgian person, you need to prove a lot more, but it is possible
to do it and to have something. For instance white people do not
want me to have this job or this position where I can tell them
something. When I am in the central building, the centre of our
enterprise, sometimes the people at the reception tell me that
for deliveries, it is the other side… They cannot imagine that I
work with them. Or in the floor of the managers, there are
people who explain me that I am mistaken, that the workers
cannot enter, but me I enter the code and I go to do my work,
simply. You have to forget and continue, otherwise it has no
sense. Flanders did not know many Africans before, so there
still is work to do for us. There are prejudices, as if all of us have
lived next to lions and elephants, or as if we cannot drive a car.
(Lamine, in Antwerp since 1999, regular status, fixed position).
Thinking ahead: Longer-term employment
After spending a while wandering around in the temping segment of
the labour market, most respondents realise that it is better to have a
profession, with a diploma, in order to find better work.
It is the same in every country, if you have no profession you are
left with the lowest and hardest and worst paid jobs, but in
Belgium even more important than in Senegal (Doudou, in
Antwerp since 2002, regular status, temping).
Some have the opportunity to get ‘on the job training’ and to receive
certificates of experience in building or forklift driving; others can
move on to become supervisors in their teams. Belgium offers systems
of subsidised contracts, where the cost of further training is compen-
sated for the employer by six months contributions to the salary.
Others invest in extra qualifications: a driving licence is most often
mentioned. Although it is almost a precondition for employment, the
time and money needed to pass the exam are often too much for
respondents. One respondent, temporarily working in a transport com-
pany as a truck driver, had a drivers’ licence from Senegal and had it
converted here, helped by his Belgian wife. Five people have secured
themselves longer-term contracts (more than one year), often because
they have obtained a relative degree of specialisation in their field. One
has been working at the reception of a hotel for 25 years, almost imme-
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diately after the moment he got papers through marriage; two others
are working, one as a welder and the other as a skilled insulation work-
er, a third has made it to supervisor in the industrial cleaning company
mentioned above.
In addition, a couple of people have made strong investments in
education and pursued a professional career. One respondent is a shop
owner and two others have high-skilled jobs as the branch manager of
an industrial cleaning company and as a marine engineer respectively.
A fourth is training to be a plumber.3 The commitment and determina-
tion needed for those trajectories are illustrated by the decision to take
Dutch classes as an undocumented migrant, and to prioritise them
after legal possibilities to work, often combining lower-level work with
studies. It requires a continuing belief in the sense and usefulness of
long-term investments in the final goal, and not getting tempted by the
relative comfort of fixed contracts at lower levels. One has to overcome
the administrative maze of recognition of diploma’s or settlement as a
self-employed foreigner. Their own efforts in training are no doubt the
most important factor for their success, but a number of factors in the
context need to be right as well. Two people had Belgian wives support-
ing them and helping them to find the way to and around institutions.
Another one inserted himself in a subsidised scheme of employment
and courses, that also provided him with the links to institutions and,
in the end, an organisation that gave him a loan for his shop. Strategic
choices for job qualifications that are in demand are crucial to be rea-
sonably able to expect that the hardship and sacrifices will pay off later.
Finally, most of these respondents were not held back by a family wait-
ing for remittances. They could afford not to send money home for
some time, which left space to invest in training hoping for returns
later.
A former mathematics student, Aziz spent eight years living as a
hawker; however, at the moment of getting papers he had to make a
choice, motivated as follows:
At that moment I said look, I will do something, I understood, I
was a bit realistic because I understood if I want to work accord-
ing to my level in French, it will not work, because here, to learn
Dutch at university level, to have a good job, I see that even the
Flemish sometimes have problems. So one has to be realistic, I
have a wife, I have a child, one has to be realistic, you have to
do something. (Aziz, in Antwerp since 1994, regular status,
shopkeeper)
Seeing that continuing his studies was not an option, he decided to in-
vest in other kinds of training. He went for a one-year programme of
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the municipality combining language, social orientation and cleaning
jobs, afterwards using these connections with the institutions to find in-
formation about an organisation that gives loans. He wrote a project for
a grocery shop and was accepted, launching the enterprise about two
months after. Given the limited size of the community in Antwerp, he
targets a wider audience (as many ethnic entrepreneurs do) (Lambrecht
et al. 2002):
If you have a small business, like me, there are some Senegalese
who come here but not many, and there is many Nigerians who
buy here as well, and the Belgians, but with the Senegalese only
it is not going to work. It is an African shop, a bit diverse,
Senegalese food but also with fofou and other things that we
don’t eat, but with the Senegalese only I will not see anyone dur-
ing three days. Also water and cigarettes for the Belgians, there
is something for everyone really. (Aziz, in Antwerp since 1994,
regular status, shopkeeper)
Unemployment
Temping goes hand in hand with shorter or longer periods of unem-
ployment between jobs. Out of the seven respondents in temping jobs,
three were unemployed at the time of the interview. In one case, a di-
vorce interrupted a training job, and the person was unemployed for
some months while reorganising his life and finding a job. Another
stopped working in a recycling shop because the heavy physical work
was difficult to combine with his age; he is unemployed because it is
difficult to find a job when over fifty. Another one seems not too moti-
vated to find something and makes a living from hawking. Respondents
who had experienced this phase previously mention how difficult it is:
I was then temping for a couple of months, but it was very diffi-
cult. One week they take you for three days, then you wait, then
you work again maybe for six or seven days, then you wait
again, and every time is another job, and other people, and you
never know beforehand, and is not sure and not stable. (Bayfal,
in Antwerp since 1998, regular status, temping)
In a chapter on the economic impact of migration, a recent OECD re-
port about Belgium states that ‘the foreign-born population is on aver-
age contributing far less to economic activity. Although employment
rates have been increasing, foreigners have a low rate of labour force
participation, higher unemployment rates, lower educational attain-
ment and may face discrimination’ (OECD 2005: 124). For the specific
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population I am discussing here, insufficient education and command
of language as well as discrimination are the main reasons.
If one has worked long enough before, he is entitled to unemploy-
ment benefits; if not, most can rely on the subsistence income. This
leads to the launch of another reason for unemployment, which is one
of comfort: combining benefits or welfare with some hawking is con-
sidered sufficient income for some respondents.
Many people who come here to Belgium do not really want to
work. If they have papers, they are happy to receive the social
benefits and go selling a bit on the side. Many of them do not
want to work, it is too hard, or they feel they are too highly edu-
cated to do the kind of work available. Because the jobs are al-
ways about physical strength, they take us because of our bodies,
but nothing else. It is difficult to find a job where you can use
your mind. If you have the papers and you can have the OCMW,
people are very happy and don’t look for a job anymore. They
have to take some course and go to school, that is not asked too
much and it is not as heavy as going to work every day. In the
evenings and the weekends, they go selling and earn a bit on the
side. They can even send something to their families with that.
(Musa, in Antwerp since 2004, undocumented, import-export)
On the other hand, some respondents clearly make efforts to get out of
periods of unemployment or dependency on subsistence income. They
may have been on subsistence income for a while because of mental
problems, divorce, or because they did not work enough yet to receive
unemployment benefits. These people can work for a year in municipal
services or hospitals, carrying out cleaning or other low-skilled jobs
with a coach and extra guidance, in order to integrate again into the
normal labour market.
In 2003 I entered unemployment, they tell me that they now
look for special [subsidised] statutes that are less expensive, or
people with a driver’s licence. I don’t like unemployment, it is
not my thing, me I like to work. The unemployment money
does not make you progress, and afterwards it is even harder to
start working again. (Bakeba, in Antwerp since 1993, regular sta-
tus, unemployed)
In Barcelona
As in Antwerp, people with work permits can rely on temping agencies
in order to find jobs, in addition to the networks they used before.
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It is more easy to find a job, with the papers, before it was al-
ways contacts, people I know, but when I have the papers, there
is offices where you can go and ask for work, no matter where,
and they don’t hesitate to take you because you are legal, you
know, and then it pays better as well. (Thierno, in Barcelona
since 1999, regularised, construction)
However, the trajectories in terms of sectors of employment are slightly
different, which will be discussed below.
Escaping agriculture
After being regularised, Bakeba continued working in agriculture; he
mentions being hired in a larger field and a bigger company, where he
was taught to drive the machines. This suggests people with papers are
eligible for slightly more specialised jobs. Then a new world opens for
him:
Afterwards, they tell me when you have papers, you can go to a
temping agency to find a job. I went there, they ask me the
papers, to fill in some forms, et cetera. The next day they called
me, I went there, they say: ‘The job is in a village 23 kilometres
away, work starts at 6 am, you need a car. If you don’t have a
car, no problem, we can find you something else, only that it
will take some more time". But me I wanted this work, so I said
yes, I have a car, certainly, but I left it at home. They asked me
many questions, they tell me not to come late at work. I say it is
a Renault Megane, I have a licence from Senegal. I went to the
company, I see that there is no problem; I will go to live there
because I don’t have a car. The first weeks I slept in the station,
afterwards I got to know someone with whom I can live. That
work, I liked it a lot, I had never had such a job, I went inside,
everyone was wearing overalls, like uniforms, and then gloves,
with lights and air conditioning, it was something else, you
know, I had never worked in a factory. (Thierno, in Barcelona
since 1999, regularised, construction)
We have seen earlier that agriculture is definitely the initial port of
entry for many undocumented Africans; and that early migrants some-
times had long-term employments in agriculture. Looking at formal
employment at the time of the interview, only four respondents con-
tinue to work in the fields. This is confirmed by numbers: in 2003 18.5
per cent of Senegalese migrants were working in agriculture, in 2005
only 14.4 per cent – a substantial decline, without counting the undo-
168 GETTING BY IN EUROPE’S URBAN LABOUR MARKETS
cumented workers (Pajares 2005). Key informants in the Barcelona
province also point out how the number of people working in agricul-
ture declines every year, because the area for cultivation diminishes. A
second important motivation seems to lie in the conditions of agricul-
tural work that may be worse than in any other sector (Sole´ 1998):
hard physical conditions in heat and rain,4 with chemicals and pesti-
cides, stooping for hours or lifting heavy weights, make respondents
seek to escape from agricultural work. But also the insecure nature of
the jobs, with high degrees of seasonality and casualisation and almost
no full-year employment, force people to seek an income in other eco-
nomic sectors, in order to secure an income through all or most of the
year. This sensitises them to openings in other sectors, as well as mak-
ing them aware that wages are higher elsewhere. A third reason lies in
the changing attitudes of the immigrants. Parts of this group have be-
come more stable and settled and start looking for a better job, enabled
by better knowledge of information channels and networks (Kaplan
1998). Hoggart and Mendoza (1999) accurately describe the resulting
status of agriculture in the immigrant labour market: ‘Once in Spain,
however, most African workers find that agriculture is a short-stay
introduction to Spanish labour markets or, occasionally, a returned-to,
short-term refuge from failure to secure a job in another sector’. Or in
the words of Amadou:
Before, all of us in the field, but now many in the factories.
Because the field is very hard, and people have to leave it, and the
immigrants working in the fields during twenty or 25 or 30 years,
you see them [shows an arched back]. The people of the factories,
this does not happen to them, the work never makes you rich but
it is different from the field. It is not so hard, that’s why the ma-
jority of the migrants change. Not all of them can change, but the
ones who can. When they have papers, of course… Before, they
have to sustain, there is no other way. (Amadou, in Barcelona
since 1983, regular status, plastic industry)
This is of course is bad news for the agricultural sector, already under
heavy pressure of global competition, and may point to problems for
its longer-term future. The sector is characterised by an old age struc-
ture, and unwillingness of children to take over; the maintenance of
competitiveness through a low-wage, anti-investment strategy (in
which the low-paid migrant workers fit) will probably not bring long-
term benefits for Spanish agriculture (Hoggart & Mendoza 1999). If
migrants soon follow the labour preferences of the locals, they will not
save the sector either.
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The first step: Unskilled temping
Via temping agencies, friends or previous employers, some respon-
dents succeed in shifting from agriculture into other economic sectors,
moving into the manufacturing, construction and services sector. Most
of the time they work on short-time contracts, changing sectors, mov-
ing around, working in shifts, often paid partly informally, as Thierno
demonstrates resuming three years of formal work experience:
I worked in Badalona, in a workshop, where they cut cardboard. I
did nine months, but always contracts of three months, eleven
hours per day. I left it, because I had to wake up very early to get
there, so I arrived late sometimes. Afterwards I found a job in
Mataro, in a company that makes glass, lamps, vases, plates in
the shape of fruits, ashtrays, et cetera. I did four months, less
paid than before, but I did only eight hours, sometimes in the
morning, then the night, or after midnight. And I moved here to
be close to work. Then three months in a supermarket, to replace
someone who was ill. Another work was with a carpenter, with-
out a contract, just in his home, he paid well. But in the end he
exploits us, in the beginning he paid well, he wanted us to stay,
but afterwards, sometimes we have to wait until the fifteenth of
the month before he pays you. I worked in the glass company in
Ocata, I started doing all kinds of different shifts with the fork
lift, till I got a fixed contract for the night shift. […]. Then a while
in construction, but there is lot of abuse there. Therefore, I left
the company and went to Fuertaventura on the Canary Islands,
where I worked for construction; and afterwards maintenance in
hotels. (Thierno, in Barcelona since 1999, regular status, con-
struction)
This quote reveals why a detailed analysis of temping periods is almost
impossible: respondents can make lists of subsequent locations and
employers, but they are likely to forget some, and asking for labour
conditions and incomes in all different periods is impossible. In her
study of different migrant groups, Anguiano Te´llez (2001) confirms
that African migrants are found mostly in agriculture and construction,
because of their demographic characteristics, limited networks and lack
of experience. Nonetheless, there seems to be a limited mobility to-
wards commerce, services and hotels (Colectivo IOE 2000; Pajares
2005; Tellegen 2000). However, when asking for a line or preferences
throughout these periods, a common answer is:
What I like more? But here, you cannot do a job that you like,
that you choose. You will do the work that exists, you have no di-
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ploma or nothing, so, you go where they ask you. What I like
most is where I earn most… (Demba, in Barcelona since 2000,
regular status, hawking)
Some respondents have come to temping after relatively long periods
of employment with a single company before: two were working more
than ten years in the textile sector, others in agriculture. However, as
these sectors are in crisis, they push out workers, and it is difficult to
find new work in same sector; respondents therefore shift to temping
in hotel and gardening sectors.
When entering the formal labour market, proficiency in the local
language becomes a selection criterion (Mendoza 1997), a rather pro-
blematic issue in Antwerp. In Barcelona, most people learn Spanish
informally in a very short time, with friends and colleagues, in bars or
on the street. As it is relatively close to French, it does not seem to cre-
ate a significant challenge, and even after a couple of months people
get by; some people even studied Spanish back in Senegal. Catalan is
not often mentioned: on the work floor, the international migrants
often work with former internal Spanish migrants who do not speak
Catalan either, but it does facilitate access to higher-skilled jobs in ad-
ministration as well as more contacts in society (Pe´rez 1995). There is
however an impressive offer for language courses for adults in the city
(Kaplan 1998), which some people use.
Just like Thierno, the most common profile of Senegambian mi-
grants in Barcelona is one of rather low-skilled workers; temping agen-
cies may ask for a written CV or a driver’s licence; both can be proble-
matic and limits employment possibilities. As a result, most do only
unskilled work, and changes come down to shifting between low-
skilled jobs, not making much progress, ‘a regular pattern of unskilled
worker job mobility’ (Mendoza 1997). However, with better knowledge
of the language, skills and experience, it seems like some are able to
increase the time of employment moving from weeks to months to half
years of temporary contracts. Nevertheless, in some cases, job changes
are motivated by the search for better wages, particularly for those who
are specialised, as we will see below.
More than education, an element which seems crucial for African
employment is their inclination to accepting challenging conditions for
themselves and their families (Trinidad Garcı´a 2003). This includes
long commuting times, staying at work for the week or working at
night, no social benefits, temporary contracts, job instability, and dan-
gerous working conditions. They are often prepared to move residence
in search for work, a big comparative advantage.
In addition, respondents in this study reported on a wide array of
mechanisms of exploitation and earnings abuse from employers, often
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based on the belief that migrants do not know their rights or are not in
a position to complain somewhere. Also at the level of workplace safety
and conditions, there are many abuses and accidents (Jounin 2004).
The sectors of agriculture, transport and construction lead to most
complaints (Pajares 2005); sectors like temping seem to be better orga-
nised, explaining why less complaints were registered in Antwerp.
Pajares also shows that migrants revendicate and complain a lot less
than their presence in the labour force would justify, often because
they depend on the employer to get regularisation or a work permit.
Abuse is clearly less than in the informal market; in addition, workers
feel more confident to leave jobs because they do not get fair treatment
or pay. Common wages at this stage are about 1,000 euro when work-
ing the whole month; many people try to work extra hours or week-
ends in order to get some extra income.
I work for the train company, with the people who put the rails;
it is a very hard work and the money is not worth the effort.
They pay 965 euro, this is exploitation; that is why I did not con-
tinue. Sometimes you are in other regions, like the south, and
the transport is not paid, and if you need to start on Monday
morning, you have to travel on Sunday to be in time. I could
work there my whole life, but I did not want, there is easier
work to gain the same. (Bachirou, in Barcelona since 2000, reg-
ular status, temping)
Longer-term employment
Some people have managed to find longer-term employments, often
because of specific professional skills they may have had before arriv-
ing. Salif for instance, a trained welder, was hired in Spain and was
offered the opportunity to study and to get a Spanish diploma; he has
been with the same company more than ten years. Pape is a shop-
keeper in an African tourist shop; his knowledge of English and
French, next to some computer skills, convinced the owners to hire
him, and he has been in the same place for three and a half years. A
rare exception is Omar, who arrived back in the 1980s and has worked
more than five years in a plastics company, doing unskilled work dur-
ing night shifts.
Sometimes, respondents have developed an active strategy of invest-
ing in training, inspired by knowledge of the importance attached to
having a profession or specialisation in western labour markets; they
were not among the higher educated in their country of origin, con-
trary to what Mendoza (1998) found. As in Antwerp, this requires a
good insight into the functioning of the labour market, or help of a
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local friend to make one see the importance of training; a certain de-
gree of freedom from the demands of the family back home in order
to postpone immediate salaries for the sake of better and more regular
employment later. One person trained as a steeplejack, another in-
vested time after work in obtaining a drivers licence for large trucks
and is currently an international trucker. None of these strategies guar-
antees a path of roses: the trucker was fired because he protested
against exploitation, and is temping again for the moment. But this
group shows a fragmented picture of job mobility for skilled workers,
where job turnover is not necessarily the result of the end of a contract,
but may arise from the search for better personal prospects in terms of
stability or better wages (Pajares 2005).
One respondent with a university background started temping in
commercial jobs upon arrival; when he became a member of the la-
bour union, he was asked to be part of the team promoting social elec-
tions amongst migrant workers. He is a labour advisor in the labour
union nowadays. Probably because of the importance of Senegambian
migration in the province of Barcelona, as well as the progressive poli-
cies of the city, there is a rather large group of Senegambian people
working in the public sector administration, as cultural mediators in
hospitals and municipal services, in international development, labour
union, etc. The equivalent in Belgium would probably be Turkish and
Moroccans in social services.
Finally, four respondents have entered the status of self-employed
shopkeeper; they tend to be among the people that had the longest resi-
dence in Spain, suggesting that a considerable sum of savings is neces-
sary for the investment, which is often acquired in collaboration with
others. A common characteristic is that being a shopkeeper requires
man and wife working as a couple, with one being in the shop and the
other doing purchasing, financial administration and tax forms.
In terms of gathering the money necessary for investment, there are
several ways, one more creative than the other: Samba worked legally
in agriculture for some years, than started to do some temping and fi-
nally met an Englishman who changed his life…
He had a phone shop, well, in fact, he had four, but he wanted
to leave the business. I worked with him free during one year,
in order to take it over – I did not have enough money to buy it.
In the evenings and weekends, I would do other small jobs, like
in agriculture, to survive. (Samba, in Barcelona since 1997, regu-
lar status, communication centre owner)
He was able to run the business with some commercial experience in
Gambia, and with support from a friend doing similar business; at pre-
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sent, he has two people working for him for the internet and phone
services, as well as transfers of money abroad. Seck came to Spain in
1982 and worked for many years in agriculture, prior to moving on to
temping in industries, and finally establishing himself in 1997 as a
shopkeeper. It started with going to Andorra, buying cigarettes and
suitcases on request, and selling them to customers. He limited the
investment costs of the real shop by locating it inside a local butchery,
with which he shared the space, rent and customers. He had just a cal-
culator, a bag with spare coins and a table to present a limited array of
products: beauty products, rice and tropical fruits. He and his four
friends continued to work in industries and took turns for presence in
the shop. Afterwards he and one companion invested in an appropriate
location for his widening range of products. Serigne also had a stan-
dard trajectory, working in agriculture before papers, afterwards work-
ing in bars and temping until he grew tired of temping. He started to
think about an arts and crafts shop, combined with a communication
centre, and obtained a loan from the bank; a Catalan friend from the
NGO-sector in which he was an active member served as guarantor.
In terms of the target audience, Serigne clearly aims at a Spanish
and tourist public with his arts shop, an African street party to launch
the opening, and a diversity of products coming from Senegal and also
Mexico and India. When it turned out that this conflicted with the
Africans customers of the communication centre who ring home, and
stay in the shop hanging around to chat, the communication centre
was moved to a different location. As an NGO activist, he combines
talks and conferences with promotion for his shop.
My strategy for the shop: there is a lot of competition, it is im-
possible to beat the Chinese in prices for clothes, so I try to be
just a little bit different or bring new things, things that are
more creative or special and unique. I also try to give a lot of ex-
planations about African culture and try to function as a multi-
cultural meeting place, with a gallery downstairs. That space
also I can use it for Senegalese hairdresser, also percussion
band. And I am going to talk in schools and for organisations,
and always ask money for these things. (Serigne, in Barcelona
since 1999, regular status, shop owner)
However, the grocery shops, hairdressers and the communication cen-
tres are clear examples of services explicitly aimed mainly at members
of the diaspora, showing that the very existence of a significant com-
munity creates jobs as the segmented labour market theories suggest.
This is shown by the special tariffs for calls to Senegal, Gambia, Mali
and Mauritania, or by the offer of fruit and vegetables, different grains
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and cereals, herbs, skin and haircare products from ‘home’. These
things become more important as one is further away from home for
longer periods of time (Martı´nez Veiga 2000). Some restaurants and
bars in the city centre offer local dishes trying to be authentic for their
own customers, but accessible enough to attract strangers as well.
Senegambian migrants in Barcelona also face periods of unemploy-
ment; the employment rate for Senegalese is estimated at about 64 per
cent (Kaplan 1998). However, unemployment benefits are limited in
time and directly linked to the number of months worked before, and
in the near absence of a subsistence income, there is less time to stay
without job; an additional pressure comes from the need to show em-
ployment in order to renew the temporary permissions. Some people
were interviewed at exactly one of these in-between periods: one re-
spondent just quit after his colleague died in an industrial accident,
after working four years in the same construction company. His job
implied often being away for the whole week, doing rather dangerous
work. Another respondent, Boubacar, has had papers since 1982, but
has been suffering from personal and family problems and faces long
periods of unemployment in between casual jobs. However, long-term
unemployment is seldomly mentioned. Contrary to Belgium, the cur-
rent employment rates of migrant in Spain are even higher than those
of the native-born population (OECD 2006).
7.2 Some remarks about the formal labour market
Undocumented migrants had rather divergent careers in Antwerp and
Barcelona; after being regularised, their tracks seem to converge in the
lower-skilled segments of the temporary labour market. They often try
to obtain a higher income and more security by specialisation or addi-
tional training.
Informal activities on the side
All respondents, faithful to their common business heritage, continue
to keep an eye open for an opportunity to buy or sell. People who used
to hawk sometimes continue to sell in periods where they cannot find
a job, others because they like it; sometimes to earn a little extra to
make ends meet or because the profit is high given their established
web of clients. In addition, everyone travelling to or from Senegal or
Paris brings over some goods to sell with a small profit margin; others
look for opportunities to be intermediaries in the transactions of others
buying cars, filling containers or looking for false papers.
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The sheer size of the local immigrant community provides for infor-
mal provision of internal services, particularly for parties and social
events inside the community. Numerous respondents earn an occa-
sional extra euro by acting as a hairdresser, photographer, cook, DJ, re-
ligious leader or tailor; some women sell home-cooked traditional
dishes or have a small informal shop with Senegalese spices, sweets
and cloth at home. Ibrahima is sewing African clothes after work and
in the weekends, on command; living from this is difficult if not
impossible:
I also have a sewing machine, very old. And as I was not work-
ing much in the beginning, the people know that I sew. I have
done this for many years. I would like to live from it, but here,
the African people who sew, they don’t have money. Because the
African migrants they don’t pay, they say at the end of the
month, when the husband has his salary. So here I am, one
owes me 30 euro, another twenty, but I cannot pay my house. I
only do it in the end of the week, and when I am tired, I leave it.
(Ibrahima, in Barcelona since 1994, regular status, horticulture)
This quote illustrates that postponing payments is frequent and infor-
mal contract enforcement is difficult, so that often considerable time is
spent collecting late payments (Soenen 2003). In addition, the prices
circulating internally are considerably lower than when providing for
outsiders: for braiding, a hairdresser for European women earns up to
250 euro a head; in the community, prices vary with the level of friend-
ship and can range from 15 to 30 euro or even up to 50 euro.
Many documented migrants also participate in informal activities in
the host country environment, not only inside the ethnic niche, show-
ing how there is no sharp demarcation between the formal and infor-
mal economies. The moonlighting may start as a necessity, when look-
ing for a way to bridge periods in between seasonal work. On a modest
level, possibilities arise in small extra activities such as guarding some-
body’s house during holidays, a low-level marihuana business, picking
cones in public forests (an extreme example of precariousness). Work-
ing extra hours without contract is a common practice in agriculture,
transport and construction, as shown below:
Sometimes I would work in tomato fields, because they give you
a contract for four or six hours a day, at the official rate of seven
euro; but you do many more at 5.25 [euro] per hour. I also tried
chicory for two days, but it was far too dirty and I did not like it, I
quit. But sometimes I go to collect pears in the weekends or dur-
ing my holidays, the boss pays me 7.50 [euro] per hour and he is
176 GETTING BY IN EUROPE’S URBAN LABOUR MARKETS
very good with me. It is without contract. (Malang, in Belgium
since 1996, regular status, industry)
For Modou, his side activity has actually become his main source of
income. Officially unemployed, and on the subsistence income, he has
a contract for a limited number of hours in a cloth recycling enterprise,
just enough to be able to keep the benefit – but in reality he is working
more than fulltime at peak times when containers need to be filled.
This combination offers him a salary of about 1,600 euro per month
or more, which he invests in import-export. It is a risky enterprise for
everyone, but most of all for people in the procedure of asylum, as it is
forbidden. They often follow courses during their waiting period or
engage in voluntary work to kill the time. Working partly undeclared
creates other problems in the longer run, like not building unemploy-
ment or pension rights, but also other problems:
Thierno calls me, he has moved to the Canary Islands. The job
he had in Barcelona with the forklift was partly in black; as a re-
sult, he did not earn enough officially to be able to take a mort-
gage for a house. His company did not want to confirm that he
works many hours in black and has a higher income, let alone in-
crease his contract. He left this job, a dead-end street, because he
is thinking about bringing his family over. (fieldnotes Barcelona)
The role of education
Armed with papers, migrants could in theory benefit more from their
previous education or experience. For people with specific skills, pro-
blems of transferral pose themselves: an archivist in Senegal is dealing
with paper, while in Antwerp many software skills are required; a car
mechanic in Gambia solves problems that an average Spanish garage
owner cannot even imagine. The same applies to a bookbinder, a soap
maker and a sofa builder. For highly educated people, the recognition
of diplomas is very difficult and can be expensive. Applying what one
studied earlier is difficult, for a variety of reasons: the level of Dutch or
Spanish necessary to pursue a professional career in nursery care,
mathematics or as a physical trainer is too high; during the years of
surviving as an undocumented migrant, a person may have lost his
knowledge. The necessary networks may be lacking, as in the case of a
sociologist/journalist who finds it difficult to access something more
intellectual after all those years. This results in a wide diversity of jobs,
mostly not corresponding to their educational level, leading a trained
bookkeeper to say:
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A link between the level of studies in our country and the
chances here? There is no link. You can have a PhD in Africa,
but here, you should not dream, you get nowhere close. That is
on the academic level; but also in the more technical field, for
instance a car mechanic. He can do it informally, but it is sure
that for a job they will ask him to do training in the VDAB. It is
true that there is not always correspondence between the experi-
ences. But in general it is difficult to find a link, mostly you are
forced to do something else. (Aliu, in Antwerp since 2001, regu-
lar status, unemployed)
Another option would be to actively direct their careers and invest in
training to increase their employment chances. In the beginning, most
interviewees showed no interest in pursuing an education programme,
as they feel it was contrary to the quest for immediate money that made
them migrate. They see studying as a loss of time, particularly because
they do not see their future here. Bakeba formulates it this way:
I did not come to discover everything, understand everything,
and to learn a language, only to earn enough money to invest
afterwards in my country. (Bakeba, in Antwerp since 1993, regu-
lar status, unemployed)
Others do not believe it will actually result in better jobs:
Training? Yes, there is training that one can do in Belgium… a
small training in bricklaying, or something else for three
months… but I don’t see many results. Me personally I did not
do it. Why do a ten-month training and then be a dishwasher in
a restaurant? It is better to start working immediately. I did this
and it worked well. Really, I am fine now, really well. (Fallou, in
Belgium since 2001, undocumented, temping)
A number of respondents did chose to invest in training, courses and
language learning, and although it is not an easy formula for quick
success, they are generally better off in the long run. Many respon-
dents have made the same analysis and started some form of educa-
tion, but did not finish. This is due to a variation of reasons, mostly
linked to the necessary means of time and energy, and the hard trade
off between short- and long-term benefits (Geets et al. 2006). Some do
not have the money to pay for training, although in many cases the
fees are very limited. The difference between Spain and Belgium is
that migrants in Belgium can often rely on unemployment benefits or
subsistence income when taking a course, while Spanish migrants
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have no economic support. However, in either case, they need savings
or part-time jobs to keep life going for the time of the course. With
changing temping jobs and a variety of shift hours it tends to be com-
plicated to show up for every class; many just let go. For others, the
family pressure to send money holds them back: when entering the
formal labour market they want to find a job as soon as possible,
because the family back home has been waiting sometimes for years.
They consider it not the right time to learn the language thoroughly or
to invest in training. The only way out is to try and provide family
members at home with a productive activity at home, like a car to run
a taxi company, which can free the migrant from sending remittances
for a while.
I don’t know, I think it is a problem of option, you have to
choose. Some of us have the time to tighten their belts, not to en-
gage immediately in hard work, but to follow rather a training,
like me. Me I see, sometimes, there is problems [in Senegal],
they call me, to inform me about problems, and me I cannot do
anything for the moment, that hurts me a lot, but it is a choice,
so I have to take it with the consequences. That is my case. But
the family only knows the problems that they themselves have,
not the problems that you encounter here. I think it is to the ben-
efit of everyone: me, my family, Belgium, everyone, but it is hard.
(Franc¸ois, in Antwerp since 2003, regular status, in training)
Being self-employed
The higher incidence of self-employed respondents in Barcelona than
in Antwerp (four versus one) is a reflection of a number of factors,
some of which are internal to the characteristics of the migration flow.
Barcelona harbours a far bigger Senegambian community, which was
also one of the first African groups to settle, which leaves them the
space to start up their niche shops. In addition, based on the traditional
business background, a more diversified set of opportunities also exist,
such as bars, restaurants, African art shops, call centres and butchers.
In Antwerp, a Senegalese nightclub, bar and grocery shop have closed
over time. However, numerous Nigerian and Ghanaian communication
centres, hairdressers, bars, video shops and grocery shops exist, sug-
gesting that the absence of Senegalese entrepreneurs on the scene is
due to their late regularisation. In addition, the community may not be
large or settled enough to create a large employment market (Epstein
2000).
Another element is linked to the administrative and legal context of
the host country, as suggested by the ‘mixed embeddedness’ notion de-
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veloped by Kloosterman (1999). In Belgium, a basic requirement is of
finishing secondary education (till age eighteen) or, alternatively, a
management course taken in Belgium. Obtaining the necessary infor-
mation and following the complex institutional procedure is often very
complicated (Lambrecht, Verhoeven & Martens 2002; OCIV 2002;
Wauters & Lambrecht 2006). Afterwards, the very strict implementa-
tion of different laws and checks from different inspection services are
a constant source of worry as are the many different taxes one has to
pay (Tellegen 2000). It is a written Antwerp policy to control systemati-
cally shops in areas with high concentrations of small migrant entre-
preneurs, to limit the excesses of fierce competition (Planningscel
Antwerpen 2004). Often problems arise with bookkeeping and con-
tracts with banks, because of lack of information and not being famil-
iar with the western system. The administrative demands for self-
employed status are lower in Spain, resulting in people with a modest
educational background opening shops; although the employment of
self-employed workers could be facilitated (Dijkstra 2000), respondents
complain less about checks, taxes and rules than in Belgium. It is
estimated that about 3 per cent of the Senegambian population in
Catalonia is registered as self-employed (Tellegen 2000). However, they
are often involved in the lower end of the opportunity structure and
have low profits because of the increasing competition.
The role of redistribution
Functioning in the labour market implies contributions to the social
security system, and therefore implies mechanisms of social protec-
tion. Once the migrant has a residence permit and work permit, he or
she is eligible for the services of most support institutions. This often
includes the possibility to follow subsidised language courses, profes-
sional training, help when setting up a business, right to loans, etc. In
addition, Belgium has the right to a subsistence income, for nationals
and foreigners. In addition, working conditions are better protected in
Belgium than in Spain, and salaries tend to be higher.
I still prefer Belgium because once you have papers and a job
life is more stable and of a higher standard, Spain is more like
Africa. Here in Belgium, social protection is better, things are
better organised, clearer, quicker, education is better, et cetera.
(Tapha, in Antwerp since 2003, undocumented, unemployed)
In Belgium, quite a few respondents have gone through a stage of ben-
efits dependency prior to securing a better income; a couple of respon-
dents seem to abuse the temporary safety net for longer periods, set-
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tling for the subsistence income while combining this with moonlight-
ing and/or hawking (as indeed some Belgians do). In Spain, unem-
ployment benefits are linked to the number of months worked, and are
limited in time.
Belgium has a lot of facilities, like OCMW and social housing
and things like that. This is very good, but it has two sides: some
immigrants, like Belgians, take advantage of it and do not work
anymore, because they can rely on the state. They want to take
things easy, they don’t really want to learn a language, it is diffi-
cult, I admit, but they don’t want to work, because there is help.
It may be an easy life, but they do not see that it leads to mar-
ginalisation, that is not where you will find respect, and that also
their children are likely to do not so good in school… . (Lamine,
in Antwerp since 1999, regular status, harbour)
Since 2004, Belgium has an obligatory integration trajectory, building
on elements that existed earlier, based on voluntary participation: a
combination of social orientation courses, language and work prepara-
tion. This came too late for most respondents, but the people on sub-
sistence income also have to follow a similar trajectory. Those people
claim it is useful and crucial in making the contacts.
Me I receive OCMW, but honestly, I would have preferred not to
receive it, but I am forced, because now I am doing the course.
So I am in a hurry to find a job and go working. Me too I want
to contribute, like everybody else, to pay taxes and everything.
Only that with the taxes, now they pay me. It is a matter of con-
science, my conscience tells me that I receive money form the
OCMW, from the state, and what I want to do first, that is first,
to know all the laws and to respect them, and to carry them in-
side myself. But the OCMW, they pay you exactly for the condi-
tion of need, and to allow people to organise themselves to get
out. You see. Because what we receive, it does not allow you to
have something extra, it is the three B’s : bread, bed and [xxx].
Pfff. You will not die form hunger, but you cannot go to a bar of-
ten. Restaurant, cinema, that is excluded. […]. But it is however
good that is exists. Really, I really say thank you, thank you. And
I am grateful. (Franc¸ois, in Antwerp since 2003, regular status,
in training)
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7.3 Other mobility strategies
Having a residence and work permit can open many doors; at the same
time, an unattended consequence is that living costs increase, thereby
taking migrants further away from their original goal of accumulating
capital in order to go back home. In the next section, we will see how
people both use the new opportunities and try to overcome the new dif-
ficulties. As we saw before, changing jobs and sectors is the first strat-
egy; studying or become self-employed may be options for others; here
I will look only at behaviour outside the pure labour market.
Continuing migration
Belgium or Spain may not be final destinations or places of fixed resi-
dence. I discussed above the seasonal migratory system in Spanish
agriculture, and the mobility of hawkers following the tourist season.
Sometimes inspired by adventure, the motivations to leave are most of-
ten the search for better work, a better life; particularly if things are
not going well: ‘they adapt to the economic and political conditions of
the country of origin, juggle with chances for work and legislation’
(Marfaing 2003b).
I would like, in about a year, if things continue like this, I will
change countries. I would like to go to a better place, like
England or the US or Australia, things like that. It is better. I
have an Australian friend, and she told me it is better, she
explained me and I understood that it is better. It is not easy to
enter, but if you try, if you are lucky, you go, otherwise, you try
another country. What else can we do? We try till the day some-
thing works out. There are people in Senegal who would like to
have my life here, and me I would like the position of someone
in the UK. That is life, you know? I think that France and the
UK are more developed than Spain; the Africans working there
have better chances than the people here. (Pape, in Barcelona
since 2000, regular status, shopkeeper)
Sometimes the mobility is not so much a well-planned project as a case
of pure desperation, or based on vague rumours. Because of the risks
involved, they tend to be single males (Mendoza 1997). One respon-
dent was living and working in Germany for some years as a night re-
ceptionist. When he broke up with his girlfriend, he left his job and
went back to France, just to continue travelling to England and finally
finding himself in Spain.
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I remember it well, it was the World Cup of 1996. I stayed three
or four months and I took my luggage direction UK, for more
adventure. I loved the country, the ways of the people, I did two
or three years there, I thought I would stay there (…) but in
1999 I went back to France for some months of holiday; I also
went to visit Denmark, but that was just to visit friends and I
did not like it enough to stay. And then I came to Spain… why…
well, I saw a programme about Barcelona and decided to come
to see it. Also they say that life is less expensive in Spain, you
earn less but you spend less as well. I wanted to try my luck.
(Bachirou, in Barcelona since 2000, regular status, temping)
This brings us back to the fraud with papers; the ones who move to
other countries are often the ones who can now rent out their papers
to others. They themselves, in turn, need a network of fellow country-
men to be able to travel with a fake visa, and arriving in the new desti-
nation country they change legal status again: they will need to work
illegally, as the work permit is not transferable (Schuster 2005).
I prefer to stay here, even if I have the residence permit in
Portugal, but as there is no more work in Portugal, I prefer to
come here. The last two years, or three, it has become more dif-
ficult. If the Portuguese themselves leave their country to find
work elsewhere, and you are not even Portuguese, what are you
expecting there? So in 2001 I left to come here, and other
friends have left for Germany, and the UK, everywhere. (Bakeba,
in Antwerp since 1993, regular status, unemployed)
The top dream countries tend to be the UK or the US, mostly because
they heard the labour market is more flexible there, and because of the
perceived greater toleration for black people. Fall notices that the
Senegalese population in the US has a slightly older profile, probably
because it tends to be a second step in the migration project, after years
of investment in education and financial accumulation (Fall 2002).
The continuing mobility shows a variety of migratory movements:
single and unidirectional, but also continuous, circular or return, tran-
sit and shuttle migration, sometimes seasonal migration, as Schuster
found in her study in Italy (2005). This nuances the idea of transna-
tionalism as moving between only two nation-states, origin and settle-
ment and invites to move away from bipolar approaches. Some of these
people can be called ‘sojourners’, moving from one country to another;
between locals and cosmopolitans, some of them feel at home nowhere
and everywhere (Sinatti 2006).
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Bringing another family member to Europe
The leitmotiv in the story of Senegambian migration is the responsibil-
ity towards the extended family back home, a heavy burden for an indi-
vidual; when he sees a possibility, he may try to get some help to sup-
port the family (Kaplan 1998). That would allow a degree of division of
jobs, with someone concentrating on regular incomes while the other
can invest in education or a shop. Several respondents thus invest in
the travelling costs of a family member, or were themselves brought
over by a predecessor. This chain migration often this results in
families spread all over Europe: sisters, uncles, cousins and aunts in
Italy, France, Spain and the US.
Now that my brother is also here, he can help me with the
house and the food, if I do not work two weeks or three weeks,
if my money is finished, my brother can help the family, there
is no problem. (Ablaye, in Barcelona since 1998, regular status,
temping)
Even a migrant who would not consider bringing over someone else,
because of the hardship and misery awaiting an undocumented new
arrival, is likely to experience pressure from young male family mem-
bers in the home country:
I never wanted my brother to join me; life is too hard here, I
don’t want anyone I love to have to suffer like this. I rather
wanted to invest in something that created work in Senegal for
my brother, and that would allow him to make a living for him-
self and all our family. But after so many years of pushing I
have now given up resistance and I am ready to pay the ticket: if
they believe that my brother can do more for them here, can
work harder and achieve more than me, we will see. (Thierno,
in Barcelona since 1999, regularised, construction)
Housing investment
Chavez illustrated how types of living arrangements may be necessary,
or desirable, over the course of an individual’s life, as a resource which
assists them in their struggle to live and work (Chavez 1990). The
crowded conditions at the early start may be tolerated for a while, espe-
cially by recent arrivals; however, adjustments to this situation must be
viewed as part of a process of migration and settlement (Burgers &
Engbersen 1999). Often people will try to move to less crowded apart-
ments, where everyone may have his own room (Kaplan 1998).
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It is difficult to find a room, because they judge on your origin.
Because often I bought the newspaper, I select twenty or 30
phone numbers, and I swear, ten or twelve say ‘I am sorry sir,
but the owner does not want foreigners’. Just like this; it is frus-
trating. Or you call, they hear you are a stranger, they say ‘oh,
sorry, the room is already taken’. But this kind of things happen
every day for us, we are used to it. But, notwithstanding, it still
hurts every day. (Franc¸ois, in Antwerp since 2003, regular sta-
tus, in training)
A very limited number of people have found the way to social housing;
they tend to be well-informed people, sometimes working at the muni-
cipality, who have easier access and better understanding of proce-
dures. Several key people mention in Spain that housing policies in
social terms are almost non-existent, which causes significant pro-
blems for migrants; in Belgium the opportunities are greater, but wait-
ing lists are very long. The husband of Penda waited two years, and
then when she was pregnant they were given priority.
What is happening in Spain over the last years, and slowly also in
Belgium, is a next step: Senegambian migrants move from renting to
buying houses to fit their new strategies and expectations. The longer
they stay, the more migrants feel that rents are very high, while their
incomes remain relatively low. They may carry the social responsibility
for family members who are also migrating (Benson 1990), or they
start to see that they may be able to reduce housing costs by renting
out rooms to undocumented migrants, completing the circle starting
with their own experiences upon arrival. Rising housing prices and the
idea of sharing the costs motivates many migrants to overcome the
high mortgages (migrants often present higher risks for banks, and
have less guarantees) and the costly administrative procedures (finding
someone to act as guarantor, or borrow even the advance).
It is a bit difficult to buy here; before, I was watching, I go to
watch and I always leave it, it was not good. But the prices are
always rising, so I decided for this. I have two cousins and a ne-
phew, they have no papers, and we can live together, when they
work they can help me with the rent to pay the bank, because
now they always have to move and they could not live with me.
(Niasse, in Barcelona since 2000, regular status, construction)
A final reason is that Spanish migrants thinking about family reunifi-
cation may find it extremely difficult to rent something on their name
in a racist environment, in order to meet the conditions they may pre-
fer to buy (Terrones Ribas 2005).
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I bought a house here to bring my wife over. Because look, I
have no money to go to Africa this year, the money I send it to
my mother, my children, my wife, when they have problems I
send them everything. I cannot keep a penny. So I said I have to
buy a house to bring my wife; if I cannot go, she can come here.
(Niasse, in Barcelona since 2000, regular status, construction)
In many cases, there is rhetoric that the investment in a house is not
contradictory to the idea of return; on the contrary, it is considered a
saving strategy. When they are ready to go back, they can sell the apart-
ment and use the profit to realise plans back home. As Martı´nez Veiga
mentions (1997), this comes down to subsistence ownership quite reg-
ularly: after paying the mortgage, there is no money left to spend any-
thing on maintenance despite the generally low housing quality.
Acquiring nationality
Long-term migrants may consider taking the nationality of their host
country or new home country: in Belgium this is possible as early as
after three years of legal residency (Lambert 2002), in Spain after ten
years5. The reasons to apply for a new nationality or to refuse it can be
practical or emotional: the older generation may remember colonialism
more vividly and want to stay loyal to their independent state and
African identity. Others may take the new nationality as a way to
express their integration or gratitude towards the new home; or just to
be able to travel more easily, to have rights to a pension, or to go back
to Senegal for longer periods. Paradoxically enough, obtaining the new
nationality can be seen as a condition to go back to country of origin
(Adam et al. 2001): they are certain to keep a link in case of failure, or
they are guaranteed an easy travelling back and forth in the framework
of business or visiting family in two continents.
While Western and Northern European countries used to adopt
rather liberal policies based on the idea of naturalisation as a means of
integration, Southern European countries tended to have nationality
legislation aimed at protecting the relationships with their ex-migrant
communities abroad (Moreno Fuentes). However, in the face of large
immigration, they generally adopted highly restrictive attitudes towards
naturalisation, with the exception of citizens from former colonies.
Baubo¨ck (2006) notices that since about 2000, more and more states
introduce formal examinations of language skills and knowledge of
society, as seen in Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the UK.
Belgium is still an exception, but is considering lengthening the re-
quired residence period.
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7.4 A better life realised, but…
Most people see this phase as the right time to start or resume family
life. Bringing a partner over can be very difficult due to the require-
ments governments impose (salary slips, housing arrangements), and
some do it without the necessary documents6. But when they succeed,
yet another challenge starts. The cost of maintaining a household in
terms of food and housing costs is considerably higher again than the
sharing of accommodation typical for previous stages of bachelor life.
If family members come over when the migrant has not been able to
organise decent conditions, it can lead to worsening financial or ad-
ministrative insecurity, or even marginalisation (Diop 1996). In addi-
tion, the wives and children bring with them a whole new set of
issues7 and expectations, often related to the possible conflict between
traditional and modern interpretations of family roles, leading to pro-
blems with hierarchy and frustration (Barou 1987). The children,
belonging to the second generation, will grow up between two cultures
(Andall 2002). These prospects sometimes inspire men to say they will
never bring their wife to Europe (Marfaing 2003b). In Spain, this pro-
cess started earlier than in Belgium, due to the earlier regularisations;
in Belgium, people have started bringing their wives over only after the
2000 regularisation.
When an undocumented migrant obtains legal status and starts a
new life, his living expenses increase considerably with every step he
takes: a car, a family, another apartment. Consumption patterns and
lifestyle changes over time, although they hardly match the local habits.
The minimum of 200 to 500 euro no longer suffices, and has risen to
800 or 1,000 euro.8 With salaries that are normally situated in the low-
er echelons of the distribution, these migrant families have to finance
the same basic needs as local households, but carry in addition the re-
sponsibility for an extended family in the home country (Barou 2001).
For the ones who intended to build a life in a new country, they may
at this stage have succeeded in their plan, and be satisfied. However,
many still stick to a vague or specific myth of return inherent in the
original migration plan, mostly formulated with a careful ‘inshalah’
(Kaplan 1998): ‘if God wants’.
People always want to go back, we always feel like the real life is
back in Senegal, and what we are doing here is just ‘between
brackets’, while we are preparing and planning everything we
will do there. We are always hoping, but nobody returns. Maybe
it is just a fantasy that allows us to continue the life we have
here. Me too I am always making plans to go back, but I know
nobody did and my wife does not want to… and among older
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immigrants we tend to joke about it (Malick, in Antwerp since
1989, regular status, industrial cleaning).
Although they may have secured a better life, most migrants have to
keep postponing return to the home country, adapting their initial pro-
ject always in the same direction: to stay just a couple of years longer.
There is a logical explanation: the low wages and marginal economic
status discussed above, combined with the continuing immediate
needs in the home country, curtail the migrants’ potential to accumu-
late resources for productive activities which could generate wealth and
employment (Marfaing 2003b).
So, with maybe 1,200 or 1,400 euro per month, you will never
have the money that you had planned to go back to your coun-
try; that dream will not come true. But still, it is my dream and
it is what we are working for, although playing on the lottery
may prove more effective to reach my aim. (Malang, in Belgium
since 1996, regular status, industry)
Being unable to fulfil their initial plans within short periods, most de-
lay their return home until after the children’s education is finished,
after retirement, and often only to be buried.9 With time, the choice
between old and new home country becomes more painful, when the
children have established their lives in Europe and one sometimes
feels a stranger in Africa (Mateo Dieste 2002). The nostalgia for the
Senegambian rhythm of life, atmosphere, and weather has to be traded
against better educational provisions for the children, or better health
care institutions when elderly. Although the dream of going back home
seems important to cope with their situation (Kaplan 2001), most long-
er-term immigrants favour the idea of a ‘commuting life’, alternating
longer periods of work in Europe with family time and some business
in the country of origin. Although migrants have always kept in touch
with home, Castles (2002) suggests that increasing numbers of immi-
grants orient their lives to two or more societies. The impact of this
trend to transnationality on nation-state sovereignty and autonomy, as
well as the process of migrant belonging, multiple identities, and
multi-layered citizenship remains an open question.
Profile of migrants in Barcelona and Antwerp
As an unanticipated outcome, I found considerable differences in the
Senegambian community level in both cities. In the theoretical chapter,
I took community and networks as a constant dimension, assuming it
would not differ between the two research settings, but that premise is
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now modified. It shows that the diversity and pluralism of black
African migration should be taken into account (Kuagbenou 1997;
Soenen 2003).
While Senegambian migrants in Barcelona represent a large variety
of geographical origins and ethnicities, it looks like Antwerp only
knows a specific type of migrant. Through a process of self-selection,10
people from rural origin and non-Wolof ethnicities are channelled
towards Barcelona, while the urban-based Wolof are overrepresented in
Antwerp.11
It is true that Belgium has more city-people than Spain or Italy.
Comparing the level of life in Belgium and Italy or Spain, you
need to think carefully. There in the South, people tend to live
in community, they always live the African life without reserva-
tions, they eat together rice every evening, and the level of their
expenses is far lower than here. Many people in a room, no in-
ternet, never go for a coffee, just go to work as much as you can
and go to sleep. They do not invest anything in their lives in
Europe; they just survive and send almost everything back
home. Immigrants in Belgium are well dressed, have good
shoes, they eat well and healthy. They want to live in the Belgian
way, go out for a meal, go to the cinema sometimes… I would
never like to go south because I cannot live like on the country-
side. (Malick, in Antwerp since 1989, regularised, industrial
cleaning)
As Malick describes, the lifestyle in the community is different in both
cities (Kuagbenou 1997): Belgium is supposed to be more developed
and individual, while Spain is considered a bit closer to the African
rhythm and atmosphere. This is reflected in the relationship with
home, and the remittances sent back. Spanish migrants are generally
more driven by the desire to save as much as possible, and economise
on any extra dimension of life. The traditions of tontines, reciprocity,
and investment savings are rife in Spain, as more people come directly
from the countryside where they have seen and lived these habits,
while people in Dakar and large cities tend to be more individualistic.
Due to a generally stronger feeling of community, the rural migrants
in Spain more often marry in their home country, sometimes because
their family opposes a white wife, and concentrate on solidarity with
the home country. The city migrants generally find it easier to priori-
tise their own lives in Belgium, and cut down on remittances.12 In ad-
dition, due to the different labour markets in combination with differ-
ent consumption patterns, the rural migrants in Spain are able to
collect more money than those in Belgium. The remittances are also
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worth more in the countryside, where daily expenses as well as land
prices are low compared to the capital.
7.5 Conclusion: Better off in Antwerp
Overviewing the results, the main theories are confirmed: Senegam-
bian migrants are employed in declining industrial sectors like textiles,
in family-based as well as industrial agriculture, in the service sector,
and they occupy flexible jobs in the temping sector. African nationals
are restricted to limited occupational and sector niches within Eur-
opean labour markets, which are not based on immigrant skills, but on
the availability of unwanted, unskilled work (Chavez 1990). By selec-
tion through language and education, and the reliance on collective
networks for job information, they are concentrated in specific sectors
and sometimes even enterprises. Despite the suggestion of some long-
term mobility in terms of sectors, most change in work still occurs
within the lower-paid unskilled occupational niches, and often because
of labour market conditions rather than as the result of worker choice.
Very similar to their undocumented situation, documented migrants
have to accept socio-professional downgrading.
In a nutshell, it seems that Belgium is more attractive for documen-
ted migrants: life is more stable and of a higher standard, and social
protection is better. However, the Spanish labour market seems to offer
more possibilities in the low-skilled temporary segments (much as it
does for its citizens, thus reflecting life in general). Some respondents
previously living in Spain, Italy or Portugal expressed their wish to
have a more comfortable life, and therefore moving to Belgium or
other Western European countries; the opposite was never mentioned.
It is important to stress that these immigrants have already achieved
the most significant step in their personal mobility process by making
it to Spain. Most respondents point out that migration on the personal
level may be a complex, unjust, difficult and lonely process that was
not what they dreamed13 (Kaplan 2001); the family back home benefits
and that is worth doing it for. De Jong et al. (2002: 860) also found
that ‘if migrants feel they can better meet family needs by working
abroad, and if these responsibilities are paramount in decision making,
then they may move even if specific types of satisfactions do not im-
prove’. As long as large international inequalities continue to exist,
transcontinental migration will remain the option for upward mobility.
190 GETTING BY IN EUROPE’S URBAN LABOUR MARKETS
8 Conclusions
If you think it’s better to try and get by at home, why don’t you
come back? Come and prove yourself that your ideas can work.
This place where you want to keep me, yes, this place, does it
still mean anything to you? (Diome 2006: 159)
To conclude the interview, I asked respondents to look back on their
migration project and evaluate it. Many expressed mixed feelings about
their success, saying they have been able to help their family economic-
ally, but at the expense of their own quality of life. The continuing
adaptation to a new home country, the confrontation with loneliness
and racism, and their generally lower position in European society
weighs heavily on the satisfaction of improving living conditions at
home; some explicitly refer to the word ‘sacrifice’. Increasingly against
their better judgment, most stick to the final aim: collecting enough
money to be able to return home and guarantee the extended family a
decent standard of living. While this plan is pushed forward until an-
other set of conditions is met, and the ties to the homeland become
more vague and imagined, they advise younger family members to stay
at home and build their future there. As seen in the quote form Salie’s
brother above, this suggestion is seldom accepted with gratitude, with
family members blaming the migrant for not caring about them any
more – a painful accusation for the ones who often make great efforts
to be able to send the monthly remittances.
Parallel to my respondents, it is time to conclude this research pro-
ject and evaluate the balance of success and weaknesses. The main re-
search question raised in the introduction was about how newly arrived
uninvited labour migrants find a place in European urban labour mar-
kets: I wanted to explore the employment patterns of recent immi-
grants in a context of socio-economic change. The economic context is
shaped by a post-industrial labour market that needs low-skilled, low-
paid flexible work in a variety of sectors, and a state that tries to regu-
late migration. These elements interact with the strategies migrants de-
velop to earn enough money to guarantee a higher and more stable in-
come for themselves and their families back home. The outcomes of
this complex interaction depend on many factors: different groups and
individuals seem to vary with respect to their ability to take advantage
of the opportunities a society offers; over time migrants may change
their preferences or their assets in relation to certain jobs; in addition,
opportunities differ by country.
The most typical trajectories, the deviant cases, and the detailed con-
clusions have been discussed before, and will not be repeated here. In
Spain, I can state that the overwhelming majority of my respondents
started working in agriculture. Though being a key element for under-
standing Senegambian formal and informal employment patterns,
when compared to the 1990s, the share of agriculture seems to decline
in decades from the 1960s. After the 1990s, we see more different sec-
tors and jobs, but more precarious and temporary, more difficult with
time; respondents also pointed at more control against moonlighting.
In Antwerp, the move is generally from hawking to temping, without
so much difference over generations, only that hawking has become
less profitable. In general terms, the analysis has shown that the major-
ity of respondents change jobs within the lowest segments of the la-
bour market, thereby confirming dual and segmented labour market
theories. For the illegal migrants the picture is a rather extreme one,
where strategies are directed at survival and at obtaining papers, leav-
ing them in a very vulnerable situation. Those who have acquired the
conditions of legal workers have a wider range of opportunities, some
of which may lead to some stability and capital accumulation – a possi-
bility not covered by the two theories mentioned above. In short, in a
segmented labour market in which some individual characteristics play
a role, next to discrimination and macro-economic trends, immigrants
are both the exploited solution and creative and productive actors.
In addition, I argued that in order to study this topic, special atten-
tion should be paid to a number of issues often overlooked in the lit-
erature. This approach was subdivided into a set of questions, which
the first part of this conclusion will try to answer, discussing the em-
pirical findings in a more overarching way, evaluating how useful these
points of attention have been. The second part will take the discussion
forward into policy implications and suggest further research.
8.1 General research conclusions
This research was, in the first place, a plea for a more dynamic ap-
proach to the migrant experience, taking into account various forms of
mobility. The dimension focused on was time, and asked about the im-
portance of dynamics over the life course, and the possible existence of
certain phases or typical trajectories. Second was the necessary focus
on mobility in a set of areas such as geography, legal status and em-
ployment. Third was the added value of international comparison be-
tween two cities, with the aim of highlighting the structural political
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and economic forces influencing migrants’ strategies. Finally, was the
method of qualitative life-course analysis an appropriate tool to capture
these dynamics?
Life-course dynamics
First, respondents tend to show a trajectory that takes them from an
intended temporary stay to becoming a permanent settler, matching
the original starting point of Piore (1979). However, in this research
the underlying dynamics and changing priorities were documented
through qualitative life-course interviews, allowing for a far more de-
tailed analysis. The key is a process of continual adaptation to changing
and limited circumstances, trying to get by in shifting economic situa-
tions. This sketch resulted in some new insights, changes, and
nuances.
To start with, three major stages of the migration experience were
distinguished, based primarily on the main concern driving their stra-
tegies in that stage: as an undocumented migrant, the focus is on eco-
nomic survival of the individual and, where possible, the family back
home. In a second phase, they invest in documentation strategies, try-
ing to regularise their stay in order to have a better chance of achieving
their goal. Thirdly, once they have become a regular migrant, most of
them try to accomplish some form of progress, in the form of upward
mobility. This changing set of priorities also reflects different levels of
security as well as economic standards of living: over time, most mi-
grants do manage to realise a more stable life, where questions about
their very survival are replaced with questions about a decent standard
of living. This evolution also implies different emotional stages, not in
the least linked to the maintenance, reunion, or formation of families.
This chronological way of presenting the process may suggest that
there is a necessary trend of climbing up the ladder, but there is no evi-
dence whatsoever to suggest that there is a one-way trajectory leading
to longer-term positions for everyone; some people get stuck in stages
where they stay throughout many years, or even go backwards.
A specific point in which this research has contributed to the exist-
ing knowledge is by stressing the documentation strategies, which are
central in the process of integration in all dimensions of life, including
in the key dimension of the labour market. The necessity to regularise
their stay constitutes a crucial element in the daily lives of undocumen-
ted migrants, if not an obsession, yet little attention has been paid to
these strategies in scientific literature. Another insight derived from
the interviews is how the labour market trajectories should be placed
in the wider context of life as an immigrant, including family back
home as well as in the host country, the importance of legal status,
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consumption as well as education. In all these dimensions migrants re-
port changing needs and objectives over time, as well as the changing
strategies to meet these aims.
My second aim was to stress the importance of mobility in an indivi-
dual’s life course in terms of legal categories, jobs, houses, cities and
countries. The empirical material has shown that a more ‘open inter-
pretation’ of many categories is necessary. First, studies about employ-
ment should always take into account the informal sector, as main or
as additional source of income. A much wider interpretation of con-
cepts of market and work, including all forms of part-time, temping
and occasional employment has shown its relevance in this study. Sec-
ond, the strict division between undocumented and regular migrant
status is often blurred, partly because of documentation strategies of
migrants, partly because of formal toleration practices by the authori-
ties. Third, migration should not be seen as a simple movement be-
tween two places: both in the past and in the plans for the future many
more locations play a role, other possible destinations, as well as the
home country. The transnational dimension of the migration experi-
ence is without doubt a key one.
International comparison
A basic point of departure in this book was to contrast the ways in
which structural forces influence migrant trajectories: how are econom-
ics and politics central to the way in which migrants organise their
lives? Despite the undeniable influences of globalisation, substantial dif-
ferences in terms of labour markets and immigration policies influence
the lives of migrants in Antwerp and Barcelona. This understanding of
the background of external possibilities and constraints in different
countries forms an important modification of Piore’s scheme. The inte-
gration of immigrants in the urban labour market is a complex process,
marked by the interaction between multiple processes operating within
the same space. My evidence suggests that different processes are at
stake, mainly political and economic, in which characteristics of the re-
ceiving country play a major role: the political regime, the salience of
migration politics, the public opinion about migrants, as well as the per-
ceived need for migration, economic growth, size and role of the infor-
mal economy, and the type of welfare state. The migrants develop stra-
tegies that interact with these elements, which can lead to a variety of
conditions of social inclusion or exclusion in the daily urban life.
The main differences can be summarised as follows: having no
documents in Belgium is far more risky than in Spain, and regularis-
ing their stay is more complicated as well, often leaving only marriage
as a way out. Spain seems to presents a larger variety of sectors for in-
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formal employment, with agriculture often representing the entrance
door, but offers possibilities in manufacturing industry and construc-
tion as well. In Antwerp, Senegambian migrants are generally left with
no option but to work as hawkers. The combination of a relatively
peaceful life in the margins with easier access to work in Barcelona,
compared to a hidden life and difficult access to work in Antwerp, in-
spires me to say that the experience of being undocumented is shaped
by the state. However, also documented migrant’s rights are con-
structed and created in a context of interests and priorities of the local
political and economic setting. When having papers, working options
also seem to be more limited in Antwerp, but social protection schemes
provide more support than in Spain. This confirms what Sassen found
for labour migration over a longer period of time (Sassen 1999: 134):
the evidence for the last two centuries shows that labor migra-
tions are patterned in terms of geography and duration. It is not
an irreversible flow that only keeps growing. It is highly modu-
lated (...). Labor migrations took place within systemic settings
and there appear to have been multiple mechanisms contribut-
ing to their size, geography and duration. From a macro societal
perspective, these can be seen as a type of equilibrating mechan-
isms. It could be argued that precisely because labor migrations
never became mass invasions, they are parts of a system, and
are conditioned by the latter’s characteristics.
Third, the choice for a semi-longitudinal approach, by reconstructing
trajectories, has shown its relevance in suggesting how the agency of
individual actors is influenced by structural factors in different dimen-
sions of life. Using the rich material of the interviews and observation,
I was able to create a rare insight in the lives of these migrants, show-
ing the interaction between different fields of life. A purely economic
and individual approach falls short of understanding the wider social,
emotional, and ideological context. In addition, it cannot grasp the
complexity, precariousness, and volatility typical of contemporary mi-
gratory experiences. The method reveals the strategies they develop;
although choices are limited as a result of the restrictive migration re-
gimes and economic adverse conditions, it shows that agency remains
important. The qualitative life-course methodology has also allowed for
the depiction of general trends and similarities but also adds the local
nuances and differences, due to the thick embeddedness of local socio-
economic and institutional dynamics; this complexity is often lost in
more general theories. However, a research question focussing specifi-
cally on one set of transitions, one dimension of mobility would have
to develop a more specialised method. The most limiting factor is basi-
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cally the memory of respondents, who generally do not remember the
exact date of starting jobs, moving houses or countries.
8.2 Policy implications
Most experts foresee larger and more diverse international migrant
flows over the next few decades, because of structural elements in the
economies and societies of both countries of origin and destination. In
the short run, market liberalisation is likely to create labour-market dis-
locations that intensify migration pressures: the demand for new work-
ers in Europe’s ageing and flexible labour markets will continue, and
the surplus labour from developing countries is likely to increase. Mi-
grants are able to earn wages that they otherwise could not obtain, and
their families, communities and governments assume that remittances
will continue to pour in. Increasingly, European countries start to ac-
cept the reality of immigration as a natural part of global economic in-
tegration, although they find it difficult to explain this to their wider
public.
Away from a total migration ban or completely open borders, the
challenge is to manage labour migration in a manner that is just,
stable and transparent, and that releases the beneficial potential rather
than detailing the related problems (Black 1996). Some conditions and
starting points are outlined before.
Undocumented migration and informal employment
Illegal immigration has become a growing problem for the EU, leading
to social injustice and exclusion. In the case of undocumented mi-
grants, a series of valid and convincing arguments can be developed to
defend their basic social rights in Europe. From a purely humanitarian
point of view, for example, a minimum degree of emergency medical
help and labour market protection should be guaranteed. Politically,
there is a cost to completely excluding a considerable percentage of the
actual population: it can lead to a dual society, with dangers that can af-
fect everyone. Unsafe housing conditions for undocumented migrants
can result in fires as seen in Paris in the summer of 2005, carrying
risks for neighbours and passers-by. Inadequate health policies may re-
sult in the spread of diseases that Europe had previously combated suc-
cessfully. Concentrations of people without any prospect for the future
and nothing to lose can result in crime. For the benefit of the wider po-
pulation, access to adequate shelter, nutrition, clothing, health care,
and education for minors might be considered. Third, the legal obliga-
tion for states to respect human rights is already a fact; although they
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often fall short in the implementation of the existing ones for undocu-
mented migrants. A migration policy might build here on international
documents such as the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (2003) and the
ILO’s formulation of a social justice that also includes irregular
employees.
What is more, undocumented migration tends to be linked to illegal
forms of employment. The acceptance of exploitation on the labour
market can de facto result in the gradual dismantling of general work-
ers’ rights. It must be recognised that labour markets are using un-
skilled cheap labour and that this labour is cheap in part because the
workers are foreign, and in part from illegality. The accumulation of
seasonal and temporary jobs, with limited social rights, is installing an
intolerable form of segregation that benefits some sectors and employ-
ers. This shows the risk that globalisation, instead of increasing
income everywhere in the word, could import conditions and practices
only seen in developing countries into the core of our society. Only that
the growth of new downgraded and informal sectors of the labour mar-
ket staffed by socially marginal migrants is not an imported phenom-
enon but rather ‘part and parcel of advanced capitalist strategies of
deregulation, for the enhancement of ‘flexibility’ in terms of a
networked economy and society, and a fragmented labour market’
(Schierup, Hansen & Castles 2006: 299). The implication may be that
legal immigration of the unskilled is again desirable, along with afford-
able social protection for these workers.
Directions for new policies
Policy trends in Europe take a number of divergent directions. On the
one hand, the pleas for more restriction and more control continue, as
showed in the proposed crackdown on bosses that employ undocumen-
ted migrants in the underground economy. However, with the continu-
ing demand and supply of cheap labour, it might be that more people
will enter illegally at the back door if the front door is closed. On the
other hand, there seems to be a consensus that some forms of migra-
tion should be encouraged. This contradiction can be found in dis-
courses: it is unclear how governments afraid of a migration-adverse
public opinion will be able to explain the advantages of selective immi-
gration, to defend or justify the increasing need for foreign workers. At
the same time, the EU is moving forward in that direction.
A first, relatively new tendency is the collaboration with countries of
origin in order to tackle the growing problem of illegal immigration.
The summer of 2006 has shown how collaboration between Spain
(and the EU as a whole) and countries of origin was necessary, but also
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how migration has emerged as a topic on the foreign policy agenda. In
this framework, a number of summits have been held between EU and
African ministers, with shared declarations about joint monitoring of
sea and border routes, repatriation, as well as the tackling of poverty,
one of the root causes of immigration. A network of information cen-
tres is planned, which will be matching the supply of legal migrant
labour for low-skill sectors such as agriculture, public works and tour-
ism, to demand in EU states; probably in a system of quota. At the
same time, it will seek to increase jobs in Africa by promoting invest-
ment in labour-intensive sectors there. The first experimental job cen-
tre was supposed to open in Mali in February 2007.
A second line of thought seems to be the launch of temporary
migration schemes, as in the rotation of guest workers. It is argued
that they are a good match between the needs of some labour markets,
the migration pressure, the fear of brain drain, and the potential of re-
turn migration. From a theoretical point of view, if the system is trans-
parent, predictable, and rights-based, it could be a realistic and cost-
effective policy option (Baldwin-Edwards 2004; Ghosh 2000). How-
ever, in practice, a set of conditions would have to be implemented in
order for the temporary migration to be successful: this would include
penalties in case of overstaying the permissible period, deferred pay-
ments, and limiting the right for family reunion. However, if foreign
workers do not wish to return home, there is an almost inevitability to
the creation of a population of undocumented immigrants.
Thirdly, there is also an increasing understanding across Europe
about the inseparability of immigration from integration. There can be
no doubt that successful immigration policies rely heavily on the suc-
cessful integration of immigrants, not least because of the ‘dual crisis
of the welfare state and the nation’ (Schierup, Hansen & Castles
2006). Public opinion may only accept increasing numbers of mi-
grants if they feel the social protection and the perceived identity of the
nation is secured. On the other side, one wonders what will become of
these first Senegambian generations when they lose their physical
power, or when they are replaced by other, cheaper workers. The new
countries of immigration could find many answers in the experiences
of older destination countries with post-war migration, whose first gen-
eration is already at the stage of retirement, homes for elderly people,
and increased health care needs. In addition, lessons should be learned
from the situation of many children from migrant origin, second and
third generations, who often find themselves with educational and pro-
fessional disadvantages when they enter the labour market. An early
investment of means (money and energy) in integration policies that
benefit not only the current immigrants but also the generations to
come would be highly recommended.
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In the quote at the beginning of this chapter, the brother left behind
in Senegal asks the migrant sister if she still cares about their home
country, and he asks for proof of that commitment. In the same way,
potential migrants and the governments of developing countries will
ask the West about their dedication to diminishing the inequalities in
the world, root causes of migration. In the comprehensive and colla-
borative approach needed for success in managing migration, their
needs and suggestions should be taken into consideration, which
would mean not only considerable amounts of aid but more equitable
systems of trade and development (Martin 1994). If host countries
think they can pay just lip service to these principles, while trying to
realise their own agenda, people will continue to come, more creative,
determined, and desperate than western legal and policing systems can
imagine or deal with.
Further research
This study has focused on immigrants’ socio-economic trajectories in
two cities characterised by different labour markets, migration politics
and welfare regimes. It has, in the first place, revealed the importance
of a dynamic approach, taking into account various forms of mobility.
This work constitutes one step in this direction, but it leaves many
questions unanswered. Future research could look in more detail at
specific forms of mobility, such as the systems behind the continuously
changing employment patterns, and the factors influencing it. The im-
pact of casual, temporary and part-time work on the lives of migrants
as well as native workers should be studied more closely. In addition,
more insight is needed in the diversity of structural factors influencing
the migrants’ strategies. Some elements have been brought to light
here in the presentation of empirical results, but there is no doubt that
comparisons between other cities, countries, labour markets, ethnic
groups and welfare regimes would show a larger diversity of mechan-
isms. Thirdly, the agency perspective is crucial, as an insight in their
own pre-existing aims and the way they change over time is essential
to understand their priorities and strategies. More work could be done
on the psychological process that lies behind this. As mentioned above,
the growing importance of the presence of women and a second gen-
eration should be taken into account when looking at the further
trajectories.
A bit further away from the main research question developed here,
some other lines of research might be suggested. In order to explain
the disadvantageous situation for most migrants in the labour market,
more work on discrimination and anti-discrimination measures by pol-
icymakers and other social partners should be encouraged. This might
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help to put to use the considerable amount of neglected but available
immigrant resources. The question of the continuing role of the coun-
try of origin could also be looked at more closely, a framework in which
the ideas of co-development could be developed further.
The final aim, in my regard, should be a world in which nobody
needs to migrate in order to secure his life or that of his family, but
where everybody would have the opportunity to travel in order to study,
work, or just discover. Western societies have kept this privilege for
themselves, but every world citizen has the right to claim it.
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Appendix A Topic list for questionnaire
Personal data
– Year of birth
– Gender
– Origin (country, city, village)
– Ethnicity
– Family status
Migration experience
– Year of leaving home
– Year of arrival in Europe
– Means of travelling
– Trajectory in Africa & Europe
– Trips back home
– Where living now
– Mobility plans
Legal status
– Phases without papers
– Phases with papers
– Documentation strategy
– Administrative status now
– Education/training
– Education and training back home
– Education and training in Europe
– Language proficiency
Job career
– Trajectory (sector, contract and level)
– Labour conditions
– Reasons to change jobs
– Search strategies
– Actual job
– Difficulties?
Social networks
– Family in Europe
– Family in Senegal
– Friends in Europe
– Associations
Evaluation of migration project
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Appendix B List of key informants
Barcelona
Name Organisation Sector
Natalia Gonzalez Caritas Barcelona, Migration Unit NGO
Babacar Mbaye Municipal Service for Reception of Immigrants,
Sabadell
municipality
Quim Pons Migrastudium, before in San Pau, Mataró NGO
Ousmane Mballo UGT (General Workers’ Union), Migration Unit
AMIC
labour union
Miguel Pajares CCOO (Workers Committees) Ceres Center for
Labour Union Studies and Research
labour union
Ousseynou Niang president ACRS (Catalan Association of Senegalese
Residents)
self-organisation
Chelo SAIER Bolsa de trabajo (Support Service for Foreign
Migrants and Refugees, Labour market Guidance)
municipality
Idrissa Djiba CCOO (Workers Committees) CITE (Information
Centre for Foreign Workers)
labour union
Papa Sow Doctor in Geography academic,
self-organisation
Aliou Diao Catalan Fund for Development cooperation regional authority,
self-organisation
Adriana Kaplan Centre for Demographic Studies, Universitat
Autonoma de Barcelona
academic
Saoka Luzolo Generalitat de Catalunya (Catalan authority),
Migration secretariat, Area of of Citizenship and
Participation
regional authority
Abdu Mawa ACRS (Catalan Association of Senegalese
Residents), responsible for social area
self-organisation
Bombo Ndir Granollers municipality, labour insertion municipality,
self-organisation
Merced Janer Municipality of Barcelona, Migration Department municipality
Marta Oficina d’Informació a l’Estranger Mataró (Office
for Information to the foreigner)
municipality
Isabel Sair Mataró NGO
Mohamed UGT Granollers (General Workers’ Union) labour union
Antwerp
Name Organisation Sector
Omar Ba VZW Sunugaal self-organisation
Wilfried Pfeffer Migration Observatory, Centre for Equal
Opportunities and Fight against Racism
federal government
Evans Eguavoen De Acht, Antwerp Minority Centre NGO
Baba Ba Senegalese sociologist and migrant academic
Nele Verbruggen PICUM (Platform for International Cooperation
on Undocumented Migrants)
NGO
Karen Poisson Social worker at the OCMW municipality
Katrijn Pauwels OCIV (Discussion Centre for Integration of
Refugees), Return migration
NGO
Abdoul Ba Doctor in Geography academic
Anissa Akhanaf City of Antwerp, Integration Services municipality
Yves Bocklandt Social Service BZN (Confederation without
Name)
NGO
Chris Van Kapellen City of Antwerp, Information Centre for
Enterpreneurs
municipality
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Appendix C Letter
The letter below and the introductory text preceding it are reproduced
from www.wikipedia.org.
Yaguine Koita (aged 14) and Fode´ Tounkara (aged 15) were stow-
aways who froze to death on a Sabena Airlines Airbus A330
(Flight 520) flying from Conakry, Guinea, to Brussels, Belgium,
on 28 July 1999. Their bodies were discovered on 2 August in
the airplane’s rear right-hand wheel bay at Brussels Interna-
tional Airport, after having made at least three return trips be-
tween Conakry and Brussels. The boys were carrying plastic
bags with birth certificates, school report cards, photographs,
and a letter. This letter, written in imperfect French, was widely
published in the world media.
Excellencies, Messrs. Members and officials of Europe,
We have the honourable pleasure and the great confidence in you to
write this letter to speak to you about the objective of our journey and
the suffering of us, the children and young people of Africa.
But first of all, we present to you life’s most delicious, charming and
respected greetings. To this effect, be our support and our assistance.
You are for us, in Africa, those to whom it is necessary to request re-
lief. We implore you, for the love of your continent, for the feeling that
you have towards your people and especially for the affinity and love
that you have for your children whom you love for a lifetime. Further-
more, for the love and meekness of our creator God the omnipotent
one who gave you all the good experiences, wealth and ability to well
construct and well organise your continent to become the most beauti-
ful one and most admirable among the others.
Messrs. Members and officials of Europe, we call out for your soli-
darity and your kindness for the relief of Africa. Do help us, we suffer
enormously in Africa, we have problems and some shortcomings re-
garding the rights of the child.
In terms of problems, we have war, disease, malnutrition, etc. As for
the rights of the child in Africa, and especially in Guinea, we have too
many schools but a great lack of education and training. Only in the
private schools can one have a good education and good training, but it
takes a great sum of money. Now, our parents are poor and it is neces-
sary for them to feed us. Furthermore, we have no sports schools
where we could practice soccer, basketball or tennis.
This is the reason, we, African children and youth, ask you to create
a big efficient organisation for Africa to allow us to progress. There-
fore, if you see that we have sacrificed ourselves and risked our lives,
this is because we suffer too in Africa and that we need you to fight
against poverty and to put an end to the war in Africa. Nevertheless,
we want to learn, and we ask you to help us in Africa learn to be like
you.
Finally, we appeal to you to excuse us very, very much for daring to
write you this letter to you, the great personages to whom we owe
much respect. And do not forget it is to you whom we must lament
about the weakness of our abilities in Africa.
Written by two Guinean children,
Yaguine Koita and Fode´ Tounkara
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Notes
Chapter 1
1 This does not mean that strategies would be the only stimulus and sole determinant
to action. They are constructs people use to make sense of their world; they can be
reviewed and amended in the light of events, and they can differ in different spheres
of life.
2 For many centuries, host of migrants have been agricultural workers, who lived and
worked in the countryside; in this study, however, I will focus on migration to metro-
politan areas.
Chapter 2
1 Even more recently, the term ‘new migration’ has been used for the movement of
Eastern Europeans from the enlarged Europe to the ‘old’ Europe.
2 Art. 2(1), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990.
3 It is my opinion that the term ‘migrant’ should be reserved for the person who moved,
not for children born in the host country. In Belgium, this is solved with the reference
‘allochtonous population’, with ‘second generation’; elsewhere with ‘ethnic minority’.
4 The term ‘sans-papiers’, launched in the academic world by Bourdieu, is not a legal
category, but a concept picked up by the French media during the first collective oc-
cupation in 1996, in the Saint-Bernard church.
5 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the
1967 Protocol.
6 If he is low-skilled, of course; high-skilled migration is often seen as good.
7 In a somewhat related framework, Portes (1995) refers to the concept of ‘embedded-
ness’ to explain the process of insertion of immigrants into various social contexts.
On the one hand, the structural embeddedness of the process of immigrant settle-
ment consists of the limits and possibilities offered by the policies and characteristics
of the society at large; the assistance and constraints offered by co-ethnic community
can, on the other hand, be defined as instances of relational embeddedness.
8 Awad’s exhaustive list of policies (2004) affecting labour migrants goes from migra-
tion control laws, welfare systems in receiving countries, education and labour mar-
ket policies, to macro-economic trade, monetary and fiscal policies. Here, only a frac-
tion of the most relevant factors will be discussed.
9 According to estimates from Europol and the International Centre for Migration Pol-
icy Development in Vienna, some 400,000 to 500,000 people annually enter Europe
illegally, adding to an undocumented population of several millions.
10 The wider ‘uban area’ of Antwerp has 944,900 inhabitants (OECD 2005).
11 The biggest minority actually consisted of substantial numbers of Dutch citizens,
who in recent times have come to the city, partly for tax-related or housing-related
reasons, due to its vicinity. In adition, there is the the presence of the long-estab-
lished Jewish minority.
12 Population Data for January 2006, Stad Antwerpen, Databank Sociale Planning.
13 In a previous political programme it included proposals for restrictions on migrants’
right to property ownership, a revision of all naturalisations granted since 1974, the re-
patriation of non-European unemployed migrants, a separate education for Muslim
children or even the withdrawal of the status given to Islam by the Belgian state (Govaert
1995). This lead to a conviction for racism in April 2004, but contrary enough changing
names (now Vlaams Belang) might guarantee them even bigger public support.
14 In Wallonia the extreme right is divided in several small political groups, torn by nu-
merous internal divisions, so their electoral significance is small.
15 The three Communities (French-, Flemish- and German-speaking) and three Regions
(Walloon, Flemish and Brussels Capital) overlap but do not correspond, and each
have specific legal powers, as well as the remaining federal institutions (the King, the
federal Parliament and the national government).
16 Despite the colonial links to Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Con-
go, the African community in Belgium is not large. Due to endemic racism until the
1950s, an atypical history developed where strong limits were imposed on emigration
from the colonies in Belgium: in 1945 only ten Congolese were found in Belgian po-
pulation statistics (Jacquemin 2002). In the 1950s, students started coming to
Belgian universities, but in the subsequent inflow of labour migrants, Congolese
workers did not play any role. Today, after an increase in asylum applications due to
continuing wars in the area, the community counts around 15,000 to 20,000 people
but apart from footballers and musicians they can count on limited popular sympa-
thy (Kagne´ 2001).
17 According to official numbers from the federal police, 11,000 files were opened in
Zeebrugge in 2003; this includes people who were caught several times (De Walsche
2005). This has leaded the British government to offer financial and logistic help in
developing detection systems.
18 Confusion between refugees and migrants, as well as the image of ‘cheaters’, may
stem from this improper use of the asylum procedure by economic migrants (Meert
et al. 2006).
19 A first peak occurred in 1993 with about 25,000 applications, and in 1999/2000
around 40,000, to a large extent linked to the Kosovo war (Lennert and Decroly 2002).
20 However, this trend has been recorded everywhere in Europe, where applications in
2005 have diminshed with 34 per cent compared to 2003, according to figures of the
High Commisioner for Refugees.
21 Congolese, Rwandese and Burundese citizens of the former Belgian colony of the
Congo do not benefit from any special treatment.
22 As for Subsaharan Africans, the earliest presence must have been a limited number
of university students from Guinea Equatorial (Spanish Colony) from the 1960s
onwards. A few sub-Saharan Africans on their way to France or other northern
European countries passed through the area and worked temporarily in industries
and construction in the metropolitan area of Barcelona or in intensive agriculture in
the peri-urban area. Few stayed, most of those because of the closure of the French
border in 1974.
23 In June 2006, a Catalan referendum backed by the central government gave the re-
gion greater autonomy. The Catalans won nation status within Spain and the region’s
parliament gained extra powers in taxation and judicial matters.
24 Spanish judiciary has even commented on elements of the law going against basic
rights of individuals.
25 In 2002, more than half a million people from Latin America entered with tourist
visa, and only 86,000 returned (El Paı´s).
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26 This schematic representation used for analytical purposes might suggest a necessa-
rily upward social path for migrants, which would be misleading. It is not an auto-
matic process; many people are stuck in one stage or another, drop out of the pro-
cess, or fall back. In addition, this is not to say that this analytical distinction is that
clear in everyday life; people may combine strategies from different analytical periods
at a single moment in time.
27 Other authors (Adam et al. 2001; Burgers & Engbersen 1999; Engbersen 2001; Soe-
nen 2003) use the distinction between ‘survival’ and ‘residence’ strategies in the con-
text of undocumented migrants. As ‘residence strategies’ may be confused with hous-
ing strategies, I prefer the term ‘documentation strategies’. The chronological ap-
proach and addition of the ‘mobility’ strategies is my responsibility. Brun also
suggest a certain trajectory by using a categorisation of recently arrived undocumen-
ted migrants, settled undocumented migrants, foreigners who were recently regu-
larised and those with permanent permit (Brun 2003).
Chapter 3
1 In Spain, I initially built on the network of a friend I knew in Senegal many years be-
fore; joining him for visits to friends and shops introduced me to many people. Actu-
ally, spending time with him in this environment, being confronted with the reality
of migration formed the inspiration for this study, as explained in the introduction.
After he moved to a different part of Spain, I kept in touch with earlier respondents
and the process continued. A Senegalese key informant independently provided me
with another set of contacts. In Belgium, the story starts with a far acquaintance
knowing a Senegalese man; I explained my research over a cup of tea. Though hesi-
tant in the beginning, he encouraged me at the end. He turned out to be a figure of
reference for part of the community, and the younger man he appointed as my guide
proved to be a great help. On my first day in Antwerp, I was introduced in a house
where people come together weekly to share a meal: the ideal place for making my
initial contacts. I was extremely lucky: today this house is uninhabited, the commu-
nity dispersed over several locations and to a large extent out of touch.
2 Unless one has the means to organise an ‘ethno survey’ suggested by Massey and
Capoferro (2004), which combines detailed life histories with data compiled at the
household, community, national and international levels.
3 Recently statistical techniques are being used to improve the method, compensating
for the fact that the sample was collected in a non-random way (Atkinson & Flint
2001). In respondent-driven sampling, for example, respondents recruit their peers,
as in network-based samples, and researchers keep track of who recruited whom and
their numbers of social contacts. A mathematical model of the recruitment process
then weights the sample to compensate for non-random recruitment patterns
(Heckathorn 1997).
4 Or others. In an example from my research, a jealous girlfriend alarmed by my calls
to a respondent called me after the interview. She understood my explanation, but
then shifted to asking for my help in resolving the question of whether he really
loved her or just wanted to marry her for papers. He had talked about this issue in
the interview, but I did not disclose the information.
5 I learned to ask ‘If God hears your prayers, where would you like to live in the fu-
ture?’ instead of the more straightforward and secular Belgian approach, in order to
avoid the inevitable polite lectures about how it is not man but God who determines
the future.
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6 Despite this setting, I never felt insecure or unsafe (Kenyon & Hawker 1999); re-
spondents were without exceptions caring and courteous.
Chapter 4
1 In Senegal, a low-level separatist war was going on between 1982 and 2004 when a
peace pact was signed. The rebellion was fuelled by complaints among Casamance’s
Diola population that they were being marginalised by the more numerous Wolof
people of northern Senegal in the allocation of national development resources. In
the Gambia, the elected government was toppled in a military coup in 1994; the
country returned to constitutional rule two years later when its military leader ran as
a civilian and won a presidential election. Despite attempts to unify Senegalese and
the Gambian territories in a political union in 1982, political disputes are rather com-
mon: a conflict over ferry tariffs led to a border blockade in 2005.
2 External debt is another major constraint to development in Africa. At $313 billion in
1994, it was equivalent to 234 per cent of Africa’s total export income and 83 per cent
of its GDP, representing the highest debt burden for any world region (UN 1996a).
As of 1994, average per capita spending for debt service was $43, compared with only
$35 on education and health. With nearly two-thirds of its export earnings devoted to
debt service, the region’s capacity to mobilise resources for socio-economic develop-
ment and employment is severely constrained (Adepoju 2004).
3 African destinations like Nigeria and Gabon became less of an option, due to their
political instability and economic crisis after the 1970s, and their ad hoc repatriation
actions of non-citizens to their countries of origin. Only Ivory Coast continued to at-
tract a lot of people, until civil war hit the country in 1999.
4 I wish to refer again to the letter of Guinean teenagers Yaguine Koita and Fode´
Tounkara, explaining how the lack of perspective made them risk their lives as stow-
aways in a plane (see annex C).
5 As professionals also look for economic and social mobility, the risks for brain drain
are well-known (Ajibewa & Akinrinade 2003). It is very difficult to decide the final
picture of the total cost-benefit analysis of migration for the country of origin, and
also the discussion about the ‘brain drain’ is very complex. It includes elements as di-
verse as the ‘return brain drain’ of for instance Indian IT-specialists, unemployment
of high-skilled people, new forms of colonialism, and the effect of remittances on the
level of dependency, economic development or new entrepreneurship (Asiedu 2005;
Diatta & Mbow 1999).
6 I was able to witness this throughout four visits to Senegal between 1992 and 2004.
7 What may play a role, according to me, is that the material and financial benefits of
migration are quickly visible and widespread. The emotional price, on the contrary,
in terms of loneliness and racism in the daily battle for subsistence are almost unim-
aginable for ambitious young men. Therefore, even if migrants tell true stories at
home, which is not always the case, it seems unlikely that this will discourage other
possible migrants to try their luck.
8 Artists, businesspersons, religious leaders and diplomats often travel for professional
reasons with an entourage; part of this group sometimes decides to stay behind in-
stead of travelling back. Sometimes a business develops: vacant places in these mis-
sions are on offer with the aim of migration. The Congolese singer Papa Wemba was
sentenced in France for smuggling hundreds of people under cover of his musical ac-
tivities over several years (De Standaard 16 November 2004).
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9 Within Catalonia, Senegambians are also concentrated in the province of Gerona
where they are often employed in agriculture (Mendoza 1998). Because of the urban
focus in this study, I leave this group on the side.
10 Other Southern European countries face the same challenge: in 2006, Italy saw
22,016 undocumented migrants arriving at the coasts of Sicily and Lampedusa,
predominantly coming from Morocco, Egypt, Eritrea and Tunisia (De Standaard 6
January 2006).
11 It is estimated by the police labour union (Sindicato Unificado de Policı´a) that arri-
vals in boats represent only 5 per cent of the total inflow; the majority, 55 per cent,
uses the airport of Barajas, Madrid, and 25 per cent more El Prat in Barcelona; an-
other 15 per cent uses the roads. Since the announcement of visa requirements for
Bolivians from 1 April 2007, the number of tourists from this country has increased
considerably, from 5,000 in May to 14,100 in November. They amounted to between
800 and 1,200 arrivals daily in Madrid in December 2006; in addition, between 200
and 300 Brazilians and about a hundred Paraguayans enter daily (El Paı´s 4 January
2007).
12 Effective is not always synonymous for correct: many migrants complain about
being dumped in desert areas bordering Algeria or the Western Sahara (El Paı´s
29 August 2006) or suffer abuse from policemen (Me´decins Sans Frontie`res 2005).
13 The traffickers and their networks have also been targeted by police services, with
more than 50 arrests in different West African countries.
14 Although the numbers diminished during the winter months, some 1,500 mi-
grants already made it to the Canary Islands in the first eleven weeks of 2007 (El
Paı´s 24 March 2007).
15 The most recent trend is that the African waters become transit routes for Asian mi-
grants travelling by boat to the Canary Islands. In March 2007, two boats with each
more than 300 migrants from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka were intercepted by
Frontex.
16 This is parallel to the East End concept of ‘ducking and diving’.
17 This name comes from the fact that many Senegalese are called Modou, abbreviation
of Mamadou, after the prophet Mohamed; the term used to refer to seasonal mi-
grants from the agricultural peanut basin, in search of additional income by informal
trade in big cities such as Dakar. In Senegal, it is now the generic name used for all
international migrants even if they do salaried work; inside the European migrant
community, it only refers to those who are involved in hawking.
18 Ecuadorian migrants also sell art from their country, Pakistanis sometimes sell flow-
ers and, recently, Chinese have been entering the hawking business.
19 Statistics released by the European Commission show that customs services of the
25 EU countries took possession of more than 75 million counterfeit goods in 2005,
which represents probably only 10 per cent of the total business; more than 25 per
cent was intercepted in Belgium (De Standaard 15 November 2006). The World Intel-
lectual Property Organization calculated that the global economy lost 77 billion euro
to counterfeit business (De Standaard 31 January 2007).
20 Sadly enough, this intention and practice tends to change personal relationships:
when somebody calls, it is probably to ask for more money, even close family mem-
bers hardly ask how the person is feeling, never sympathise with hardship or pro-
blems. Some migrants complain that their family would no longer welcome them to
live back at home because they run the risk of cutting their most effective survival
strategy. It is hard to distinguish friendship or love from sheer interest when on a re-
turn visit: everyone wants something from you, and girls in Senegal now want to
marry only migrants, under the motto of three Vs: venant, villa et voiture (‘return mi-
grant, villa and car’).
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21 The World Bank estimated that in 2005 almost 200 million migrants sent officially
232 billion dollar remittances home; an additional 80 billion was transferred through
informal channels. developing countries received 167 billion, more than double the
total amount of development aid. The World Bank estimates that 2.5 million people
escaped poverty through remittances.
22 Most quotes are therefore from men; I will stress it when a woman is being quoted.
23 This goes contrary to the fact that West Africans (particularly Nigerians and Senega-
lese) have the highest rate of second degrees in Britain and France. Maybe people
with higher education tend to go to countries where they hope to benefit immediately
from their education.
24 In Koranic schools pupils learn to recite Arabic, not to speak or write the language in
itself.
Chapter 5
1 It should be repeated that the informal labour market is by no means the territory of
undocumented migrants alone; on the contrary, moonlighting is in the first place an
activity of nationals and legal foreigners (European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions 2005). For local workers undeclared work is gener-
ally a strategy to generate extra income after hours or in an inactive period protected
by social rights; it seldom provides the basic income. Some documented migrants
may copy this behaviour or return to informal work during periods of unemploy-
ment.
2 Original name changed; the street name has become a common name to refer to this
particular house and community of hawkers.
3 A square known for its concentration of African bars and restaurants, in an area with
many African residents. At weekends, it functions also a meeting place for African
communities from Paris, Germany and the Netherlands.
4 Spanish labour unions do receive complaints from undocumented workers, and do
follow up their files as they do with other clients. However, many immigrants consid-
er how the consequences of a complaint could be worse for themselves: they may
lose their jobs.
5 A recent estimation pointed at about 75,000 undeclared workers in Belgium, result-
ing in a ‘shortage’ in social contributions of 6 per cent, 2 billion euro. In addition,
considerable numbers of unemployed or registered employed also moonlight (De
Standaard 3 October 2006).
6 In the first year, 10,000 new ‘proper’ jobs were created through this subsidised sys-
tem.
7 This can easily lead to problems with correspondence (e.g. about asylum applications
or regularisation) arriving in previous addresses.
8 In Antwerp, this process is further aggravated by the arrival of asylum seekers, who
at the start of their application are ‘allocated’ to a municipality according to a disper-
sal plan. However, some municipalities sometimes prefer to pay for accommodation
in big cities, rather than providing them with convenient accommodation on their
own territory (De Standaard 11 April 2006).
9 In both countries, there is a right to education for children from parents without pa-
pers. An undocumented child gets a diploma, is insured, and can do an internship,
but cannot be paid. Schools cannot report the children or the parents to the police or
the Department for Foreigners.
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Chapter 6
1 He misses a third distinct category, consisting of the group of undocumented mi-
grants who settle in and around existing ethnic communities. Examples are the un-
documented Moroccans that form part of the established Moroccan community that
Engbersen describes.
2 Again, the solution for this can be mainly found in community organisation, such as
tontines. In this system of rotating credit, people contribute a fixed amount a month;
the total is given each month to a certain person of the group, designated by luck or
negotiation, taking turns until the whole group has received. Group pressure forces a
certain discipline in saving, while the system allows people to make important invest-
ments (Lelart 1990; Soenen 2003).
3 There have been reports about public officials rejecting to register undocumented mi-
grants without any justification, municipalities making the procedure unreasonably
difficult, or property owners refusing to provide proof of address. A civil servant in
Barcelona explains how the city prioritises registration as part of their reception policy:
In Barcelona, we pushed a lot for empadronamiento to be an important tactic, like a
condition for normalisation. There are cities that don’t ask it so much, because
they may stay only very short, question of fear for intervention from the police...
some people have problems with this. In Barcelona, we support actively a policy of
empadronamiento, it is the only instrument against marginalisation, to use schools,
basic health services, social. It has been five years a strong pressure but we move
on with this accumulated stock.
4 Since the Aliens Act that went into effect on 22 December 2003, police are now able
to consult data of foreigners registered at municipalities through a special procedure.
Undocumented migrants may feel it is no longer safe to register at the municipality,
thinking that they run the risk of being apprehended by the police and possibly de-
ported (although the procedure has not yet been used).
5 Migrants travel overland without documents, leaving the identity card at home, in or-
der to hide their nationality and avoid immediate repatriation upon arrival. Once
settled, the family back home sends the documents, with which they can get a valid
passport in the Senegalese embassy.
6 One example was particularly absurd, as it concerned the work permit of a deceased
elderly Senegalese man being used by a youngster.
7 As opposed to the control of external borders.
8 Ulysses was the leading character in the ancient Greek epic poem the Odyssey, de-
scribing the ten years it took him to get home after the Trojan War. He is thus a sym-
bol of long travelling with terrible ordeals.
9 A considerable flow of spontaneous migration occurred parallel to official guest work-
er schemes, induced by intense recruitment campaigns, and normally solved by regu-
larising them after arrival even though not part of a bilateral scheme.
10 El Paı´s reports on the arrest of four people including one police officer, for selling
false documentation in exchange for money (up to 6,000 euro) or sexual services
(28 July 2006).
11 Belgium used the Schengen agreements to limit access to the territory. These agree-
ments authorise its members to remove the obligations of free movement of EU citi-
zens, by re-imposing the checks at the borders, for short periods during special cir-
cumstances.
12 Without much scientific basis, one can see some reasons for this: older women have
greater resources and can offer more security to a migrant; also, if single they are
often lonely and less likely to find a national as a partner. In a couple of cases, these
women got to know their African partner in the country of origin, an brought him
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over after marriage. Without excluding the possibility of real love, we have to recog-
nise the existence of sex tourism industry with the specific objective of picking up a
young virile black man; from the black male’s perspective, the possibility of this lead-
ing to a migration opportunity is attractive.
13 The results of the first four streets were as follows: in 342 families, together totalling
622 people, 43 per cent had Belgian nationality; 38 per cent were native Dutch speak-
ers, 21 per cent had a European language as their mother tongue and 41 per cent
spoke a language from outside Europe. Only 28 per cent had a job, 41 per cent lived
off social security, 3 per cent from the OCMW and 18 per cent has no official income.
Housing was inadequate in 49 per cent of cases, and 65 families resided in the city
illegally (De Standaard 16 May 2006).
Chapter 7
1 A way around this is to wait five years until receiving the permanent permit, which
automatically includes both.
2 Internal domestic work is not often done by black women: in that sector, there seems
to be a preference for Christian migrant women who speak the language already,
such as Latin Americans. In addition, African women often have their husband and
children in Spain, making residential work difficult; the Dominican women on the
contrary mostly come on their own.
3 In addition, two respondents are artists and have been so all their lives; they have
tried different statuses, as employee or self-employed, but always made a living from
their music (giving percussion classes, playing in bands, assisting other musicians,
organise concerts, give workshops). They seem relatively happy although many com-
ments can be made on provisions for artists. They build on previous experience and
talent; as this is not a route for many others, their trajectories will not be analysed in
detail here.
4 And this is only Catalonia; the many African workers in Almerı´a face temperatures
up to 50 degrees (Kaplan 2001).
5 For residents from most countries; for some Latin American countries, it is only
three years.
6 There is also a cultural complication in the process of family reunion: the European
lawmaker’s nuclear conception of a ‘family’ does not coincide with the African struc-
ture of polygamy and extended families (Timera 1997). Polygamy is prohibited in
Europe, thus there is every incentive to hide polygamous relationships. Informally
this practice can continue in transnational space: the husband can live in Europe
while all the wives are in Africa; he can bring only one to Europe, or they can take
turns; and he might marry several in Europe, without registering the marriage offi-
cially. For the children, this may be solved with complicated partial reunification,
with one or some children staying in Africa in order to keep the link with the rest of
the family; they may join the migrants later, legally or illegally. In any case, the social
protection of the women and children can be in danger (Barou 2001; Bryceson &
Vuorela 2002; Salzbrunn 2002; Timera 2002).
7 This sadly includes practices of genital excision, dowry, and divorce by repudiation
(Scales-Trent 1990). European criminal laws forbid clitoridectomy and infibulation,
making mothers hesitant to have daughters excised in Europe. They may simply
return to their home country for a short visit to have the excision performed there,
where it is legal; however, on their return they can be punished.
8 A more or less representative spending pattern is as follows: Segui works as a specia-
lised worker in construction, earning between 1,200 and 1,300 euro per month. He
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pays the bank 700 euro per month for the apartment, 200 euro for the car. Renting
out two rooms, he makes 200 euro a month. That leaves him 500 to 600 euro a
month for expenses remittances. If he would have his wife and child in Spain, the
extra on the budget would soon melt down.
9 My research in Antwerp and Barcelona deals with, by definition, only people who have
yet to return, making it impossible to estimate the number of those who did return.
10 This probably happens through a variety of mechanisms. A first element is the mode
of transport during the migration trip, based on disposable income: the migrants
who travel over land and sea tend to be poorer, of rural origin, end up in southern
Europe. The ones who have the connections and money to obtain a visum and air-
plane ticket can travel to anywhere in Europe. Second, this trend is reinforced by
chain-migration: most respondents chose their destination based on links to an
established community from their region of origin. Through this filter of networks,
Bubacar, from Mandinka and rural origin but travelling by plane to Germany, ended
up in Spain because of recommendations inside his ethnic community.
11 This model is reproduced inside the Spanish case; the people living in the city centre
correspond more with the Belgian image, while those in the satellite towns, to the
community model.
12 This difference is also found by Romaniszyn in the Polish community, but more as
a characteristic of individuals without the ethnic link as I found in my research
(Romaniszyn 2000).
13 As illustrated by Musa: ‘I don’t want to stay in Spain. Life here is not worth living,
people are not friendly, money is not enough to live a life. Migration is not worth the
trouble. I thought I would find a better life, but on the contrary… . This is not a life.
This does not make sense. What does it rhyme to? Work, sleep, eat. And sometimes
problems. There is no future, no perspectives, no security.’ (Musa, 32, in Barcelona
since 2003, undocumented, textile factory).
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Abstract
This book examines two major social changes experienced by European
cities in the last two decades: post-industrial economic restructuring
and new immigration flows. The link between both has been exten-
sively discussed throughout a variety of theoretical approaches and in
numerous descriptive contributions. Adding to those studies, this re-
search focuses on three elements of migratory experience that have
been relatively neglected thus far: a dynamic view of changes over time,
the influence of national welfare and legislation frameworks, and the
importance of support mechanisms outside the labour market. The
material underpinning the arguments is the qualitative life-course ana-
lysis of 81 in-depth interviews with Senegambian migrants living in
Antwerp and Barcelona.
First, it is shown how a more dynamic approach on the position of
newly arrived migrants in receiving economies improves the static per-
spective common to most theories. I describe how respondents may
move from purely survival stages, over phases of looking for a regulari-
sation of their legal status, to a more stable context in which they can
work to improve their socio-economic situation. Second, the life course
of these migrants is influenced by substantial differences between An-
twerp and Barcelona in terms of labour markets, welfare and immigra-
tion policies. Despite the undeniable influences of globalisation, the lo-
cal institutional framework and its implementation are crucial. In addi-
tion, immigrants interact with these rules, developing strategies to
circumvent the law, limit the consequences of breaking it, or creatively
trying to match conditions. Third, it is argued that a purely economic
and individual approach cannot grasp the complexity, precariousness,
and volatility typical of contemporary migratory experiences. In analys-
ing their life courses, attention is paid to the changing roles of commu-
nity, social support systems, the legal context, the relationship with
home, and the integration schemes. An in-depth insight is given into
the lives of migrants, the limits, rights and possibilities for getting by
in two different European urban settings.
Extracto
Este libro examina dos grandes cambios sociales experimentados por
las ciudades europeas en las u´ltimas dos de´cadas: la reestructuracio´n
econo´mica post-industrial y las nuevas corrientes de inmigracio´n. El
vı´nculo entre ambos procesos ha sido ampliamente debatido desde una
gran variedad de enfoques teo´ricos y disciplinares. Agregando a estos
estudios, la presente investigacio´n se centra en tres elementos de la ex-
periencia migratoria que han sido relativamente descuidados hasta la
fecha: una visio´n dina´mica de los cambios en el tiempo, la influencia
del bienestar nacional y los marcos legislacio´n, ası´ como la importancia
de los mecanismos de apoyo externos al mercado de trabajo. El materi-
al que sustentan los argumentos aquı´ planteados es de naturaleza cua-
litativa basado en el estudio de trayestorias vitales de inmigrantes sene-
gambianos entrevistados residentes en Amberes y Barcelona.
En primer lugar, se muestra co´mo un enfoque ma´s dina´mico acerca
de la posicio´n de los inmigrantes recie´n llegados en las economı´as re-
ceptoras mejora las perspectivas esta´ticas comunes a la mayorı´a de los
ana´lisis teorı´cos. Se describe co´mo los informantes pueden moverse
desde etapas de pura supervivencia, pasando por fases de buu´squeda
de una regularizacio´n de su situacio´n legal, hasta un contexto ma´s es-
table en el que puedan trabajar para mejorar su situacio´n socioecono´-
mica. En segundo lugar, las trayectorias de curso de vida de estos inmi-
grantes se ven influidas por las diferencias sustanciales entre Amberes
y Barcelona en te´rminos de sus mercados de trabajo, las polı´ticas de bi-
enestar y de inmigracio´n. A pesar de los innegables influencias de la
globalizacio´n, el marco institucional local y su aplicacio´n pra´ctica resul-
ta crucial. Adema´s, los inmigrantes interactuar con estas normas desar-
rollando estrategias para circunvalar la legislacio´n, limitando las conse-
cuencias de infringir dicha normativa, o tratando de responder a las re-
stricciones de forma creativa . En tercer lugar, se argumenta que un
enfoque puramente econo´mico e individualista no puede captar la
complejidad, precariedad e inestabilidad tı´pica de la experiencia migra-
toria contempora´nea. Al analizar las trayectorias de curso de vida se
presta atencio´n a la evolucio´n de las funciones de la comunidad, los
sistemas de apoyo social, el contexto jurı´dico, la relacio´n con el hogar, y
los programas de integracio´n. En este trabajo se presenta un conoci-
miento en profundidad acerca de las condiciones de vida de los mi-
grantes, los lı´mites, derechos y posibilidades de adaptarte a dos contex-
tos urbanos europeos diferentes.
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Samenvatting
Dit boek onderzoekt twee belangrijke sociale veranderingen die
Europese over de laatste twee decennia getekend hebben: post-
industrie¨le economische herstructurering en nieuwe migrantenstro-
men. De link tussen beide is uitgebreid bediscussieerd in een reeks
theoretische benaderingen en in talrijke beschrijvende bijdragen. In de
lijn hiervan focust dit onderzoek op drie elementen van de migratie-
ervaring die tot dusver relatief weinig aandacht gekregen hebben: een
dynamisch zicht op veranderingen doorheen de tijd, de invloed van na-
tionale welvaartsstaat- en wettelijke kaders, en het belang van hulpme-
chanismes buiten de arbeidsmarkt. Het empirisch materiaal dat de ar-
gumenten onderbouwt is de kwalitatieve levensloopanalyse van 81 diep-
teinterviews met Senegambiaanse migranten die in Antwerpen en
Barcelona wonen.
In de eerste plaats wordt aangetoond hoe een meer dynamische be-
nadering van de positie van nieuw aangekomen migranten in de ont-
vangende economiee¨n een meerwaarde biedt tegenover het meer sta-
tische perspectief van de meeste theoriee¨n. Ik beschrijf hoe responden-
ten kunnen evolueren van de loutere overlevingsfase, over een periode
van zoeken naar regularisatie van hun legale status, tot een stabielere
context waarin ze kunnen werken aan het verbeteren van hun sociaal-
economische situatie. Ten twee wordt de levensloop van deze migran-
ten beı¨nvloed door substantie¨le verschillen tussen Antwerpen en
Barcelona in arbeidsmarkt, sociaal- en migratiebeleid. Ondanks de on-
miskenbare invloed van globalisering, blijft het lokale institutionele
kader en de implementatie hiervan cruciaal. Bovendien interageren mi-
granten met deze regels, ontwikkelen ze strategiee¨n om de wet te om-
zeilen, de gevolgen van een inbreuk te beperken, of creatief om te gaan
met de omstandigheden. In een derde punt wordt geargumenteerd dat
een louter economische en individuele benadering niet de complexiteit,
kwetsbaarheid en vluchtigheid kan vatten die typisch zijn voor heden-
daagse migratie-ervaringen. Bij de analyse van hun levensloop kan aan-
dacht besteed worden aan de veranderende rol van de gemeenschap,
systemen van sociale hulp, de wettelijke context, de relatie met het
thuisland, en het integratiebeleid. Er wordt een diepte-inzicht gegeven
in de levens van deze migranten, de grenzen, rechten en mogelijkhe-
den om rond te komen in twee verschillende Europese stedelijke
contexten.
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